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This thesis focuses on the application of Identity Management (IDM) technologies1 for the 
assessment of risks within the context of Dutch citizen-government relations. The technologies 
analysed range from the development of risk evaluation systems in order to profile citizens against 
a variety of risks and to the implementation of citizen identification technologies.  
Digital identity management deals with the digitization, registration, processing and 
classification of personal information. These practices are going through a rapid evolution which 
involves a diversity of new information and communication (ICT) systems, tools and methods in 
citizen-government relations (e.g.: storage devices, databases, profiling methods, data-collection 
practices and data-mining techniques). IDM technologies are part of systems which serve to 
facilitate citizen-government relations. This is exemplified by the growing number of e-
governmental services introduced to foster efficiency in bureaucratic interactions, as well as the 
introduction of several technology-intensive travel documents and entry-exit systems at borders. 
However, the processes for the management of these data are not always transparent, and they create 
an obscure net of digital and non-digital links in which personal data sets, or “digital personas” can 
emerge, grow, transform and become impossible to erase. IDM technologies are often connected to 
larger information management systems2. The processes in which these systems are involved enable 
and contribute to an advanced and dynamic differentiation (e.g.: registration of individual 
characteristics) amongst citizens in daily practice through an increased reliance on collecting 
personal data within contexts of healthcare, public safety, national or international security, 
immigration and other spheres of public-private interactions.  
Although the growth in collecting personal data allows for more individualized treatment 
of citizens, this collection also fosters the use of this data for collective interests. Increasingly the 
collective interest of security has begun to supersede other concerns and has become a primary 
objective in the development of new IDM technologies. Given the prominence of security interests 
and the fast development of digitalized prevention methods in various public domains, this thesis 
aims to provide a critical analysis of the consequences of using such systems in the day-to-day lives 
of citizens in general, and two particularly vulnerable groups in particular: children and migrants.  
Each of these groups can be regarded being in a more vulnerable position than regular citizens. 
Therefore reflecting upon their position is useful in order to draw a better picture of the digitally 
mediated developments influencing democratic citizen rights and citizenship in general. These two 
groups seem, furthermore interesting for analysis because in their case forms of collective security 
interests, such as preventing child abuse and anti-social behaviour towards children, and identity 
fraud, illegal entry and related crimes concerning migrants appear difficult to balance with other 
interests, such as the protection of personal data, private life and non-discrimination. As the Dutch 
                                                        
1 Identity management technologies serve to establish ‘identities’ (defined as personal data sets). This includes the 
identities of persons subject to the system, in this case children and migrants, as well as those professionals (e.g.: 
technicians, doctors, security agents, border guards, etc.) who interact with this system on a regular basis. These 
systems serve to both determine identification and allow for differing levels of access control in the process.  
2 Clark, R. ‘Human identification in information systems: management challenges and public policy issues’ 




Data Protection Authority stressed in one of its recent reports, for instance, beyond the complexity 
of digital networks the scant knowledge of data protection of certain professionals dealing with 
youth care at Dutch municipalities can also contribute to detrimental implications on children’s and 
families’ lives3. 
Theoretical and empirical resources  
 
The intensive deployment of IDM technologies and the exponential growth in the capacity 
of databases indicates a gradual shift in administrative identification procedures even across borders 
within the EU (see for instance, “STORK 2.0 Project” 20154). Registering information is no longer 
a problem as is also evident in discussions with respect to Big or Open Data. A trend is there, where 
government agencies increasingly tend to trust and rely on IDM technologies that are able to process 
larger amounts of data, which is believed to deliver higher quality assessments, including 
preventative evaluations. A report by the Dutch Scientific Advisory Council of the Government 
describes this eagerness for more data as a shift from ‘e-government’ towards information-led, or 
‘I-government’ practices5. Yet, how to sort data (and according to what parameters) brings a whole 
new dimension of selective practices regarding people’s lives, and the legal boundaries of such 
data-sorting practices need continuous evaluation. The necessity of such evaluation has also been 
underlined by a recent comparative legal analysis on the use of Big Data by the Dutch Scientific 
Advisory Council of the (Dutch) Government6. 
 The new European data protection regime will give clear new requirements to the sorting 
out of data. The enforcement of such principles as ‘privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default’ and 
new rules prescribing ‘data protection impact assessment,’ ‘data breach notification,’ ‘data 
portability’ or the new ‘right to be forgotten’ provide a great addition of regulative tools in order to 
prevent the misuse and harmful effects of digital technologies on citizens’ lives. The practical, daily 
enforcement of these principles and legal prescriptions presents quite some challenges, however. 
Scholars have already raised criticisms, even before the introduction of the new European General 
Data Protection Regulation. For instance, Van Dijk, Gellert and Rommetveit argue that the form in 
which data protection impact assessments can be mandatorily issued by the data controller 
authorities raises concerns because ‘merging risks and rights in the proposed fashion could change 
their meanings into something hardly predictable.’7 This is especially troublesome within the context 
of risk assessment practices on children and migrants, because of the ambiguity of what a risk can 
constitute in itself. Given the controversial ways in which digitalized correlations are designed to 
produce a certain risk profile on child or a migrant, to predict what rights of these persons could be 
jeopardized by the very design and implementation of such risk forecasting technologies raises further 
controversies and unfortunately do not strengthen the legal position of these groups. 
                                                        
3 ‘Gemeenten onzorgvuldig met privégegevens burgers’ NOS.nl (Den Haag 19, April 2016). Retrieved on June 
6th, 2016 from <http://nos.nl/artikel/2100176-gemeenten-onzorgvuldig-met-privegegevens-burgers.html> 
4 STORK 2.0., EU project of the 7th EU Framework Programme, Project web-site consulted on 22nd May 2014 
from <https://www.eid-stork2.eu/> 
5 Prins, C., Broeders, D., Griffioen, H., Keizer, A.-G. & Keymolen, E. ‘iGovernment Synthesis’ 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid, Den Haag (WRR, 2011) 
6 Van Der Sloot, B. & Van Schendel, S. ‘International and comparative legal study on Big Data’ 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbelied, Den Haag (WRR, 2016) 
7 Van Dijk, N., Gellert, R., & Rommetveit, K. ‘A Risk to a Right? Beyond Data Protection Risk Assessments’. 
(2016) 32(2) Computer Law & Security Review, 31–50.  
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Other rights introduced by the new data protection regulation could however be helpful to 
strengthen their position when they are exposed to scrutiny by such preventative systems. The new ‘right 
to be forgotten’ could become a good example for this. Yet, this right also raised questions especially in 
terms of how to invoke such a right in practice and what legal and technological settings would serve as 
best pre-conditions for such a right. For instance, Mayer-Schonberger in his encompassing and thought-
provoking analysis sees the practical feasibility of the right to be forgotten by means of furnishing 
personal data with ‘expiration dates’8. Bartolini and Siry outline a view of the practical enforcement of 
a right to be forgotten by exploring notions of consent withdrawal9. In general, Koops remains sceptical 
about the implementation of this right in practice. Amongst other things he points out that, on the one 
hand, when deciding who to turn to with a request for data erasure ‘much will depend on the concrete 
distribution of responsibilities between provider and users defined in the terms and conditions.’ On the 
other hand, he also stresses that the “multiplying character of Internet data” will significantly 
complicate the erasure of data10. While bearing in mind these criticisms, the implementation of such a 
right in certain risk profiling cases of children, for instance, could be a very helpful legal remedy in 
getting rid of the potentially stigmatizing effects of a long-lasting risk profile. The security related to 
how such risk profile data should be stored also remains a crucial issue for this thesis. 
Therefore, the potential of the new ‘data breach notification’ principle will also be useful to 
assess. Notwithstanding data protection De Hert and Papakonstantinou appreciate the principle of 
‘data breach notification’ introduced by the new data protection regulation, they remain sceptical 
as to how such notifications shall be best effectuated in practice11. Still a major benefit of this 
principle is that data protection authorities will earn unprecedented powers to make companies 
improve the personal data security and privacy of their clients by rendering this principle an 
additional obligation for data controllers. Yet, the effectiveness of these powers will still have to be 
proved in practice. Bisogni studies the effectiveness of data breach notification laws in general, and 
based on his model he concludes that the “implementation of more severe DBNL has higher impacts on 
decreasing the number of notified breaches, but context changes and actors behaviour drive this impact 
to lose its significance, in absence of any countermeasure such as ad hoc law amendments or 
revision.”12  
In opposition to the earlier, the new prescriptions related to profiling in the GDPR will be 
highly beneficial, for instance to evaluate the preventative risk assessment practices of Dutch 
authorities on children. The prescription related to profiling (Art. 20) is a widely applauded 
achievement of the GDPR. The new regulation specifies that any measure based uniquely on 
automated data processing that has legal effects on ‘natural persons’ would count as ‘profiling.’ Yet, a 
set of scholars highlight different aspects of non-transparency around these practices. Koops points 
out, for instance, that putting this new principle into practice will create significant challenges as a 
consequence of “increasingly automated operations on data—think of cloud computing and profiling—
                                                        
8 Mayer-Schonberger, V. Delete: the Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age. Princeton (US), Woodstock(UK), 
(Princeton University Press 2009) 
9 Bartolini, C., & Siry, L. ‘The right to be forgotten in the light of the consent of the data subject’ (2016) 32(2) 
Computer Law & Security Review, 218–237.  
10 Koops, B. ‘Forgetting footprints, shunning shadows. A critical analysis of the “right to be forgotten” in big 
data practice’ (2011) 3(8) Scripted, 229-256. Retrieved on March 12th 2013 from <http://script-ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/koops.pdf> 
11 De Hert, P., & Papakonstantinou, V. ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: 
A sound system for the protection of individuals’ (2012) 28(2) Computer Law & Security Review, 130–142.  
12 Bisogni, F. Evaluating Data Breach Notification Laws - What Do the Numbers Tell Us? (2013) In TPRC 41: 
The 41st Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (pp. 1–21). Retrieved on 
February 22nd 2014 from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236144> 
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that data controllers themselves do not fully understand or know the details of. How can one effectively 
exercise the right to being informed, the right to access, to right to correction[…]?”13. Furthermore, 
Ferraris, Bosco and D’Angelo make the criticism that even this regulative novelty with respect to 
profiling could not provide effective remedy with respect to the negative implications of profiling on 
fundamental rights and democratic principles, such as certain forms of liberty, because profiling 
processes do not routinely “allow the citizens to challenge the reasoning behind the process”14. In 
addition to that, Moerel and Prins criticize the position of companies who through the massive use of 
Big Data analytics, “without knowing the reasons behind a systematically identified correlation, will 
treat the chances presented by these correlations as facts” to act upon or deal with15. These insights are 
particularly useful for the risk assessments practices on children and migrants, because such instances 
of non-transparency behind risk profiling decisions can be especially harmful regarding these groups. 
Certain Dutch authorities when carrying out preventative profiling on children and migrants 
fall within the domains of criminal justice and law enforcement, and therefore their risk assessment 
practices would be considered legitimate. Given these practices for the analysis in this thesis I will 
also rely on certain prescriptions of the new Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive. 
Concerning this new directive De Hert and Papakonstantinou appreciate its ‘data-centric approach’ 
instead of a ‘data-user centric approach’ to data protection, because during law enforcement data 
processing the purpose of processing is leading much more than the focus on the user or controller 
of data. This is significantly different compared to regular data processing. For instance, criminal 
justice authorities argue that they thrive on ‘hearsay’ and need to use and retain data for purposes 
earlier unknown, including profiling. Furthermore, they also stress that suspected criminals should 
not be informed of being in a police database, neither should they get access to it16. The effect of 
this new Directive on fundamental rights still has to be tested. Until then, the perceptions of scholars 
in surveillance studies and Science and Technology Studies concerning the controversies around 
digital technology are useful to inform data protection and human rights centred analysis in this 
thesis and draw more informed conclusions. In the following paragraphs I have gathered together a 
handful of useful concepts from surveillance studies and STS to show this. 
The architecture of risk profiling systems, especially due to the increasingly obscure 
network of digital channels (especially in the world of Big Data) evokes a ‘panoptic-like effect’ as 
these can both be seen to construct and foster an impression and experience of constantly being 
under surveillance17. The continuous and complex observations that these systems carry out, reveal 
the characteristics of what David Lyon calls the “surveillance society,” in which surveillance has 
become part of our everyday life18. It is surveillance based on an “algorithmic attentiveness”19, one 
                                                        
13 Koops, B. ‘The trouble with European data protection law’ (2014) 4(4) International Data Privacy Law, 250–
261.  
14 Ferraris, V., Bosco, F. & D’Angelo, E. ‘The impact of profiling on fundamental rights.’ Working Paper 3 of 
the ‘Protecting citizens’ rights, fighting illict profiling’ project. (2013) Retrieved on February 14th 2015 from 
<http://www.unicri.it/special_topics/citizen_profiling/PROFILINGproject_WS1_Fundamental_1110.pdf> 
15Moerel, L., & Prins, C. Privacy voor de Homo Digitalis: Proeve van een nieuw toetsingskader voor 
gegevensbescherming in het licht van big data en Internet of Things In Homo Digitalis, Den Haag (Nederlandse 
Juristen Vereniging, 2016) 
16 De Hert, P., & Papakonstantinu, V. (2012). ‘The Police and Criminal Justice Directive Comments and 
Analysis’ (2012) 22(6) Computer and Law Magazine, 1-5. Retrieved on January 12th 2013 from 
<http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Dehert/411.pdf> 
17 Foucault, M. (translated by Alain Sheridan). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (New York: 
Vintage 1977). First published in French as Surveiller et punir, (Gallimard, Paris, 1975) 
18 Lyon, D. (2001). Surveillance society. Monitoring everyday life. Buckingham(UK), Philadelphia(US), Open 
University Press 
19 Amoore, L. ‘Algorithmic war: everyday geographies of the war on terror’ (2009) 41(1) Antipode: Journal of 
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that has certain features. First, it has an overall capacity to feed personal information into algorithms 
that make certain data significant in relation to ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ or risky characteristics. 
Secondly, the ability to flag these data as ‘abnormal’ or ‘risky’ bears potentially serious 
consequences for the persons under scrutiny. Thirdly, these systems provide a relatively permanent 
and continual form of data capture. This facilitates the detailed and complex surveillance of citizens 
in which certain information gains importance for governmental agencies. This “algorithmic 
attentiveness” is also an evident technique within Dutch policy areas of healthcare, public safety, 
border control and immigration. 
This attentiveness, for instance during risk profiling can also be regarded as an aspect of 
security20 that is apparent in youth healthcare21 and social work practices. The way certain problems 
are defined within these fields resonates equally with the evolving perceptions about who to include 
and exclude. Child abuse cases are most illustrative of such problems, especially since there seems 
to be no consensus about what constitutes ‘child abuse’ in itself. Ian Hacking refers to perceptions 
about child abusers and child abuse as follows: “Anyone who feels differently is already something 
of a monster. We are so sure of these moral truths that we seldom pause to wonder what child abuse 
is.”22. Such questions raise further questions about what certain public safety or security problems 
are, how are they framed, to what legal rules and principles can they be linked to and what legal 
remedies provide appropriate assistance to implement and use digital systems that are aimed at 
preventing such problems. 
In the specific case of youth healthcare practice, for instance, as Van de Luitgaarden23 
suggest that the framing of identities already happens amongst professionals, children and parents 
on a case-by-case basis through interactions. Yet, such interactions are increasingly enhanced by 
the new information systems and IDM technologies that youth care professionals work with. When 
such a technology-enabled practice is carried out with a preventive stance it may “harm a good 
diagnosis”24, for example uncertainties about a risk in relation to the child may reinforce 
unnecessary precautions and could even have harmful effects on the child. The extent to which such 
judgments may occur and what legal and socio-technical implications of preventative practices are 
apparent on children’s families’ lives and on the work of professionals constitute core part of the 
analysis in this thesis.  
A set of such implications can be described as unfair modes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Because IDM technologies for risk assessment in their complex relationships to authorities, laws, 
policies, professionals, children and migrants are ‘more than neutral’25 through their use they enact 
and reinforce practices of inclusion and exclusion. These technologies both fulfil political goals in 
offering more efficient and smoother ways for the selection and ‘management’ of people, and they 
also transform citizen-government relations through their operation. For instance, IDM 
technologies often draw new – or accentuate already existing – differences between citizens, 
                                                        
Radical Geography, 49–69. 
20 Boyle, P., & Haggerty, K. ‘Spectacular security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex’ (2009) 3 
International Political Sociology, 257–274. 
21 Horstman, K. Inaugurial speach: Dikke kinderen, uitgebluste werknemers en vreemde virussen. Filosofie van 
de publieke gezondheidszorg in de 21e eeuw. (2010, Maastricht University), Maastricht 
22 Hacking, I. ‘The Making and Molding of Child Abuse’ (1991) 17(2) Critical Inquiry, 253–288. 
23 Van de Luitgaarden, G. Knowledge and knowing in child protection practice. PhD thesis, (2011, University of 
Salford), Salford (UK) 
24 Monasso, T. ‘Electronic Exchange of Signals on Youth at Risk: A value perspective’ in Van der Hof, S. & 
Groothuis, M. (Eds.) Innovating Government (41–57). Den Haag (2011 Asser Press) 
25 Feenberg, A. Critical Theory of Technology. Oxford (UK) (1991, Oxford University Press) 
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differences that have the potential to be highly discriminatory26. Bowker and Star explained that 
technology-mediated selective processes enact certain types of discriminations by the very fact how 
categories have been designed and drawn together for selection processes. Such discriminations are 
also exemplified through the preventative use of IDM technologies. This thesis notes that methods 
of and for sorting citizens have been increasingly ‘delegated’27 to automated systems and practices 
performed by IDM technologies. The delegation of sorting methods to IDM technologies is seen to 
represent a ‘best solution’ for a diversity of complex socio-political, cultural and economic 
problems related to citizens. These ‘solutions’ are predicated on such judgments that mutually 
assign certain selection criteria of citizens to IDM technologies, and information management 
systems to which these technologies are often connected. In practice, the use of IDM technologies 
reinforces these criteria, and thereupon also automates and speeds up judgments.  
Government agencies use personal data as an essential resource to speed up judgments and 
pinpoint the need for forms of intervention, or what Amoore describes as “actionable 
intelligence”28. This “actionable intelligence” can be regarded as a useful concept for the analysis 
in this thesis, as such intelligence is a driving force in identifying those citizens - children or 
migrants - who are considered ‘at risk’ and ‘as a risk.’ While this “actionable intelligence” is 
constructed within technology-intensive relationships, it is relevant to consider that both technology 
and the relationships in which it is embedded can constrain behaviour, in fact as Akrich refers to 
technology: “the composition of a technical object constrains actants in the way they relate both to 
the object and to one another”29. Some of the undesired effects of these constraints become apparent 
in practice, when for instance data sets between databases are processed. The transfer of biometric 
data among databases shows such effects as for instance falsely accused persons based on a 
fingerprint match. 12 years after the infamous case of Brandon Mayfield questions still arise as to 
how his fingerprint could have been mistaken by fingerprints of a terrorist30. Although the 
“informatization of the body” through these biometric technologies has already provoked much 
political, ethical, societal debate31. The fact that the combination of these various biometric 
technologies still form the basis of ‘multimodal’ screening processes and that these ‘multimodal’ 
systems are being increasingly taken up by both public and private agencies suggests that 
controversies may only intensify (especially in the era of Big Data). The broad scale use of 
biometric features as identification and identity verification material - also used within the context 
of immigration and border control practices on migrants - are perhaps best exemplified by digital 
identification cards 32. In this case, a great deal of trust is “inscribed” into these cards 33 since they 
                                                        
26 Bowker, G. C., & Leigh Star, S. Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. Cambridge (US) 
London (UK): (1999, MIT Press) 
27 Latour, B. ‘Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World’ in M. Knorr-Certina, K. D. & Mulkay (Eds.) 
Science observed: perspectives on the social study of science (pp. 141–171). London, Beverly Hills, New Delhi 
(1983, SAGE publications) 
28 Amoore, L. ’Lines of sight: on visualization of unknown futures’ (2009) 13(1) Citizenship Studies, 17–30 
29 Akrich, M. (1992). ‘The De-scription of Technical Objects’ in W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.) Shaping Technology 
/ Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (pp. 205–224). Cambridge, MA (MIT Press, 1992) 
30 Office of the Inspector General. ‘A review of the FBI’s handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case’, Washington 
D.C., (US Department of Justice, 2006) Retrieved on 16th March 2014 from 
<https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/final.pdf> 
31 Van der Ploeg, I. ‘The Politics of Biometric Identification Normative aspects of automated social 
categorization.’ Biometric Technology & Ethics, BITE Policy papers No. 2., Rotterdam (Rotterdam Institute for 
Healthcare Management & Policy, 2005) 
32 Lyon, D. Identifying Citizens: ID cards as Surveillance. Cambridge (UK); Malden (US) (Polity Press, 2009). 
33 Latour, B. ‘Technology is society made durable’ in J. Law (Ed.), A Sociology of Monsters; Essays on Power, 
Technology and Domination (pp. 103–131). London, New York (Routledge, 1991) 
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contain valuable personal data for verification and are difficult to counterfeit34. Yet when these 
artefacts are evaluated closely, there is a significant weakness in relation to their establishment and 
operation. A biometric identification card requires ‘breeder documents’ – such as a birth certificate 
– in order to authenticate and verify the applicant’s data before it is issued. As such, the entitlement 
of a particular person to receive one of these ‘technologically enhanced’ cards relies on these less 
verifiable, less secure source documents35. Identification cards and passports36 as technologically 
enhanced tools are fundamentally undermined by being based on these weak stemming documents. 
As the analysis will demonstrate in the chapters of this thesis the latter scientific thought has been 
found very useful to assess the empirical material with respect to migrants and by this to inform 
legal analysis and answer parts of the research question.   
The above selected legal and surveillance studies and STS-based conceptions are far from 
constituting an exhaustive list. In this introduction they only served to pinpoint a couple of crucial 
directions where the analysis of this thesis should and will take the reader during the assessment of 
the broader legal and socio-technical implications of risk assessment technologies on children’s and 
migrants’ lives. Examples of false accusations37 have already shown that digitalized prevention 
performed in practices of youth care, law enforcement and border control can present huge 
challenges for those exposed to these practices. Consequently, these challenges will put the current 
and the newly drafted data protection framework as well as the existing human rights tools and to 
some extent our democratic principles to the test. Therefore, it is essential to analyse how 
preventative measures are enforced through the use of IDM technologies in relation to such groups 
as children and migrants that can be viewed as being at the ‘peripheries of (democratic) citizenship’. 
To scrutinize the legal and societal implications of the use of such technologies on such fundamental 
rights as privacy, non-discrimination and, for instance, the best interests of the child or such 
principles as liberty and equality when enacted in practice are key for a democratic society. 
 
IDM systems in two domains 
 
“Near the beginning of Les Misérables, the main character, Jean Valjean, is released from 
prison and offered temporary shelter by the Bishop of Digne. However, Valjean’s desperate 
situation, one that includes lack of food and resources, motivates him to steal silver from the 
Bishop’s home. When the local authorities catch Valjean, something unexpected happens. The 
Bishop goes above and beyond what most human beings would do. He covers for Valjean and 
does not allow him to be taken to jail [by Javert, the desperate police officer who wants to catch 
him]. Valjean is deeply moved by the Bishop’s action on his behalf. He does not take this 
moment for granted and ‘pays it forward’ throughout his life, aligning his own choices with 
                                                        
34 Dodge, M., & Kitchin, R. Codes of Life: Identification Codes and the Machine-Readable World; London 
(CASA, 2004) 1-47. Retrieved on November 11th 2011 from 
<http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/working_papers/paper82.pdf> 
35 Salter, M. The rights of passage: passports in international relations. Colorado (US), London (UK): (Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, 2003) 
36 Torpey, J. The invention of the passport: Surveillance and Citizenship. Cambridge, New York (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 
37 Munro, E. The Munro review of child protection Part one: A system analysis. London (Department for 




what was modelled for him in that fortunate moment […] The Bishop comes to Valjean’s rescue 
based on what seems fair and humane to him.”38 
 
Jean Valjean, the classic character created by Victor Hugo, can be regarded as a perfect example of 
an ‘outcast’ citizen, who wants to return to society - a man with a difficult childhood and a 
‘suspected’ newcomer to a city after spending time in jail. His past as a convict becomes common 
knowledge – even without digital technologies - to those who meet him. The continuous projection 
of his negative past on him, first of all by the police officer Javert, becomes almost a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’; until he meets someone who approaches him differently and starts to look for the good 
in him by trusting him as much as one human can trust another. At the same time, the relationship 
between Valjean and Javert, who continuously follows Valjean so that he can pre-emptively put 
him in jail because of his ‘risky’ past, to differing degrees depicts characteristics that can be thought 
similar to the relationship between children and the current Dutch youth care, youth healthcare and 
criminal justice authorities, and to the relationship between migrants and Dutch border control, 
criminal justice and immigration authorities. For it is claimed that the kind of trust that can be 
granted by someone to a child or a migrant becomes increasingly embedded in and predicated upon 
the relationships to digital technologies. The digitally mediated relations between children and 
government authorities and migrants and government authorities provide reflections on the 
evolution of digitalized citizen-government relations in general. 
This thesis will show that the risk-oriented perspective that professionals are required to 
take while digitally evaluating a child or a migrant against previously defined risks is something 
that complicates the relationship between government officials and children, and government 
officials and migrants. Furthermore the fact the youth care related data are not always properly 
protected amongst others due to the lack of data protection knowledge of professionals only adds 
to the complexities39. These digitalized practices, although installed to serve the noble purpose of 
preventing these very problems from happening, can also be regarded as contributing to undermine 
the trust in migrants, children and their families. Moreover, how these digitalized practices both 
from the perspective of migrants and children perform instances of inclusion and exclusion within 
these groups fairly needs analysis.  
Against such a background, the legal analysis will explore whether the fine line between 
preventative digital profiling and unintended, yet digitally mediated prejudice can still be separated 
out in citizen-government relations by focusing on these two groups. The thesis will assess from a 
legal perspective the interplay between the good intentions behind preventative practices, the often 
risk-oriented glass of professional authorities and both the digitally designed (e.g.: risk categories 
to prevent risks) and the in-practice emerging implications of technology use and how each of these 
components influence the life chances of such ‘in-between’ citizens as children and migrants and 
indirectly society as a whole.  
 
                                                        
38 Retrieved on January 12, 2016 from 
http://www.centertheatregroup.org/uploadedfiles/plays_and_tickets/productions/2011/les_miserables/files/lesmis
_edres.pdf See also the relevant chapter in Hugo, V. Les Miserables, Volume I, Book 2nd, Chapter XII – The 
Bishop works - London(UK), New York(US), Victoria(AUS) (Penguin Group, 1980)  
39 Hartholt, S. ‘Privacy jongeren jeugdhulp slecht beschermd’ Binnenlandsbestuur (Den Haag, 25 April 2016) 




Why children and migrants? 
 
Both children and migrants are groups affected by the changes in perceiving security through a 
broadened taxonomy of risks and the embracing of new technologies for risk evaluation. Both 
groups are seen as being at the periphery of citizenship, considered vulnerable due to their lack of 
certain legal entitlements, and this also illustrates the multifaceted concept of ‘security’ as both 
groups are increasingly considered being ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk.’ The connection between being ‘at 
risk’ and being perceived ‘as a risk’ constitutes a conceptual symmetry between these groups in this 
thesis. The analysis will thus shed light on how IDM technologies and security systems affect the 
relationship of children to government authorities and migrants to government authorities and how 
these relationships mutually shape these technologies.  
First, the Dutch policy domains of youth healthcare, youth care and also in part law 
enforcement will be analyzed as they increasingly shape and are shaped by public safety. The case 
of a 3 year old Dutch girl40 generated particular media and policy interest in concerns about children 
being ‘at risk.’ In this case, youth healthcare workers and other agencies involved with the girl were 
blamed for not having adequately shared data on the child, and if they had done so the child’s death 
could have been prevented. With this case marking the tip of an iceberg, as digitalization had already 
been initiated, the problem of child abuse was translated into a problem of information sharing. For 
this technology became seen as an important facilitator to prevent further problems. In order to 
address this, three main technological systems were proposed and developed. One serves to register 
children’s healthcare data, involving in part the categorization and signaling of risks. It is called the 
Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (hereinafter, DYHR). The second is a specific risk signaling and 
forecasting system for the public safety of children (and citizens), called the Reference Index High 
Risk Youth (hereinafter, RI). In the RI, risk signals are sent from other, linked technological 
registration systems that youth care institutions work with. Between the DYHR and the RI there is 
an overlap in function. The DYHR’s section of risk registration is connected to the RI and, upon 
registration, risk signals are automatically sent from the DYHR to the RI. The third system is called 
ProKid 12- SI (hereinafter, ProKid), which is a preventative risk signaling system used by the police 
in order to signal problems concerning children, their homes and their families. Through the use of 
the DYHR, the RI and ProKid, risks are projected for all children nationwide, and these children 
become understood in light of these risks through the interrelated processes of prevention. 
Therefore, the extent to which certain automatically enabled processes contribute to the construction 
of risks, as well as how these risks are indicative of specific problems within the mechanism of 
prevention, need to be analyzed. The way certain problems are indicated is significant for children’s 
lives, since these problems become referential to the type of intervention which will be assigned to 
them.  
Secondly, Dutch border control and immigration contexts and to some extent the law 
enforcement context will be analysed. The status of a migrant becomes established through and 
after an identification procedure in these contexts. There are various categories of migrants which 
are established, including asylum seekers and illegal and legal immigrants, and in this thesis I also 
include travellers under the term migrants. After the establishment of their status, asylum seekers 
are often seen as being ‘at risk,’ illegal migrants ‘as a risk’ and legal migrants and travellers to a 
                                                        




much lesser extent as either of these. Within the contexts of border control, immigration and law 
enforcement, instances of identity fraud and illegal entry among migrants and identity fraud among 
suspected and convicted criminals contributed to the introduction of high-tech biometric 
identification systems and risk profiling systems at national level. Two biometric identification 
systems, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) console within immigration and border 
control practices, and the PROGIS console within law enforcement practices, exemplify this and 
are in the focus of this thesis. In part also influenced by current political discourse within the EU 
concerning such goals as minimizing risks of terrorism, potential criminal activities and social 
liabilities that illegal migrants might pose for EU citizens, one risk profiling system, called the 
Advanced Passenger Information system (hereinafter, API) used at Schiphol Airport to screen 
travellers by border control authorities also constitutes the focus of analysis in this thesis. In order 
to sort out potential perpetrators by using these systems, in practice all migrants are considered 
suspicious and screened against security threats (‘as a risk’), including identity fraud, illegal entry, 
international crime and even potential terrorism. Yet, many of them can be particularly vulnerable 
since they have often been forced to leave their homeland, have very little financial resources, and 
have no official status (‘at risk’). The threats and problems migrants are associated with both as 
potential perpetrators and as victims are always part of processes that mutually implicate each other. 
When migrants become perceived in light of these risks within digitalized prevention processes, 
this can also result in false accusations, with the detrimental implications of such digitalized 
decisions on their lives.  
The implications on both children’s and migrants’ lives require empirical and legal analysis 
for two reasons. First, because through these practices children and migrants become, in the 
administrative sense of the word, citizens and digitally mediated decisions of inclusion or exclusion 
related to them are carried out. Secondly, the implications of the practical use of digital risk 
assessment technologies on this ‘becoming citizens’ allow for unnecessary and unfair exclusions of 
citizens. Therefore the empirical insights can help the legal assessment from both data protection 
and human rights perspectives and also in seeking proper legal remedy and other forms of 
compensation for the victims. 
Given these contexts, one of the objectives of this research is therefore to enrich the legal 
analysis by exploring the implications of use of such technology on citizens’ lives through case 
studies focusing on the peripheries of citizenship. As also highlighted above, children and migrants 
are two most vulnerable groups at the peripheries of citizenship, and they are considered most 
illustrative of the multifaceted concept of ‘security’ for this thesis by being increasingly considered 
both ‘at risk’ and ‘as a risk.’ While government owned IDM technologies become operational in 
the name of ‘bureaucratic’ efficiency and public security and national defence, their influence on 
individual freedoms and security – specifically those of these most vulnerable groups – pose acute 
concerns. Such concerns can be the discriminative treatment of persons through identification 
procedures that violate their religious, cultural or other rights. While the use of these systems depicts 
a drive to further stimulate the standardization of personal identification and risk assessment 
techniques, it also depicts a drive to make the diversity of citizens increasingly and individually 
identifiable, distinguishable but also comparable. This as we will see leads to a variety of 
controversies and ultimately to the fallacy that these systems can prevent risks. What often lacks in 
public discourse is that these systems also bring new risks. Although migrants and children can be 
regarded as being at the periphery in light of the risks that youth care policy goals attempt to prevent, 
and in the case of migrants in light of the risks prioritized on the agendas of national and 
international politics, the aspects forming Dutch youth care policy and immigration policy, 
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international crime prevention at national level and prevention goals related to immigration policy, 
international crime and terrorism at international level do not form the prime focus of this thesis.  
Problem description 
 
The increasing reliance upon the preventative use of identity management systems within citizen-
government relations and more specifically within the contexts of youth care, youth healthcare, 
criminal justice, immigration and border management are indicative of how security has become a 
crucial lens through which citizens in general and children and migrants in particular are evaluated 
and understood. Digitalization within these contexts has undoubtedly brought advantages, for 
instance, in terms of efficiency, or in the context of travellers the facilitation of their movement. 
Yet, the unintended consequences the design and daily use of these systems can bring for the lives 
of children and migrants from the perspective of the EU’s new data protection regime, children’s 
rights prescriptions and human rights principles have not yet been analysed and reflected upon. 
Notwithstanding this, children and migrants are more vulnerable to the detrimental implications 
stemming from the production of digital risk profiles than regular citizens. Compared to adults, 
these groups often lack legal entitlements, and awareness or knowledge of digital identity 
management and risk assessment practices. Assessing the position of children and migrants as 
vulnerable groups is useful to reflect upon the use of IDM systems and the legal and societal position 
of citizens in relation to government authorities in The Netherlands in general. Therefore, this thesis 
sets out to conduct empirically informed legal analysis, while bearing in mind the following main 
research question:  
What are the implications of the design and use of preventative IDM systems for the legal and 
societal position of citizens within different contexts of citizen-government relations in The 
Netherlands; and what is the potential of the EU data protection as well as the ECHR fundamental 
rights regime to prevent and remedy the potential risks of such system-use for the lives of citizens?  
There are several sub-questions which follow from this:  
 How does a digitalized risk profile emerge in practice regarding a child and how does this 
influence the child’s legal and societal position as well as become a risk for children’s 
lives?  
 What is the potential of the EU data protection regime and the children rights’ framework 
of the ECHR in mitigating the risks of the digitalized prevention practices on children’s 
lives?  
 How are migrants perceived by digital monitoring practices, and what are the implications of 
these practices on their status: are they themselves at risk, non-risk or do they pose a risk? 
 What is the potential of the EU data protection regime and the human rights’ framework of 
the ECHR in mitigating risks that digitalized prevention practices regarding migrants can 
bring about?  
 To what extent can commonalities between the digitalized risk assessment practices 
regarding children and migrants be helpful in mitigating their vulnerable position by means 






In order to answer these research questions, this thesis focuses on two specific case studies, 
children and migrants that are illustrative of the use of new IDM technologies for preventative 
use within Dutch citizen-state relations. The analysis of case studies involves legal research that 
is informed by empirical insights. The latter includes semi-structured interviews with 
professionals; detailed system demonstrations including descriptions of these systems in use; 
legal analysis of relevant existing and newly drafted data protection rules and human and 
children’s rights prescriptions as well as desk-research regarding useful concepts from 
surveillance studies and Science and Technology Studies, more specifically from Actor 
Network Theory. The empirical research entails the practical experiences of system developers 
and users, as well as system demonstrations. Interviews have been conducted with different 
youth healthcare workers using (or having designed) the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, 
youth care professionals working in one way or another with the Reference Index High Risk 
Youth or police professionals working with ProKid SI 12-. Furthermore, officers who used or 
took part in designing the INS console, the PROGIS console or the API system, such as those 
of the INS, the Royal Netherlands Marechausee and the Dutch Alien Police have been 
interviewed in different Dutch cities. In this way the diversity of localities and local traditions 
and routines have also been accounted for in the analysis. I interviewed 15 professionals (some 
of them on multiple occasions) related to the case study on children and 12 professionals (again, 
some on multiple occasions) related to the case study on immigrants over a period of two years. 
By no means can these interviews give exhaustive insights into the working practices. Yet, the 
insights are very useful to reflect upon the legal position of children and migrants in light of the 
potential of these new risk assessment technologies. The insights are furthermore helpful to 
open a discussion about concepts of security risks in light of such fundamental rights as for 
instance the right to a private life, the right to data protection and such principles as 
proportionality, subsidiarity, fairness, lawfulness, legitimacy and indirectly also liberty and 
equality.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters, three of these (chapters 1, 2 and 4) have been published 
as contributions in two books, and three (chapters 3, 5 and 6) have been published in the form of 
scientific journal articles. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 assess the legal and socio-technical implications of 
digital prevention systems introduced in Dutch youth care, healthcare and criminal justice on 
children’s and families’ lives. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the legal and societal implications of the 
daily use of two Dutch identification systems and one risk profiling system on migrants lives. 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions about the normative potential of current and future data protection 
rules and the potential of human rights principles with respect to the commonalities that frame the 
vulnerable, ‘at risk’ position of children and migrants as a result of the use of these risk evaluation 
systems.   
More specifically, chapter 1 deals with the problem of how the increasing reliance on the Dutch 
Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High-Risk Youth and the ProKid SI 12- 
systems are implemented and used to provide a ‘better, more complete’ view of children who might 
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potentially be victims of such threats as abuse, negligence or educational problems, such as 
dropping out of school or who might potentially form a threat themselves by developing or having 
already developed anti-social or delinquent behaviour. In this first chapter we argue that the operation 
of the risk assessment systems entails not only the installation of the right software and operating it 
properly, but also that extensive work needs to be done to operate them as intended, and make them 
cover the rather ambiguous realities of children lives, which in fact results not only in the representation 
but also in the ‘construction’ of risks. Furthermore, the first chapter argues and demonstrates with 
empirical examples that behind these technologies there is a logic that expands these systems: if a 
digitalized risk assessment fails, the answer is to implement new modes of digitalized risk evaluation.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the legal aspects of digitalized profiling of children in Dutch child-care 
contexts. It analyses specifically the future implications of the proposed data protection rules on the 
current practices of profiling children by forms of individualized risk assessment. As in the earlier 
chapter, the daily use of the Dutch Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High-Risk 
Youth, and the ProKid SI 12- system provides illustrations of the problems inherent in such profiling. 
The negative implications of using these systems and determining how these implications can be 
addressed by legal means is essential in order to protect both societal interests as well as the individual 
privacy and data protection interests of children and families.  
Chapter 3 in particular analyses the ProKid SI 12- system as it is situated within the Dutch justice 
system as a ‘tricky’ preventative tool to assess children below the age of 12 against a variety of risks 
both as victims and as potential perpetrators. Empirical examples show that the preventative digitalized 
profiling modes challenge a set of fundamental children’s rights principles such as ‘the child’s 
assumption of a constitutive role in society,’ its ‘privacy’ and at times also ‘the assumption of innocence 
of a child until proven guilty.’ Ambiguities furthermore also relate to Dutch legal prescriptions, 
according to which the police shall perform law enforcement tasks, although prevention tasks directed 
at youth would not qualify as such tasks. Moreover issues also relate to the fact that while using ProKid 
other systems that process strictly law enforcement data of persons above the age of 12 are also consulted 
in order to form a risk qualification about a child. 
Chapter 4 deals with the second group of citizens at the periphery: migrants. It analyses how 
migrants become increasingly focussed upon through framing them as being ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk.’ To 
illustrate the ways in which migrants become perceived as a consequence of using digital screening 
processes, two biometric identification systems – first the INS console implemented and used within the 
Dutch immigration chain, and secondly the PROGIS console introduced and used within the Dutch law 
enforcement chain – will be analysed. As a risk profiling system to assess travellers against a variety of 
risks, a third system, the so-called Advanced Passenger Information system will also provide empirical 
details about how travellers can become framed ‘as a risk.’  
Chapter 5 shows, by means of other empirical details about the three systems discussed in chapter 
4, what kind of implications the use of these systems bring about from the perspective of both existing 
and future data protection rules and from the viewpoint of fundamental human rights. Although The 
Netherlands, through its commitments as member state and border country of the EU, has 
significant risk forecasting responsibilities and duties to screen immigrants and travellers crossing 
the Dutch Schengen border, the empirically fostered legal analysis shows that the pitfalls of the 
extensive use of these risk evaluating systems can easily bring new risks for the lives of migrants. 
Chapter 6 provides a critical evaluation of the similarities between children and migrants as 
vulnerable groups. The aim of the chapter is first to bring commonalities between children and migrants 
to the fore and evaluate whether the legal framework properly deals with the implications of preventative 
identity management technologies on the lives of children and migrants. Secondly, the chapter also 
intends to assess whether the legal framework reinforces this vulnerability or mitigates the vulnerable 
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position of children and migrants. To explore the ways in which professionals can be made more 
reflexive about the pitfalls of their technology use and how the legal framework can provide help to 
remedy the negative implications of using these systems on children and migrants’ also constitutes 
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Thesis chapter II. 
Risk Identities: Constructing Actionable Problems in Dutch Youth 
Karolina La Fors-Owczynik and Govert Valkenburg 
1. Introduction 
Dutch child-care policy has become increasingly focused on making the lives of children more and more 
‘transparent’. This is accomplished by connecting multiple digital databases and aggregating data about 
children and the persons to which they are connected. This is to give the most complete picture possible 
of children who may be at some sort of risk. This is believed to increase the success rates of interventions 
made in the lives of these children (Keymolen & Prins 2011: 21). The (potential) problems these systems 
are to address include abuse and negligence within families, educational problems including dropping 
out of school, and petty criminal behaviour such as shoplifting, nuisance and vandalism. 
In this chapter, we explore developments in ‘completing the picture’ of children through the use and 
development of youth-care related databases. First, we argue, these systems are not just a matter of 
installing the right software and operating it appropriately. Rather, it requires a lot of work to make the 
systems work, and literally make them match a rather complex and ambiguous world. Second, while 
this work is intended to make the risks visible, it also inevitably obscures some of the realities it tries to 
represent, which in turn entails that some of the risks are ‘constructed’ rather than merely ‘represented’. 
Finally, we observe that the whole logic of the system is such that it tends to expand: if it fails in some 
sense, the response is typically to install more risk assessments, to implement more risk indicators, and 
start the risk identification processes earlier in a child’s life. 
It is perhaps not that surprising that a comprehensive approach to youth risks includes the establishment 
of the most complete possible set of information from a variety of professionals, as this increases the 
likelihood that a risk or future wrong is identified in time. One of the explicit aims of national youth-
care policies is that ‘no child should go unseen’ (Inspectie Jeugdzorg, 2008).1 However, we will show 
that the ever increasing demand for information on a child does not always work out the way it was 
intended, for example when stigmatization arguably occurs (Dutch Youth Institute, reported by NOS, 
2010). 
Risk and prevention are not simple concepts. On the contrary, in this context they refer to complex 
arrangements of children, professionals, institutions, personal records, data technologies, legal statuses, 
communication protocols, and professional routines. Within the Netherlands, youth care is organized 
across medical, educational and law-enforcement institutions. In practice, this means that risks are 
identified and shared among various youth healthcare organisations, police departments, schools, 
judicial institutions such as the Child Protection Council and the Youth Care Bureau, municipalities, 
emergency departments of hospitals, social workers, housing companies, sport clubs and a variety of 
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other organizations involved with youth. We show that some problems occurring in child care are in 
fact owing to the heterogeneity across parties. 
We will discuss three database systems currently used in the Netherlands. First, we discuss the Digital 
Youth Healthcare Registry (DYHR, or Digitaal Jeugdgezondheidszorgdossier in Dutch). It is designed 
for the registration of healthcare information on children between 0-19 years. Second, we discuss the 
Reference Index for High Risk Youth (RI, or Verwijsindex Risicojongeren in Dutch). The RI is a large-
scale risk signalling system that connects various digital systems, youth care organizations and 
professionals by providing digital exchange of risk signals about children and youngsters aged between 
0 and 23 years in the Netherlands. Finally, we discuss ProKid 12- (pronounced ‘ProKid twelve-minus’). 
This is a tool for risk assessment on children aged between 0-12 years, used nationwide by the police. 
In ProKid, colour codes are assigned to children, reflecting various levels of estimated risk. 
At face value, it appears as if ‘risks’ are simply identified and then communicated through particular 
networks and relationships. On the one hand, ‘risks’ indeed appear in the form of simple indicators such 
as classifications, signals, and colour codes. These forms make risks ‘actionable’. On the other hand, 
the indicators consolidate extensive assessments. When indicators arrive at a new location, they are in 
turn interpreted and re-imbued with a potentially different meaning, instigating different interventions. 
This occurs because of divergent backgrounds of professional knowledge, routines, codes of conduct, 
and anything else on which professional practices may just differ. As we will continue to argue, the 
work done to deal with risks is successful in some ways, and perilous in others. 
2. Risk assessment systems for youth in The Netherlands  
Following Dutch youth policy, both youth care and law enforcement have increasingly become geared 
towards prevention: problems are to be solved proactively before they become real. ‘Risks’ and their 
identification serve to make problems actionable before they actually occur. Indeed, wordings such as 
“making risks visible”, or “making the child transparent”2 often appear in youth policy. This eagerness 
for making visible the potential problems of children is reflected by mottos from professional reports: 
“to establish a comprehensive approach to children” (Berkeley & Van Uden, 2009), “to create a 
complete view of children”, and “no child should go unseen” (Inspectie Jeugdzorg, 2008). Identifying 
those who might be responsible for future crimes provides the rationale of many prevention practices. 
As one professional explains: 
“The goal initiating ProKid was to ensure that police officers in the field work more efficiently. What you 
see with the police is that normally they respond to an incident. Only when something happens, the police 
are called, and then they arrive to start an investigation. […] The idea was that you want to know the 5% 
of people that are responsible for 60% of all crime incidents. If you know them, you can focus on the 5% of 
children who may actually come in contact with the police.” (ProKid professional, city A) 
This ‘making visible’ of children’s problems serves a two-tier purpose: first, it facilitates the 
identification and classification of the ‘abnormal’, and second, by consequence, it makes these 
abnormalities actionable, or at least presents the indispensable object for action. This practice is justified 
by the assumption that intervention will be more effective if it takes place earlier. This entails a need for 
early identification of risks. Thus, early risk assessments on youth are considered essential resources for 
professionals.  
                                                   
2 The paradoxical point that transparency strictly refers to a particular kind of ‘invisibility’ will not be elaborated further here. 
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Emphasis on prevention  is also evident in other areas of youth care, such as for example youth 
healthcare (Gorissen, 2002; Mathar & Jansen, 2010). The availability of interconnected risk 
identification systems also facilitated police corps and social workers to increasingly carry out pro-active 
actions, and prevent harms not suffered and crimes not committed yet by youth (Min. van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, 2012). At the same time, youth healthcare professionals increasingly take up tasks that shift 
from counselling and support towards the prevention and control of youth and the crimes they potentially 
commit (Friessen, Karré, & van der steen, 2011). This preventive approach to youth care and the 
according arrangements of organizations have received wide acclaim in professional policy discourse. 
The consensus seems to be that the results are good and investments justified (ACTIZ, 2012).  
2.1. Digital Youth Healthcare Registry 
In the Netherlands, children aged between 0-19 are screened periodically through consultations with 
healthcare professionals. These occur at specialized youth healthcare offices for children from 0 to 4 
years, and by school doctors for children from 5 to 19. The Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (DYHR) 
is a healthcare database used for the registration of children’s psychological, social and cognitive data. 
Use of the DYHR by school doctors and advice centres became mandatory as of 2010.  
In the DYHR, a child’s record is kept as a Basic Data Set (BDS). In addition to generic medical data 
(weight, height, visual and auditive capacity, etc.), the BDS contains indicators that could be regarded 
as risk indicators. Most prominent among these is the list of “invasive events” that was part of the 2011 
version of the BDS (Nederlands Centrum Jeugdgezondheid, 2011). This includes suspected physical 
abuse, serious illness of the parents, parental divorce, alcohol abuse by the parents, and teenage 
pregnancy. Notably, as this list was found to be too much of a straightjacket, it was replaced by a ‘free 
text field’ in the subsequent version (Nederlands Centrum Jeugdgezondheid, 2011, 2013). Although the 
text field now allows for less specified (‘free’) descriptions of risk, it remains a significant indicator for 
risk. Also, while the ‘freedom’ to report increases, it is still only a freedom to report risks, which entails 
that the possibilities for a child to become risk-profiled grow. 
2.2. Reference Index for High-Risk Youth 
The Reference Index for High-risk Youth (RI) is a comprehensive risk signalling system that connects 
a variety of digital systems. It enables youth care organizations and professionals to digitally exchange 
risk signals on children and young adults aged 0-23 years. It is an infrastructure rather than a single 
system. Each time a risk is identified and entered into a local system, this identification is automatically 
forwarded to the national RI. The aforementioned DYHR as well as other youth healthcare practices in 
general are connected to the RI (Rouvoet, 2007; Wet op de jeugdzorg, 2005) and it has been operational 
since 2010. 
The RI facilitates the communication of alerts regarding children among professionals. The transmitted 
risk signals represent potential harms. The risk signals only consist of risk flags, and are not 
automatically supplied with explanatory information, nor any other content of the children’s files. The 
only information accompanying the risk flag are the name of the professional who issues it, the name of 
the organization the professional works for and the name of the child the signal is related to (Nouwt & 
Hogendorp, 2010). The concealment of more substantial information was demanded by the Dutch 
Medical Association (Dutch: KNMG, Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot Bevordering der 




2.3. ProKid 12- 
ProKid 12- is a risk categorization system for children between 0 and 12 years. The child’s address 
serves as the primary key to the database. ProKid employs four colour codes to represent risks: white, 
yellow, orange and red, respectively signifying a growing gradation of concern. White signifies that no 
risks have been identified as yet, yellow represents a possible development of risks, orange indicates 
that problems and even criminal behaviour have already occurred, and red symbolizes children who 
have repeatedly shown criminal behaviour, or of whom multiple cases of suspicion have been recorded 
(Abraham, Buysse, Loef, & Dijk, Van, 2011). Following a pilot phase, the system has been in operation 
nation-wide by the Dutch police as of 2013 (Tweede Kamer, 2012). 
The risk categories and their attributions are based on behavioural-scientific models, and explicitly 
aimed at early detection of potential criminal behaviour of children. The attribution of colour codes is 
done automatically, by means of algorithms, on the basis of information in other large police databases. 
These include the Basic Facility for Law Enforcement (BFLE, or Basisvoorziening Handhaving in 
Dutch) as well as the Basic Facility for Forensic Investigation (BFFI, or Basisvoorziening Opsporing in 
Dutch). Information from ProKid is shared among youth care partners if a ProKid manager decides that 
there is reason to do so.  
3. Doing ‘risk’ in practice 
Identifying and eliminating youth risks is complex work. Numerous professionals are involved, ranging 
from educational and social practitioners, to healthcare workers and legal and police professionals. By 
definition, the knowledge one professional has of a child is always limited: not so much because they 
do their work poorly or because they have limited resources, but because any profession has things on 
which it focuses and things on which it does not. A medical professional ‘sees’ different things than a 
police officer or a school teacher.  
In recognition of this partiality of knowledge, the information systems introduced above are explicitly 
set up to meet the challenge of crossing boundaries between professions. The systems are intended to 
yield a more comprehensive view of the risks that children are exposed to than any single profession 
could have by itself. This sharing of information is increasingly seen as an essential resource for a range 
of youth care professionals in the execution of their daily preventive tasks (RadarAdvies). The emphasis 
is adopted by many regulations that legally stimulate the deployment of digital risk profiles. The Public 
Health Act (Wet Publieke Gezondheid, 2008) requires professionals to digitally register data including 
risks about children in DYHR. The Law on the Reference Index (Rijksoverheid, 2010) stimulates the 
aggregation of risk profiles on children by a variety of professionals involved in youth care.  
However, it turns out that the sharing of information is not just a panacea to eliminate risks. Managing 
the information requires work of its own, and while often fruitful, this work is also at times difficult and 
frustrating. One corollary of the fact that professions frame problems differently is that seemingly the 
same information might have different meanings and implications in different situations. In the doctor’s 
office, a mother with a medical problem might be just that, but from a social-work perspective, more 
structural problems might be suspected. In choosing between these options, a healthcare professional 
may need more comprehensive information from other professionals, which may not be available 
through mere risk indicators.  
Risk indicators are compact representations of risks. They may be shaped as, amongst others, categories, 
colour-codes or signals. While facilitating communication, indicators also consolidate comprehensive 
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assessments, complex sets of information and tacit professional knowledge. An indicator (at least partly) 
obscures the process of risk identification. This (at least partly) precludes their discussion and revision, 
and indicators become more fixed de facto. A perfect example is the use of colour codes in the ProKid 
system, which turn out to be both elegantly compact and sources of confusion (Willems & Van der 
Heijden, 2011: 3). 
The practices in which individual professionals operate are more unruly than the ideal of comprehensive 
risk identification suggests. Between different institutions and professions, consensus is often lacking 
on what a risk exactly is. A youth healthcare professional, for instance, explained her frustration over 
this problem, and how it troubles her ability to assess risks:  
“You see the categories with a red checkmark, with certain families the screen is almost only red. You still 
need to read the record [underlying the checkmarks], and you can relatively quickly figure out what the 
problems are. But it is often difficult to fill in the risk assessment form, or to risk-score children, because 
there is no clear definition of risks. For instance, a ‘sleeping problem’ of a child can be just that, but it can 
also be a symptom of issues between the parents; or it can be caused by cultural elements that are just 
different between one family and another.” (CB-nurse, city D) 
While the meaning of the symbolic representation of the risk may remain unclear, its presence in a 
graphic material form seems to express a very clear urgency for action. Yet, if professionals find 
themselves confronted with this urgency, they obviously want to be sure that they can tell a sleeping 
problem from parental tensions before proceeding to action. While an indicator is aimed to deliver 
‘actionability’, it also carries ambiguity. This ambiguity entails that different professionals may 
conclude to different ‘optimal’ solutions.  
Within the RI, similar ambiguities occur in the presentation and interpretation of risks. One professional 
using the RI reports that it often remains unclear what others mean by particular risk signals. This is 
owing to the fact that the contents of children’s records are not shared for privacy and confidentiality 
reasons. 
“Professionals have a web-based system, which can send signals automatically. In addition, we have also 
some ‘soap connections’ [automated connections]. Risk signals can be sent directly to the RI, if 
professionals register a risk in their own files. But they only send signals, no content. We do not know what 
the risk signal is about.” (RI manager, city B) 
Finally, the very definitions of risks within the context of ProKid are themselves ambiguous. This is 
remarkable, as ProKid is based on standards that explicitly describe when a child needs to be scored 
with a white, yellow, orange or red flag. For example, the orange code is to be attributed to children 
“who either have at least once been registered as suspects of a serious crime (such as animal abuse, 
arson, sexual offences, public violence or robbery) or more than once have been reported as missing. 
Furthermore, a child can also be profiled with an orange flag, if he/she has been reported as a suspect 
five times or more, or he/she it has been registered five times in relation to various incidents, or if he/she 
has been reported ten times or more as a victim or a witness.” (Willems & Van der Heijden, 2011: 3) 
This orange colour code thus represents a rather heterogeneous set of problems, the complexity and 
heterogeneity of which remain implicit. Within the orange class, the distinctions between perpetrators, 
victims and witnesses vanish. Whereas the colour codes were intended to speed-up the assessment of 
reports by offering a quick summary, the resulting ambiguity compels police officers to yet investigate 
the whole background of an issue. 
On top of these direct identifications of risks – in the sense that professionals explicitly regard something 
as a risk and enter it into the system – risks are also constructed indirectly, through what could be called 
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‘circumstantial evidence’. Such construction is particularly facilitated by systems that are connected to 
ProKid, such as the BFFI. The following quote shows how a risk identification emerges in, or ‘between’, 
these systems. It is the result of observations made by a police officer at a crime scene, which are not 
directly related to the crime, but may be related to a child: 
“[…] when our officers are at an address, and find drugs, […] this information becomes registered in 
BFLE. But if they find a baby bottle in the kitchen, and ask whether there is a baby; and the inhabitants of 
the house answer: ‘No, the bottle belongs to my sister who comes here occasionally’. If the officer cannot 
find hard information about whether we need to seek care for the baby, or who exactly lives there, to what 
extent the person makes something up… and the officer has a bad feeling[about it], and wants to use the 
information [about the bottle], he can register it in BFFI. We, ProKid managers, can see that.” (ProKid 
manager, city C)  
This ‘soft’ information will eventually become relevant in risk assessments done by means of ProKid. 
It thus adds to the whole assemblage of early warnings and early risk identification, so as to further help 
prevention. This emergence of risk identification is exemplary for what happens when multiple 
institutions become involved: risk identifications propagate through systems, through which their 
genesis fades out of scope, and their content becomes more solidified. 
Early detection and a comprehensive view hinge importantly on communication and the distribution of 
information.  
“[The DYHR] helps you to create a better problem overview. You can provide better advice and guidance 
based on the information it contains. […]Previously, we had a hand-written ‘integral paper record’ in 
which you needed to search for information manually. Now, you click on a section and it appears 
immediately before your eyes in a digital format. Extracting, sharing and analysing data from the digital 
dossier is much faster.” (CB-nurse, city D) 
Yet communication and distribution of risk assessments are not just that. They are mechanisms, 
mobilized to bring a variety of professionals together and promote communication between them. In the 
view of one RI manager, such promotion of communication and the matching of risk signals are 
beneficial to rendering multiple problems with children visible. The infrastructure brings those 
aggregated problems under the attention of professionals. As the RI manager explains: 
 “The number of [risk signal] matches increases over time. For us, this indicates that professionals 
increasingly contact each other over a child’s case. In 2008, we had 30,000 signals and 2,277 matches. In 
2009, we had 30,313 signals and 3,100 matches. Up until now [July 2010], we have had 30,081 signals 
and 3,500 matches. […] The idea behind the system was to arrange a child’s case as a point of connection 
between professionals. Thus, children with multiple problems would become visible earlier, […] receive 
better help, in case they have multiple problems within a family. Such complexity needs to be addressed 
comprehensively, so that a child will not be ‘ping-pong-ed’ between professionals, each of them needing to 
start the child’s assessment from scratch.” (RI manager, city A) 
However, this leaves untouched the fact that risk-related data potentially represent different issues for 
different professionals. For example, the police officer managing ProKid reported her difficulty to 
interpret what the colour-coded risks symbolize. For example, concerning one incident, the police officer 
explained her hesitation in assessing the gravity of the incident and reducing it to a single risk indicator:  
“The problem we encounter with ProKid is that we get our colour lists in Excel each week, but we also 
need to read all the reports and what a yellow or a red colour symbolizes. If there is a report about a child, 
who has set something on fire, we only know that it has set something on fire. We do not know whether it 
has set a newspaper on fire, or a whole school building, for instance. So, you have to read the reports to 
learn the severity of the crime. This is important for your risk analysis.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
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It is not straightforward what kind of risk information is to be shared between the police and youth care 
institutions. This is partly the consequence of the fact that policies to stimulate co-operation between 
law enforcement and youth care organizations are still developing. The following manager doubts the 
validity of the instruments in practice, even though they are ‘scientifically founded’. He explains that it 
would be better to exchange information already if files of children are tagged with orange, yellow and 
even white flags: 
“If I see a child who has just a yellow or white coloured registration – and I know this does not yet qualify 
it for sending to the Youth Care Bureau – but the child’s friend is ‘red’ in the system; then I bring this extra 
information into the case discussion within the Youth Care Bureau.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
The professional thus seeks his own way in dealing with colour codes, and looks for ways to include 
information that would otherwise not fit into the system. Particularly, information from the social 
environment of the child is sought to be incorporated.  
Numerous examples exist of when the smooth, digital sharing of information obscures rather than 
improves the view of professionals on children. For example, the distribution of erroneous information 
shows a perilous irreversibility:  
“Everything I register goes instantly into the computer and can be monitored. […] If someone has filled in 
something wrong, then I need to receive an email query whether I would take out the wrong information. 
Until then, [the wrong information] remains in the file.” (CB-doctor, city A) 
This quote indicates how risks are foregrounded and consolidated by digital mediation. On the one hand, 
the registration of data is distributed in such a way that it becomes instantly visible for professionals in 
different locations. This is supposed to be helpful for the early identification of risks. On the other hand, 
erasing these data from files becomes a highly work-intensive process. Erasure is not automated, but 
involves extensive e-mail correspondence. This means that, in case of erroneous information, the rapid 
sharing adds confusion rather than clarity, as corrections are always delayed. As the information is 
predominantly about risks, and the identification of those risks travels much faster than their possible 
correction, the system de facto favours the emergence of risks over their correction. 
This is where the systems clearly show a non-neutrality between the negative realities of risks, and 
potential positive realities that may be articulated to oppose them. They are designed to store not just 
any information, but a particular selection of information. This entails that some information cannot be 
stored, even if a professional assesses the information as relevant, and even if the data is seemingly 
neutral or innocent.  
4. Risk prevention biting back 
As we have discussed, the DYHR, the RI and ProKid systems all in some way manage risk identities of 
children. Also, each system connects multiple practices, providing channels between different 
professions. In this section, we discuss this identity management across professional boundaries as an 
‘ontological practice of selection’ (Bowker & Leigh Star, 1999; I. Hacking, 1991; Ian Hacking, 1986; 
Law, 2008). Whether something counts as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’, ‘deviant’, ‘at risk’ or ‘as risk’ always 
has consequences for the very world those attributed classes describe, which makes this ‘description’ 
also a performative affair. One intended consequence is that these classes offer a ground for preventive 
action. Yet, not all consequences are intended or justified, and we will articulate some of the structural 
issues that carry unintended consequences. 
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The dominant idea informing the installation of the risk assessment systems is that transparency, 
visibility and comprehensiveness are key to prevention of youth problems (Keymolen & Prins, 2011; 
Van der Hof, Leenes, & Fennell-van Esch, 2009). We approach this ‘making visible’ as an ontological 
affair, as risk identification also transforms the problems that are identified. For sure, there are serious 
and real problems among youth that merit intervention by social workers and other professionals. 
Clearly, these problems must first be identified, if possible before they actually emerge, before any 
intervention can be made. However, the shape in which these problems are articulated does not stand in 
a one-to-one, unequivocal relation to what actually happens in the life of the child. We show that the 
DYHR, the RI and ProKid do indeed identify real problems, but that they also transform these problems, 
represent them in non-neutral ways, and introduce ambiguities of their own. 
To identify risks in children and make them actionable, risks are consolidated into indicators: items on 
which children are scored, and which offer justification for a particular intervention to be made. On the 
one hand, such indicators are compact and practical: they reflect the severity of a situation, and instigate 
interventions. On the other hand, these indicators conceal a lot. A percentage, a colour code or a ‘yes/no’ 
item hides the work through which a professional arrives at the indicator. This work includes 
professional interpretation and judgment, professional discretion, conversation with a range of other 
professionals, intuition, tacit knowledge, contextual knowledge, etc. The necessity of these non-
formalized ingredients is  recognized by official reports and guidelines (Inspectie Jeugdzorg, 2008), yet 
they are not reflected by the indicator itself. Even if formal standards are in place that specify how an 
indicator is to be scored, as with the colour codes above, this formalized part of the assessment is never 
the whole story (for otherwise we would not need professionals but only administrative clerks or even 
computers to do the assessment).  
In addition to identification, the systems are about communication and distribution of risk assessments. 
More specifically, communication is to take place between different practices of youth care, and these 
practices employ potentially incompatible approaches. This entails that the identified risks need to be 
presented in multiple ways, that they are mobilized for multiple programmes, that they are to fulfil 
multiple tasks, and that they will be imbued with different meanings across situations. Communication 
in this sense is not the transparent transport of information, but complex work of translation across 
boundaries.  
The use of indicators as tokens of complex judgments makes such communication possible in the first 
place. Indicators are ‘mobile’: they are compact and can be conveniently passed on to another 
professional. They are also ‘immutable’: as they are deeply rooted in the practices that establish them, 
it becomes hard or even impossible to deny or contest them. As ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1987), 
indicators are able to mobilize a wide range of actors by their alerting characteristic. At the same time, 
the compactness that allows their mobility entails a continuous need to reinterpretation and adjustment 
to local knowledge, traditions, codes of conducts and objectives. 
While crossing disciplinary boundaries, the aforementioned concealment enables indicators to help 
keeping responsibilities in place. For example, even though intensive sharing of data between medical 
and non-medical youth-care professionals was pursued by connecting the DYHR and the RI, the Dutch 
Medical Association KNMG pled for strict limitations on the sharing of medical information. Obviously, 
the KNMG held paramount the privacy and confidentiality of patient data. The ‘best interest’ of the 
child should be the touchstone for whether or not medical data would be shared (KNMG, 2009). By 
reducing such complex information to single indicators, exchange of that information became possible 
in the first place. 
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Offering both ‘transport’ and ‘seclusion’ of information, risk indicators are perfect examples of what 
have been conceptualized as boundary objects: entities that are ambiguous and flexible enough to work 
in different contexts, but also stable enough to meaningfully connect between those contexts (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989; Star, 2010). They deliver some of the promises for which the information systems 
were installed, namely the connection of different professional practices. At the same time, what they 
actually convey is not a simple representation of a pre-existing reality, but a particular construction of 
that reality.  
Once these indicators are established, they become harder to modify. To some extent, they start to live 
a life of their own, not least because the exact conditions under which they were established become 
invisible. While they are supposed to be representations of chances and possibilities for deviance, 
deviance also becomes more ‘real’: it ‘exists’ as representations presented by the systems. The reality 
of the issues in part consists of a certain irreversibility, once an indicator has been assigned to a child. 
As one RI manager explains: 
“The problem is that the Reference Index at the time of its introduction was presented as a ‘Concern 
reporting system’, similar to the ‘concern reports’ police write. You know, it created among professionals 
an idea of quite a ‘serious and heavy’ system. Hence, professionals are often afraid of signalling anything 
in there, although in practice it is just an alerting system and only contains data from the municipality 
register. This fear to signal is a pity.” (RI manager, city D) 
We observed that professionals sometimes become hesitant to enter issues into the system, as they 
cannot oversee the effects their data input might bring about elsewhere. The same professional expresses 
her own fear of the potential consequences of risk profiles. Quite delicately, a few minutes later, she 
reports: 
“…oh while I am showing you this, I have almost put a risk flag on my own child,that is something I would 
absolutely not want as a mother…” (RI manager, city D) 
The ‘making real’ of risks through the establishment of indicators is not just in making a solid 
representation of what is already there. This ‘solidification’ is not neutral, but prioritizes risks: indeed, 
they are risk indicators, and a risk constitutes a negative frame and calls for action. The risk assessment 
system does not accommodate positive realities or anything else that could mitigate or oppose an 
observed risk. One professional explained her frustration at not being able to register that a child is doing 
well:  
“Many professionals who have already been working for years within youth healthcare, notice for instance, 
that they cannot register signals in the system that reflect that things are going well for the child. I find it 
to be frustrating that I can only register negative things, only risks, and not that the kid is doing well. The 
system only allows you to record risks. For example, that the child is hyperactive. It is as if children can 
only have problems. If things are going well for the child, then I would like to register that, but I cannot.” 
(CB nurse, city D) 
The system is geared towards prevention, but it de facto disallows professionals to retract concerns if 
they think the measures would be too much or unnecessary. 
Although solidifying risks is intended to ease professional communication across practices, certain 
translations of risks into technological software or scripts (Akrich, 1992) can be sources of frustration 
for professionals. A quote from an interview with a ProKid managing professional exemplifies this. For 
ProKid, changes of address are key. However, the system is not able to register two addresses with one 
child. This is potentially problematic: 
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“Address changes in the [ProKid] system are not connected to changes in the municipal registry.3 When a 
police officer reports on an address, [the data] are checked automatically against the municipal registry. 
However, if parents divorce and move to two different addresses, and they arrange co-parenthood, the 
child is usually registered only at the mother’s address. So, if a problem occurs at the father’s address, 
ProKid unfortunately misses out on that.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
The inability to associate two or more addresses with a child is seen to hamper risk assessments. This is 
more than just a design flaw. It is a technological solidification of the social norm that children live with 
their married parents. Oddly, it opposes the tendency of risk assessments to extend into the broader 
social environment of children beyond their immediate family (see below).  
5. Proliferation of risk assessment 
The preoccupation with risks as actionable, negative realities parallels a proliferation of risk indicators. 
It is one thing that risk indicators are arranged in ways that they can be shared easily between different 
professionals. It is another thing that risk assessments and the communication of those risks seems to 
engender an ongoing expansion of the number of risk indicators. 
This connects to what Van der Ploeg (1998) observed in the context of pre-natal care. She showed that 
pre-natal interventions are always susceptible to the critique that the intervention would have been more 
effective if it had been made earlier, when the problem was supposedly still smaller and easier to 
encapsulate. This instigates ever more intensive and earlier screening. Van der Ploeg describes this as 
the “logic of infinite regression”. In the present case, a similar logic suggests that risks linked to children 
can be dealt with better if their registration is more comprehensive and indeed earlier.  
We will discuss three dimensions of this multiplication of risk indicators. First, practices of risk 
assessment increasingly include the family of the child explicitly in the registration of risks. Second, a 
similar development is visible regarding the broader social environment of the child. Third, as suggested, 
there is an assumption that earlier identification of risks leads to their being better manageable. In 
conclusion, these three developments culminate in the growth of the number of indicators.  
5.1. Extending the view onto the family 
The attention paid to a child’s family in youth care practices continues to increase and to be integrated 
formally in the system. A police officer working with ProKid, for instance emphasizes the influence of 
parents on their children. As changes of the parents’ relationships may have serious consequences for a 
child, according to him, these should be part of a child’s risk assessment. The following example 
illustrates how a risk profile of a new family member may affect a child’s colour code in ProKid:4 
“Many times you see, the mother is divorced and has a child, and the child gets a report. The child is 
reported as hyperactive. Then, later the mother starts a new relationship with a man, who moves in at the 
same address. If the mother’s new boyfriend, for instance, already has a police record, or has been involved 
in domestic violence, this creates a high risk factor for the child. The child lives at one address with this 
man. Therefore, the yellow colour of the address [in the child’s record] will turn into orange[...]Another 
example is when the mother has been caught with shop-lifting, and then she explains that she did the shop 
lifting because of her severe circumstances, e.g.: ‘otherwise I am not able to feed and take care of my child’. 
This also constitutes a risk factor.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
                                                   
3 In the Netherlands, municipalities maintain central registries of addresses of all their inhabitants. 
4 One assumption underlying ProKid is that incidents with persons living at the child’s address constitute a risk factor for the 
child. Therefore, they are to be reported. 
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Beyond criminal concerns, the profiling of parents also plays a central part during risk assessments in 
youth healthcare practices. Screening the health conditions of parents constitutes a significant part of 
health screening processes for children. In the use of the DYHR, the social and financial statuses of 
parents increasingly receive attention from professionals, and they are taken into account when assessing 
the health risks children may be exposed to: 
“You need to know of possible healthcare risks; whether the parents, for instance, have a [social or 
financial] problem. Moreover, if the parents have problems, the broader picture need to be looked at, and 
not only the child. It is possible that you have already noted down issues in the DMO protocol.5 For 
example, the parents might be unemployed, have high debts, or the child has been taken out of the family 
home, etc. These issues […] importantly influence the child’s development.” (CB nurse, city D) 
In some youth healthcare practices, even the extended-familial relations are considered essential for an 
adequate risk assessment. A professional using the DYHR shares her frustration at not being able to 
properly assess a child’s risk profile, as assessment of the broader social environment of the child was 
not possible with the digital system at the time. This complicated her work, as here knowledge remained 
incomplete. She could not see a child’s relation to its step-father, step-mother or to its grandparents. She 
argues that familial relations should be made more visible: 
 “You actually need a structural description of the family. I mean all those relatives with which the child 
interacts daily. So far, only the biological father and mother are registered in the [DYHR] record, but not 
the stepfather, stepmother, stepbrothers and stepsisters. Or, if the child often stays with grandpa or 
grandma, then the grandparents need to be registered in the dossier, too. But the system does not allow for 
such registration, unfortunately. Nowadays, there are a lot of divorces. We should also make those family 
relations visible, I think.” (CB nurse, city D) 
In contrast to this, the RI contains a novel ‘family functionality’. This functionality increases the number 
of family members that can be made relevant in a risk profile of a child. It also increases the number of 
youth care professionals that are connected to the RI. In particular, it ropes in professionals who are not 
focusing on the child but on older (even adult) brothers, sisters, and on parents.  
5.2. Expansion into the broader social environment 
Another dimension of proliferation is the increasing attention paid to the larger social environment of 
the child within practices connected to ProKid. Even the behaviour of neighbours can be relevant to a 
child’s assessment:  
“Suppose there was a fight between neighbours. […] Then, I know that the children of the neighbours have 
probably been involved in that fight, too. The police come and make a report. Then, in ProKid, I see that a 
child from one address fought with a child from the neighbouring address. I can then check back in time, 
and see that these children’s fathers also fought, two years ago. I can then connect these things, and that 
is the analysis I do.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
This shows how multiple profiles, including the profile of the neighbour or the father, are drawn together 
in a ProKid-based analysis. From these combined risk profiles, risk factors to which the child is exposed 
are identified and registered more sophisticatedly in the child’s ProKid record. 
                                                   
5 The DMO protocol is a standard, early signaling/warning instrument used within Dutch youth healthcare practices 
in order to assess children aged 0-4 years. (Hielkema, de Winter, de Meer, & Reijneveld, 2008) 
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In addition to familial and social relations, ProKid even brings forward a child’s relations to animals. 
ProKid incorporates behavioural-scientific research findings holding that the way children interact with 
animals is indicative of the risks a child might pose to society in the future: 
“We also have another, somewhat strange risk factor in our list: animal abuse. If a child abuses an animal 
at an early age, then, according to the scientific findings of Radboud University of Nijmegen, that child has 
a higher inclination for sexual abuse at a later age. We relied on scientific explanation to include such a 
category into the system.” (Police officer responsible for ProKid project, city B) 
Also the child’s friends’ risk profiles are made part of risk assessments. Links between friends’ risk 
profiles increase the weight attributed to those profiles:  
“If I see a child who has a ‘yellow’ or ‘white’ colour code, and although officially the case is ‘not yet 
worth’ being sent to the Youth Care Bureau (YCB),6 but if a friend of that child is ‘red’ in the system, then 
I share this extra information [about the ‘yellow’ or ‘white’ colour coded child] during the case discussion 
within YCB.” (ProKid manager, city B) 
These examples demonstrate that the proliferation in social space is becoming visible as a redefinition 
of social roles. Children who are diagnosed as being ‘at risk’, are increasingly also treated themselves 
‘as risk’: behavioural-scientific evidence suggests that children who are exposed to risks, run a greater 
chance to become perpetrators themselves. While this is taken as a reason for additional care, and not, 
say, for pre-emptive punishment, it is indicative of the logic of ever earlier and more comprehensive 
detection. What is more, indicators attributed to persons surrounding the child not only offer more risk 
indicators against which a child is to be assessed, but also intensify the preventative monitoring of 
persons who are seen to fall within the social space of a child. 
5.3. Extension in time 
The third dimension of this proliferation of risk assessment concerns time. One example is provided by 
the installation of so-called “pre-signals” into the Reference Index. These are flags that can be added to 
a child’s record in the local Reference Index. If such a flag is set, on any new information added about 
the child by a different youth care agency, an automatic email is sent to the institution that originally set 
the flag. Differently, a ‘real’ match leads to an email being sent to all those institutions that have signaled 
a risk about the same child in the reference index. These pre-signals are not forwarded to the National 
Reference Index, neither are they ‘matched’ by any automatic process. Pre-signals provide opportunities 
for early warning, legitimated by the consequences of the pre-signal being comparably limited. 
However, they remain part of socio-technical assessments, and stimulate earlier evaluations and 
consequently interventions. Likewise, the aforementioned advancement of colour codes based on 
indirect risks can be seen as a proliferation into time: issues surface earlier, and this is thought to improve 
prevention.  
Proliferation in time not only concerns the past, but also the future. The RI distinguishes between ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ risk signals. The active state of a signal refers to the period a risk signal can be 
automatically matched: 
“Each signal has an expiration date. […] For instance a police signal remains for 3 months, a signal from 
an educational institution for 6, signals of other organizations generally remain for 12 months, and we 
keep BYC signals for 24 months in RI. Signals can be matched only during these periods. […] According 
                                                   
6 According to the ProKid instructions, each case with a ‘red’ or ‘orange’ colour code needs to be forwarded 
directly to Bureau Youth Care (Hensen, 2010: 34). 
13 
 
to the new Youth Care Act, after a signal becomes passive, it remains visible for another 5 years on the 
web-site. Afterwards, it must be deleted.” (RI manager, city C) 
   
Despite technical restrictions, such as the absence of automated matching, the ‘passive state’  in practice 
produces an extension of the time a signal remains actionable for professionals. Within this period, a 
‘passive’ signal keeps presenting a negative reality that should be mended: 
“This passive signaling allows for another professional to use the source of the passive signal, in order to 
acquire information from the professional about the child.” (RI manager, city D) 
The constructions of pre-signals and ‘passive’ signals in the RI, and the colour-code classifications of 
risks in ProKid epitomize the proliferation of risks in time. Risk indicators accompany a child on a 
longer time span in practice, thus offering a longer window of opportunity for preventive intervention.  
5.4. Ever more indicators 
Taken together, these developments lead to a growth in the number of risk indicators. In addition, 
difficulties of communication across various professions are often attributed to a certain incompleteness 
in the available information on a child (Inspectie Jeugdzorg, 2008). This incompleteness instigates the 
addition of ever more risk indicators, which are thought to be more usable in different contexts if these 
indicators are more diverse and comprehensive. If risk assessments work imperfectly in one context or 
another, the response has been to add more indicators so as to increase the likelihood that they contain 
information that is meaningful in a particular context. Certainly, professionals working with these 
systems are not necessarily uncritical or naïve about such additions. Quite the contrary, the removal of 
the fixed list of invasive events from the BDS described earlier reflects a critical stance, as does the 
recognition that building systems are a matter of trial and error. 
The mere growth of the number of indicators perpetuates and amplifies problems that we have observed 
so far. Opacity and ambiguity are more likely to cause problems if there are more indicators to 
materialize them. Similarly, the increasing number of indicators combined with their ‘permanence’ 
increases the chances for a child to become and remain qualified as being either ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk’. 
Also, the increasing number of connections between risk factors, colour codes, risk signals and risk 
profiles and their surrounding practices increases the chance that combinations of those indicators 
produce a ‘hit’. As Van der Hof (2010) argues, while the DYHR eases the circulation of information, 
the resulting escalation of information itself poses new difficulties for professionals, as the most 
problematic cases become more troublesome to sort out. What is more, ‘less serious’ issues increasingly 
raise alerts, because the large number of indicators makes the system in a way too sensitive.    
All of the issues described are the consequence of a sincere pursuit of good care for children. New risk 
indicators often result from new scientific evidence and the recognition of real flaws in care practices. 
However, practices of youth care and the digital systems through which they operate entail a 
proliferation that brings severe problems of their own.   
6. Conclusion: it’s hard not to be at risk 
Modes for identifying and preventing risks in youth care in the Netherlands are being  reconfigured in 
unprecedented manners. Prevention is performed by a growing range of youth care and law enforcement 
organizations, systems and professionals. The problems they face include various forms of child abuse, 
anti-social behaviour and medical problems. Attempts to solve these problems occur through the use of 
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comprehensive digital means, and the enrolment of ever more socio-technical practices of youth care, 
as well as an extension of what is thought to be relevant. Involved practices currently include the police, 
healthcare professionals, social workers, municipality administrators, educational institutions and debt 
counselling services. 
Underlying all these developments is the sincere aim of improving the protection of children. First, this 
aim is translated in a need for ever more information and improved sharing of information and translated 
into digital technology. Second, this need for information is transformed into a pursuit of ‘making 
children transparent’, or to create a ‘comprehensive picture’ of the child. Third, as we have shown, this 
picture is subject to the dynamics that spawns risk assessments in various ways described above.  
In this study, the practices of youth care seem to be built on the presumption that risks are pre-existing 
and real, and can be made more actionable by making them visible. While we do not deny the existence 
per se of such risks, our analysis shows that in practice a very specific reality of risks is constructed. 
Risk indicators proliferate, propagating ambiguities and interpretational problems. Making risks ‘real’ 
and existent in the form of technologically mediated indicators also transforms chances of deviance into 
real expectations. Particularly, the gradual transformation from a child ‘at risk’ towards a child ‘as risk’ 
is to be understood as a consequence of this proliferation.  
This study suggests that the mentioned practices of youth care ‘produce’ risks in two ways. The first 
refers to the construction of risks as risk indicators. This construction is key to making risks actionable 
and for initiating prevention. The second sense raises more concern. The dynamics of consolidating 
risks into indicators and of the proliferation of those indicators simply raises chances for a child to 
become subject to a regime of care or raised attention. In many cases, this will be justified, however, in 
other cases problematic.  
These ‘false positives’ are recognized, but accepted as a ‘cost’ of the system. The spokesman of an 
umbrella organization7 for Dutch youth care agencies responds to recent findings that 10% of all 
suspicions of child abuse reported to the Advice and Reporting Centre Child Abuse (ARCC, in Dutch: 
Advies en Meldpunt Kindermishandeling, AMK) - a sub-organization within Bureau Youth Care - were 
false.  
Journalist: The Dutch Youth Institute argued today in the daily newspaper ‘Trouw’8 that families feel 
stigmatized, if they are falsely accused [of child abuse]. Do you recognize this?  
Spokesman: Yes. If for a small circle of professionals risks remain known about a child, and if parents 
return to the GP, they know that a suspicion had been registered and investigations took place. We argue, 
however, that this price we must pay for the remaining 90%. That is more than 14000 children per year in 
The Netherlands where investigations happen correctly. In these cases, it proves to be crucial that 
investigations happen. So this [10% false suspicion] is a consequence that we cannot entirely prevent.”  
(NOS, 2010)  
Despite this acceptance, our analysis has shown that such negative side-effects are contingent upon 
particular technological choices, such as the reduction of complex observations to simple indicators. 
Side-effects include false-positives, the impossibility to indicate that a child is doing well, and emerging 
ambiguities of risk indicators that entail misunderstandings between care practices. Solutions for these 
effects may not be in finding better technological solutions, nor would we argue for an abolition of risk 
assessments as if they were only bad. Rather, improvement could be sought in reconsidering how risks 






are made present, and whether technological, professional and organizational elements could be 
arranged differently, such that they present those risks in ways that invite reflexivity, and awareness of 
the side-effects showcased in this chapter. 
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Thesis Chapter III. 
 
Profiling ‘anomalies’ and the anomalies of profiling: Digitalized risk 
assessments of Dutch youth and the new European data protection regime 
 




A key component of the proposed data protection rules outlined in the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) is that any measures based solely on automated data processing that have 
legal effects on ‘natural persons’, including children, count as ‘profiling’. Currently, the 
digitalized profiling of children in Dutch child-care policies has gradually gained prominence 
in efforts to detect or prevent child abuse and anti-social or delinquent behaviour. This chapter 
analyses how the proposed data protection rules will impact the current practices of profiling 
children and creating individualized risk assessments in the Netherlands. To illustrate the 
problems raised by such profiling, this paper analyses the professional use of three profiling 
registries: the Dutch Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index of High-Risk 
Youth, and the ProKid SI 12- system. Investigating the negative implications of the use of these 
and determining how these implications can be addressed by legal means is crucial to striking 
a proper balance between the interests of society, privacy and data protection, and individual 
children and families. Although each registry is meant to prevent problems and serve the ‘best 
interests’ of children and society, their use produces new risks, including the possibility for 
erroneous criminal prognosis, stigmatization, and discrimination. By drawing upon empirical 
data and legal analysis, this paper argues that the use of these technologies by authorities and 
healthcare providers in the Netherlands will challenge new data protection provisions and that 
it is therefore necessary to reframe the data protection regime to better protect “the best interest 




On 25 January 2012, the European Commission released the draft proposal for the European 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This was a landmark event because the GDPR is 
intended to replace Directive 95/46/EC, which has been the primary legal instrument regulating 
data protection in Europe since 1995. Under the GDPR, the legal basis of data protection, as 
understood since the 95/46/EC Directive was adopted, would change remarkably. The latest 
(final) version of the GDPR was released on 15 December 2015 by the European Council, and 
includes proposed amendments made to the earlier text promulgated by the European 
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Parliament. For purposes of the analysis conducted in this paper, I rely on this latest (European 
Council) version.  
In drafting new data protection rules, the European Commission chose to rely on two 
separate legal frameworks: one for the protection of ‘regular personal data’ (i.e. the GDPR) and 
one for the protection of personal data during criminal and judicial proceedings (a separate 
Directive). Therefore, together with the proposed regulation, the Commission introduced the 
Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive. The latter would replace the 
2008/977/JHA Framework Decision. Interestingly, the regulation and the directive establish 
separate legal bases for regulating commercial and public and security-related data, including 
specific rules for often criticised practices like profiling within these contexts.  
Given these developments, this paper examines how the proposed data protection 
regime, when adopted and enforced, will be able to cope with the problems presented by 
profiling children on the basis of risk assessments1. For this purpose, the digitalized risk 
profiling practices of the Dutch government will be used as illustrations. Furthermore, the paper 
seeks to investigate what social problems, such as the possible negative implications for 
children’s lives, emerge as a consequence of these risk profiling practices, and how these 
negative implications can be properly addressed by modifications to the proposed data 
protection rules. 
Today, the preventative, digital profiling of  ‘anomalies’ such as child abuse and anti-
social or delinquent behaviour by children constitute prominent mechanisms that professionals 
in the Dutch youth healthcare, youth care, and criminal justice sectors rely on2. Connecting 
multiple digital databases and aggregating and sharing data of preventative import concerning 
children and other persons connected to them have been seen as optimal and efficient ways to 
orchestrate the prevention of abuse and undesirable behaviour. This digital transition has been 
bolstered by regulatory and administrative changes within the contexts of Dutch youth care and 
law enforcement. One such change took shape in 2013, when the administrative set-up of the 
Dutch police corps became more centralized, as 25 regional police units were reorganized into 
10. A major transition affecting the Dutch youth care system occurred in January 2015, when 
the provision of professional care for children was transferred from provinces to municipalities. 
Although the new data protection regime, including the proposed legal specifications about 
profiling are not yet finalised, the proposed specifications about profiling are considerably 
improved as compared to those in Directive 95/46/EC. This paper analyses the implications of 
three risk assessment systems in light of the proposed rules, an analysis that is useful, on one 
hand, to assess the capacity of the new regime to deal with the problems raised by creating risk 
profiles of children and, on the other, to see what this could mean for future risk profiling cases 
of children by government systems. Furthermore, the choice to evaluate the new regime is 
motivated by the vulnerable (legal and social) position of children compared to adults and by 
the concerns scholars have raised with respect to the legitimacy of digitalization in youth care. 
Scholarly concerns relate to how the government will manage to keep up with controlling data 
flows and providing transparency as laid down by the Dutch Data Protection Act3 and the 
European General Data Protection Proposal (Klingenberg & Lindeboom, 2013). 
                                               
1 By children, I mean in this article all persons between 0-23 years. This is a practical choice. I simply followed the definition 
used by the Reference Index High-Risk Youth, which uses the broadest age definition for a child among the three systems 
analysed here. Therefore, by this term I mean children assessed by any of the three systems. 
2 The Minister of Youth and Family: André Rouvoet explained in an interview (van Wijck, 2009), that during his 13 year carrier 
being an MP he experienced no discussion on the topic of child abuse, therefore how glad he was that the topic was finally put 
on the top of political agendas. 
3 Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens 2000 (Data Protection Act) Retrieved on 10th August 2014, from < 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011468> 
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This article is organised in four sections. Section two provides an overview of the three risk 
profiling systems, including a review of their advantages and disadvantages. Subsequently, 
section three presents relevant provisions of the current and the upcoming EU data protection 
regime with respect to profiling. After a few words on the methodology used in this research 
(section four), section five discusses key advantages of profiling systems as well as  the main, 
scholarly criticisms raised with respect to digitalized profiling methods. Based on empirical 
findings, section six argues that the proposed data protection provisions will fall short of 
providing protection for children within the contexts of current risk profiling practices of 
children by the Dutch government. Additionally, these practices create new problems or risks 
for children related to the registration, daily use, and erasure of the risk assessments created and 
used for profiling purposes. After a discussion (section seven) on how law might provide 
protection for these side effects,  section eight concludes in answering whether the new EU data 
protection assessments of risk profiling systems concerning youth would be better 
supplemented by a stronger focus on fundamental rights of children (as elaborated in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
2. Overview of the three risk profiling systems 
 
2.1. Digital Youth Healthcare Registry 
 
The Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (DYHR, or Digitaal Dossier Jeugdgezondheidszorg in 
Dutch) is designed for the registration of healthcare information on children (and, indirectly, 
about their close families) between 0-19 years of age. This system has been used since 2009 
nation-wide in The Netherlands. A set of Dutch laws provides the legal framework for the 
Digital Youth Healthcare Registry—for instance, Art. 5 of the Dutch Public Health Act (Wet 
Publieke Gezondheid, 2008), which prescribes the digitalization of health records. The 
Individual Healthcare Professions Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg, 
1993) is a second law that applies to the DYHR. This act specifies confidentiality requirements 
for professionals regarding the sharing of patient data. The registry is also legally controlled by 
a third statute, the Act on Medical Treatment Contracts Acts (Wet Geneeskundige 
Behandelingsovereenkomst, 1994). This act defines conditions for accessing patients’ files. The 
Dutch Data Protection Authority underlined the importance of the principle that sharing 
children’s healthcare data for preventing child abuse must be proportionate. Because the DYHR 
is connected to the risk signalling system, the Reference Index for High Risk Youth, data 
sharing can and should remain efficiently minimized(CBP, 2007). The time limit for data 
retention in DYHR is 15 years.  
2.2. Reference Index for High Risk Youth 
 
The second system is the Reference Index for High Risk Youth (RI, or Verwijsindex 
Risicojongeren in Dutch), a large-scale risk-signalling platform connecting a variety of digital 
databases, youth care organizations and professionals. This platform allows for the digital 
exchange of risk signals about children and youngsters in the Netherlands between the ages of 
0 and 23. When risk signals are shared, no information is shared other than the signal. Only the 
name of the child and the youth care organization concerned about the child is linked to the 
signal. This is done for the sake of privacy so that no confidential information is shared instantly 
with a risk signal. After two professionals of different organizations have signalled a risk about 
the same child, a certain ‘alarm bell’ goes off in the RI, and the two professionals need to 
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contact each other and share more information about the specific child. The legal basis of the 
Reference Index lies in the adjusted Dutch Youth Care Act (Wet op de jeugdzorg, 2010) and in 
the Law on the Reference Index High Risk Youth(Rijksoverheid, 2010). A large number of 
local systems are used nation-wide since 2010. All local RIs are set up in such a manner that 
each of them is also linked to a national system. In the national reference index all risk signals 
registered in local RIs are logged. A risk signal remains for max. seven years in the system. 
Although a risk signal can only be matched with other risk signals for two years, after that 
period a signal still remains visible for professional by being archived for 5 additional 
years(Oerlemans & Bruning, 2010).  
2.3. ProKid 12- SI 
 
The third system is ProKid 12–SI (pronounced ‘ProKid twelve minus SI’), a system used 
nationwide since 2014 by the police to assess children aged between 0 and 12 years. A child’s 
file comprises two parts: one column for the evaluation of the child and one for the assessment 
of his/her home address against four colour-coded risk categories. Each colour—from white to 
yellow, orange and red—demonstrates an increasing degree of risk. The evaluation of a child’s 
home address involves the risk qualification (the eventual bad influence) of family members 
and other related persons living at the same address with the child. A colour in a child’s file can 
change over time.4  ProKid is controlled by a number of Dutch laws (Social Support Act, Public 
Health Act, Youth Care Act, the Compulsory Education Act, Police Act) that define 
responsibilities of state, provincial and local governments regarding the care of young people. 
The development of a ‘comprehensive multidisciplinary chain approach for youth’ underpins 
this legal framework. Part of this approach is a working process called “early identification and 
referral”(Goedee & Rijkers, 2010), introduced in 2007 to stimulate co-operation between the 
Dutch police and a primary youth care organization called Bureau Youthcare5. Until January 
2015, this working process also provided a basis for ProKid6. Although according to Dutch 
penal law children under the age of 12 cannot be prosecuted, the aim of ProKid sets a precedent 
as it in fact carries out digitalized prevention work on children under the age of 12 years. Given 
ProKid is a system used by the police, the Police Data Act applies to the data processing and 
thus legitimizes this use. The time limit for retaining data in ProKid is set by 5 years. 
 
2.4. Advantages of DYHR, RI and ProKid 
 
The Dutch Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (DYHR) had been intended to replaces paper 
records and improves the healthcare ‘image’ of each child by using digital record keeping in 
which a more extensive set of categories are seen to offer improvement. A more elaborate 
categorization would help build a better view of a child, which would assist in preventing child 
abuse cases. In this respect, the possibilities for a doctor or nurse to detect the physical or 
                                               
4 Controversies around these systems also provide reasons for thorough analysis. For instance, the Dutch government’s ability 
to safeguard transparency and the proper protection of personal data had already been raised as focal points for investigation 
in light of such IDM systems (Klingenberg & Lindeboom, 2013). These issues raise further controversies as to how to 
orchestrate legally, administratively and technically the preventive profiling of children in each of these sectors. Controversies 
also surround the vividly disputed potential negative implications the transition in the youth care and law enforcement sector 
might cause, as well as the government’s increasing push to exchange data(Goedee & Rijkers, 2010) across sectors. 
5 As of January 2015 Bureau Youthcare organizations are abolished and their tasks are taken over by other certified youth care 
organizations and the municipalities. 
6 As of January 2015 Bureau Youthcare organizations do not exist in their old form anymore in The Netherlands. Due to the 
decentralization process in youth care, the tasks earlier performed by Bureau Youthcare had been redivided and redistributed 
between newly certified youth care organizations and city halls. 
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psychological implications of family problems on a child is easier and more visible for a variety 
of healthcare professionals who have access to the record. The link between the DYHR and the 
Reference Index (RI) High Risk Youth helps to improve communication and information 
sharing from the DYHR in regard to the signalling of such risks as abuse or domestic violence 
associated to a child. A major impetus for the design and installation of the RI was the need to 
improve information exchange between different youth care professionals and organizations 
when professionals were aware of problems concerning the same child. The risk signalling 
‘alarm bell’ infrastructure of the RI among professionals, when it signals correctly, can be 
considered the primary advantage of the system.  
 ProKid SI 12- is a digital system to prevent problems that children might suffer from in 
their closest social environment and problems that children can cause to others by their anti-
social or delinquent behaviour. When performed accurately, enhancing prevention by digital 
means and can save children from potential further harm. This is valued as the prime advantage 
of ProKid.    
 2.5. Disadvantages of DYHR, RI and ProKid 
 
Although the new European data protection regime has not yet been accepted and used as a lens 
to assess preventative digital risk-profiling practices in children via DYHR, RI and ProKid, the 
systems have already earned the critical attention of scholars. The profiling7 of children by the 
Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (DYHR), which had previously been called the Electronic 
Child Record (ECR), received public8 and academic criticism in its primary stage. The DYHR 
is based on a 30-page description of more than 1000 standard categories called the Basic Dataset 
(van Dijk, 2008), according to which risks related to children are registered9. The main Dutch 
professional organization responsible for healthcare, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (in 
Dutch: Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst—KNMG)10 
raised its concerns specifically with respect to the accessibility of DYHR profiles and argued 
for strict limitations. Van der Hof and Keymolen highlight such side effects of profiling by the 
DYHR what they call an “identity turned into stone”. By this they refer to the consequence of 
retaining data for 15 years in a DYHR profile, which can cement a digital snapshot image of a 
child. Simply by remaining in the file for 15 years, this image can negatively influence a child’s 
life in the future. By the “stigmatized identity”, Van der Hof and Keymolen also note that the 
digital record can influence professionals in ways that at times could hamper a face-to-face 
dialogue with a child: “preconceived opinions can stand in the way of an open and fair contact” 
(2010: 320).  
Profiling practices by the Reference Index High Risk Youth have also been exposed to 
criticism. The Reference Index is a risk signalling system or “a spider in the web” (Keymolen 
& Prins, 2011) to which a large variety of youth care professionals are connected by posting 
only risk signals of a child that are based on risk profiles. The National Reference Index is a 
                                               
7 Despite a newly emerging trend where online profiling gains importance7, the risk profiling of children by Dutch 
government technologies such as the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High Risk Youth and the 
ProKid 12- SI system occur against an already defined set of criteria, and those criteria should be set by standards in 
healthcare, youth care or law enforcement in The Netherlands. Each match between a profile and a child is regularly 
nominative and shows that a child is associated by name to a risk category. 
8 Elektronisch Kinddossier eind 2010 ingevoerd - < http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/42055-elektronisch-kinddossier-eind-
2010-ingevoerd#> 
9 Each category definition emerges as natural or innocent to the person it characterizes, yet when personal attributes captured 
within categories become benchmarks upon which decisions of exclusion or inclusion are made, the BDS categories can also 
be seen as ‘carriers’ of certain selective politics (Suchman, 1994). 
10 For more information about this, please see: <http://knmg.artsennet.nl/Nieuws/Overzicht-
nieuws/Nieuwsbericht/39762/KNMG-Elektronisch-Kinddossier-niet-te-breed-toegankelijk-maken.htm> 
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single umbrella system under which all local reference indexes hang. The system is designed 
in such a way that if two professionals post a risk signal about the same child, a match emerges 
as a certain alarm bell indicating that the two professionals need to initiate contact and discuss 
the child’s case. With each risk signal posted in a local system, a copy of that signal 
simultaneously enters the national reference index. Keymolen and Broeders identified a 
shortcoming of this set-up by showing that it allows for “sharing information without fully 
grasping the context of this information” (2011) among professionals. Van der Hof raised her 
concerns regarding the extensiveness of the Reference Index. According to her, the Reference 
Index can prevent those children who are most in need from receiving adequate help as a 
consequence of the requirements that professionals should abide by when screening 
children(2011). 
 ProKid SI 12- is primarily a prevention system implemented by the Dutch police to 
assist in digitalized risk-profiling work on children. The colour-coded profiles for ProKid are 
developed by behavioural scientists(Nijhof, Engels, & Wientjes, 2007): white, yellow, orange 
and red correspond to an increasing gradation of concern in relation to a child should he/she be 
a victim, a witness of violence or a perpetrator. Both children and their home addresses can be 
assigned colour codes. If the colour of the address darkens, the colour code of the child also 
darkens. This colour code shows a growing risk in the child’s social environment; for instance, 
if a child’s family member has a police record, this qualifies as a direct bad influence on a 
child’s development. Registration can remain in the system for a maximum of five years. 
ProKid has been operational nationwide since 2013 and, as such, it is unparalleled11. The risk-
profiling practices of children by ProKid have been exposed to fierce criticism. For example, 
in Schinkel’s view, ProKid is a technology that materializes a penalizing pressure or “pre-
pressure”(2011) on children who are exposed to what Lyon calls “surveillance as social 
sorting” (2003). Moreover, Bruning et al., advising the Dutch Child Ombudsman, argued for 
broader transparency for parents regarding how a risk calculation is made in ProKid and that 
professionals should balance between risk and protecting factors as their top priority when 
assessing a child(2012).  
Schinkel formulates an overall criticism regarding profiling by each of the three above-
mentioned technologies and the developments accompanying their introduction within Dutch 
youth healthcare, youth care and law enforcement in general. According to him, these systems 
epitomize certain forms of “technologies of security” (Foucault, 2004). In Schinkel’s view, 
there are two main negative effects of profiling by these systems: the extensive “normalizing 
effects on the Dutch population” and the significant contribution of these systems to the 
“prepressive construction of a risk population” (2011).  
 Although all of these criticisms are highly valuable and necessary, they did not address 
the practical implications the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry and the Reference Index High 
Risk Youth have on the General Data Protection Regulation and, more specifically, the practical 
implications of ProKid on the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive. To 
demonstrate these implications, the following section reveals an analysis based on empirical 
insights from professionals working in different cities and institutions in the Netherlands using 




                                               
11 Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012), 29 279 Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde Nr. 147 Brief van de minister van veiligheid 
en justitie aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Den Haag 
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3. Profiling children in light of current and new data protection rules 
 
The Digital Youth Healthcare Registry and the Reference Index High Risk Youth fall under the 
95/46/EC Directive and after the proposed Regulation comes into effect, this new regime 
applies to the processing of data by means of both systems. Given that data from the ProKid SI 
12- system is not exchanged in a cross-border setting, only very limited parts of the Framework 
Decision 2008 can be seen applicable. Yet, when the Police and Criminal Justice Directive 
becomes enforced, ProKid will fall under this regime. For this reason, the relevant provisions 
of this new regime will also be analysed. 
Although the 95/46/EC Directive is implemented in the Netherlands through the Dutch 
Data Protection Act, the directive “lacks child specific rules” (Van der Hof, 2014). Art. 21, for 
instance, only defines specifications regarding the sharing of children’s healthcare data (La 
Fors-Owczynik, 2015). In light of the current data protection legislation, this lack of child 
specific rules constitutes great challenges when looking for legal safeguards for children from 
the side-effects of digitalized profiling practices, such as the risk profiling performed by Dutch 
government agencies. 
From the perspective of profiling prescriptions concerning how data shall be processed 
is also crucial. Art. 5 of the 95/46/EC Directive prescribes with respect to data processing, 
leading principles such as lawfulness. Yet, it allows member states to specify conditions for 
lawful processing. On the contrary, GDPR specifies conditions for lawfulness and fairness by 
including principles, such as transparency and data minimisation, and by defining liabilities for 
the controller.  
Art. 7 of the 95/46/EC Directive specifies conditions for lawful processing, such as the 
data subject’s consent or the necessity criterion of data processing (i.e., for public interests). 
GDPR, however, adds to these criteria the balancing of interest criterion. By the time the GDPR 
is in force, the latter criterion is essential to rely on when it comes to the risk profiling of 
children by government systems.  
Arts. 10 and 11 of the 95/46/EC Directive are also of utmost importance for risk 
profiling practices of children because these articles specify the information obligation of the 
controller towards the data subject. The GDPR builds on these specifications, but it introduces 
a far broader set of obligations for the data controller in Art. 11, Art. 12, and Art. 14. Art. 12 
sets out conditions for transparency when the data subject exercises his/her rights. Moreover, 
Art. 14 specifies that the data controller shall inform the data subject about the data processing. 
For instance, with respect to the storage period of data, it also prescribes the “right to lodge a 
complaint to a supervisory authority” for the data subject. Art 15 of GDPR follows up on Art. 
14 and defines the right of access of the data subject. As a precondition to the right of access, 
Art. 18 prescribe the right to data portability, meaning that upon request of the data subject the 
data controller shall facilitate the transfer of the data subject’s data from one system to another. 
The right to data portability or the right to lodge a complaint do not exist in the current directive.  
Yet, Art. 13 of the 95/46/EC Directive provides derogations for the information obligation of 
the controller and for the right of access of the data subject. Art. 14 of GDPR expands conditions 
for derogations for the information obligation and for the right of access. The latter derogations, 
when the GDPR will be in effect, would also be applicable for all three risk-profiling systems 
of children analysed in this article.    
The 95/46/EC Directive specifies general provisions regarding profiling in Art. 15. It 
granted “the right to every person not to be subject to a decision, which produces legal effects 
concerning him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate 
certain aspects related to him…”.  
GDPR Art. 20 specifies much stronger provisions with respect to profiling. First, that 
“the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
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processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her. ..[and that profiling] is based on the data subject's explicit 
consent”.  
However, compared to the June version (2015) of the GDPR, in the December version 
(2015) of the text certain specifications regarding profiling have been erased. In the June 
version Art. 20 included, for instance, that “profiling that has the effect of discriminating 
against individuals on the basis of race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or beliefs, 
trade union membership, sexual orientation or gender identity, or that results in measures 
which have such effect, shall be prohibited.” Moreover, prescriptions have also been erased 
relating to that “profiling which leads to measures producing legal effects concerning the data 
subject or does similarly [and] significantly affect the interests, rights or freedoms of the 
concerned data subject shall not be based solely or predominantly on automated processing 
and shall include human assessment, including an explanation of the decision reached after 
such an assessment.” 
The latter two specifications, if kept intact in the December version of the GDPR, could 
have further fostered the protection of citizens against profiling, including children, via the 
GDPR and also compared to the relevant prescriptions of the 95/46/EC Directive. However, 
the final version of Art. 20 lifted the limitations of the Directive, which specified that measures 
stemming exclusively from ‘automated individual decisions’ constitute profiling. The new 
regulation expanded the scope of protection by involving any measure of profiling that has legal 
effects on ‘natural persons’, including children. Although Art. 20 generally prohibits measures 
based on automated profiling, as Kuner critically noted, it includes exemptions that are “broad 
and ill-defined” and could potentially lead to harmonization problems and excessive use(2012). 
Furthermore, Costa and Poullet highlight that the regulation shifted from the conception of 
profiling that is the “classical automated individual decision” and refers to data that is directly 
related to an individual to automate reasoning regarding that person(2012).  
Although the complete prohibition of profiling children has been deleted from the final 
form of the regulation(Hornung, 2012), it introduced another new legal safeguard: the data 
subject’s consent to profiling. In line with this, the “data processor must ensure that 
distinguishable conditions exist for the data subject to consent to profiling” (ibid, 2012: 259). 
The introduction of this new consent is different from the consent to data processing, which 
was first established by Arts. 7 and 8 of the 95/46/EC Directive. The risk assessment systems 
under study are designed to score children against risks; each system has a legitimate aim that 
is cemented by law. If the GDPR is in force, Art. 20(1a, b) allows profiling if such activity is 
set by Union or Member State law. Therefore, because risk profiling by the three systems is set 
by Dutch law, the data subject’s consent to profiling by these systems would not be applicable. 
As Koops argues, for citizens, it is impossible to opt out of data processing by government 
systems because citizens cannot simply choose a different government(2014).  
Beyond derogations as to the prescriptions of GDPR by national law, Art. 21 of the 
GDPR also defines restrictions from the rights and measures laid down by GDPR, if data 
processing is aimed at safeguarding national security, defence, public security, or the 
“prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public 
security”.  
When GDPR is enforced, all of the provisions discussed above will apply for DYHR 
and the Reference Index High-Risk Youth. 
 Given that the ProKid system is a national police system, as mentioned earlier, it falls 
under the Dutch Police Data Act. Due to its national character, only limited parts of the 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA are applicable. For instance, Art. 3 defines the 
requirements for data use by law enforcement authorities including its proportionality, 
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lawfulness and legitimate purpose. However, after the Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive is implemented in Dutch law, the relevant provisions will also be 
applicable for data processing activities performed by the ProKid system. The Directive 
specifies that profiling by “means of automated processing” should be prohibited unless 
national law provides for it otherwise (Art. 27). During such profiling practices, “suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests” must be ensured. According to 
the Dutch government, the main benefit of the EU Proposal on the Police and Criminal Justice 
Data Protection Directive with respect to profiling remains “mainly in the transparency 
obligations [Art. 28] and Art. 14 deserves further attention in this context” 12. This is a fair 
observation, given that the directive allows for extensive options where profiling practices via 
national laws can flourish.  
4. Methodology  
 
The methods applied in researching the issues addressed in this article encompass both legal 
desk-research and analysis and empirical research.13 In combining both methods, this research 
is staged in the tradition of science and technology studies and more precisely, actor-network 
theory.  This approach is particularly valuable for the issues addressed in this article, given that 
it allows a better understanding of how the unintended implications or risks of using digital risk 
assessment technologies occur and what these implications can mean for children and families 
in the current and new data protection regime. The empirical data are collected with 18 semi-
structured interviews that the author conducted with professionals using one of the three 
systems in different cities of the Netherlands. The interviewees were selected on the basis of a 
set of predetermined criteria (among them were professionals that had been involved in the 
design process or were daily users of these systems). The selected interview quotes presented 
below show the unforeseen analysis and typical implications that can arise as a consequence of 
the design and daily use of these systems. In the discussion, these implications are assessed 
against the background of the current and upcoming data protection regime. The quotes aim to 
demonstrate two things. First, the current text of the data protection regime could lead to 
controversies regarding the risk profiling of children. Second, the examples also depict 
controversies inherent in the design and use of risk profiles.  
5. Problems raised by profiling systems generally 
 
Although profiling citizens has long been a delicate subject within data protection 
discussions(Hildebrandt, 2008; David Lyon, 2001; Rubinstein, Lee, & Schwartz, 2008; Van 
der Hof, Leenes, & Fennell-van Esch, 2009), its importance has only grown with the 
development of an extensive set of Internet-based and inter-connectable digital technologies 
and ubiquitous systems. These technologies are seen as the means to increase opportunities for 
different forms of success in different fields and disciplines. Ubiquitous systems are regularly 
installed to collect a broad range of behavioural information on persons(Canhoto & Backhouse, 
2008; Manders-Huits, 2010; Van Eijk, Helberger, Kool, Van der Plas, & Van der Sloot, 2012). 
                                               
12 Brief  van de Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie over het ‘EU-voorstel: Richtlijn bescherming persoonsgegevens bij 
gebruik door politiële en justitiële autoriteiten (COM(2012)10) en EU-voorstel Verordening algemeen kader bescherming 
persoonsgegevens (COM(2012)11)’ (2013) 
13 Part of the empirical data in this article can also be found in K. La Fors-Owczynik & G. Valkenburg ‘Risk identities: 
constructing actionable problems in Dutch youth’, in Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World (Eds.) Van 
der Ploeg, I. & Pridmore, J. (Routledge, 2015). Part of empirical data concerning ProKid can also be found in K. La Fors-
Owczynik Minor protection or major injustice? Children rights' and digital preventions directed at youth in the Dutch justice 
system [2015] 31 Computer Law and Security Review 651-667 
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Such information is then used to design and offer more ‘tailor-made’ services for citizens, 
including commercial(Benoist, 2008; Pridmore, 2012; Zarsky, 2010), medical(Jansen & de 
Bont, 2010; Oudshoorn, 2011), judicial(Hoogstrate & Veenman, 2012; Koops & Leenes, 2005), 
employment-oriented(Henman, 2004; Leopold & Meints, 2008), online or social media-related 
services(Leenes, 2010). Profiling and profiling technologies, therefore, are widely regarded as 
tools to create opportunities for ‘improving’ the image of the profiled subjects by aggregating 
data about them in different ways that can depend on a large variety of interests. 
However, beyond the benefits that each digital profiling practice is set to achieve, 
substantial academic literature has already directed attention towards the shortcomings of these 
practices. Hildebrandt notes, for instance, that abuse is not the major problem with profiling, 
“but the fact that we have no effective means to know whether and when profiles are used or 
abused” (2008: 318). Shoemaker highlights the data subject’s lack of control over the type of 
profile that is made about him/her: an image of the profiled person emerges without his/her 
“desired and expected input into the process” (2009: 14). Similarly, Prins advocates for 
establishing more control for the profiled subjects by providing more transparency about the 
profiling processes(2007); she also raises concern with respect to the ‘responsibility’ of data 
processors towards data subjects. She claims that within the current largely complicated web of 
digital systems, it has become nearly impossible for a citizen to find the right data processor 
who, in that moment, is responsible for processing a persons’ data(2014: 56). Furthermore, Van 
der Hof and Prins argue specifically about commercial profiling and the ways in which data are 
aggregated and projected onto customers. They also describe how profiles are “personalized” 
(2008) and used to steer consumers’ choices in ways that are opaque to those subjected to these 
practices. A major concern of Koops and Leenes is that profiling practices—because they occur 
without the involvement of the subject—are manipulative and at times are even confining to 
persons’ autonomy(2005). McKenna argues similarly and advocates for considering where the 
boundaries remain when it is argued that eventual crimes can be prevented by advanced 
profiling techniques: “it comes down to the issue of personal autonomy of the individual and 
the need for there to be awareness of what is happening” (2012: 15). Schermer raises among 
others that a major concern of profiling is that individuals are often judged on the basis of group 
characteristics and not on their own characteristics(2011). This could lead to incorrect or 
discriminative decisions what he explains as the “de-individualisation” effect of profiling. Gray 
and Citron also formulate concerns regarding the large-scale behaviour-steering effects of 
massive profiling techniques in a post 9/11 US environment. They argue, for instance, that 
individuals with different religious and cultural backgrounds are more sensitive to profiling and 
surveillance in general. They explain that individuals in the US often perform “self-censoring” 
to prevent becoming suspected persons of national security interest(2013). Children’s rights 
scholars further argue about profiling practices by systems such as ProKid that they have a 
“stigmatising” effect(Bruning et al., 2012). Yet, this risk is not limited to ProKid. For instance, 
if a risk profile from the DYHR or a risk signal from the RI is shared, the use of these data can 
also discriminatively affect a child.   
A common denominator in all of the criticisms regarding profiling relates to the fact that 
whatever the purpose of profiling might be, as a form of surveillance(De Vries, 2010;  Foucault, 
1977; Lyon, 2006; Schinkel, 2011), profiling continuously produces asymmetrical power 
relationships between profilers and those subjected to profiling. This asymmetry emerges 
immediately in favour of the profiler by the time he or she gathers data about its subject. The 
more data that is gathered about the profiled persons within these relationships, the more 
‘hegemonic’ a profiler can become. Several attempts have been made to legally empower 
profiled persons—for instance, by assigning “property rights” (Prins, 2006, 2010; Samuelson, 
2000; Sholtz, 2000) to them or by potentially establishing a ‘fundamental right to identity’(De 
Hert, 2008; Gutwirth, 2009; Prins, 2007). Lately, for example, GDPR introduced the possibility 
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of fining companies or other profilers who unlawfully collect data about a person14. 
Furthermore, data protection principles such as ‘informed consent’ and the right of a person to 
‘individual self-determination’ can all be regarded as legal constructions to empower the person 
being profiled and to shrink his or her hierarchical distance in relation to the profiler. Yet, in an 
era of ubiquitous computing, profiling has increasingly become a manner of gathering 
enormous amounts of information about persons simply because— for instance, as Van der 
Ploeg argues about biometric sensing technologies at airports—persons in these profiling 
practices are increasingly seen as being “available” (2010). When not their name per se, but 
rather information about their behaviour, biological traits and habits are of more interest, then 
the mechanisms of legal empowerment seem to fall short in providing adequate counter 
balance. Because, profiling today has increasingly shifted away from its classical form - when 
data about a specific person was gathered to provide more ‘personalized’ services for him/her 
- towards the previously mentioned more group-oriented and typology-producing practices 
where the profiled subject can remain anonymous, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) aims to tackle the new challenges(De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2012) inherent in 
these new profiling practices. Practice shows however that challenges remain also concerning 
the classical form of profiling practices, especially in regard to children and digital risk-
assessment practices by the Dutch government. 
6. Problems or ‘anomalies’ raised by risk profiles in light of the changes brought 
by the GDPR 
6.1. Constructing15 risk profile data 
 
What risk? 
In light of the GDPR, when we take a closer look at the perception of risks by professionals a 
significant shortcoming of all three risk-assessment systems can be identified. To assess what 
counts as a risk in practice, it is essential to evaluate the implications of a digital risk registration 
from the perspective of the (current and the new) data protection regulation. Professionals 
explain that to define and construct what counts as a risk within their systems is a major 
difficulty in their daily work. A nurse, for example, working with the Digital Youth Healthcare 
Registry explained the following: 
“…it is often difficult to fill in the risk-assessment form or to risk-score children because there 
is no clear definition of risks. For instance, a ‘sleeping problem’ of a child can be just that, but 
it can also be a symptom of issues between the parents; or it can be caused by cultural elements 
that just differ between one family and another.” (CB-nurse, city D) 
A notification (often a letter) to the parents of a child must accompany any risk registration 
within the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry notification by law.  
A doctor from another city shares her working method regarding how she indicates a risk: 
“If you look at the list [of children], you first see the risk items and you will not see regular 
issues. While say a mother is crying to me that she cannot manage to breastfeed. We have just 
been talking about this. Then, I would not register this as a risk because she is not a risk mother. 
                                               
14 For this prescription, see ECJ, Luxembourg, 13 May 2014, C-131/12 
15 Here, the word construction certainly does not intend to suggest that risks are made up of thin air, but the risks within the 
administration of professionals become existent, noticeable and actionable for others through their digital registration.      
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But, I want to remember this issue and I think it is useful that this issue is indicated in red [as 
other risks] in the child’s file because during the next consultation another colleague will check 
it together with other risks.” (CB-doctor, city A) 
The latter quote suggests that when an issue is indicated as red in a child’s digital file, this 
could steer the attention of any colleague who views files towards those files, which contain 
red check-marks, including the particular baby’s file mentioned above. This occurs because 
the digital files are set-up in such a manner that a red check mark in a child’s file usually 
provides a risk indication and would primarily catch the attention of professionals. Yet, at 
the same time, it is difficult for a colleague who opens the files to determine whether a ‘red 
check-marked’ file constitutes a ‘real risk’ or only ‘highlighted issues’. Therefore, the 
conclusion can be drawn that transparency regarding what a risk is or what a ‘risky issue’ 
constitutes often remains a puzzle for professionals who view children’s digital files. 
The two excerpts above both demonstrate that the definition of a risk registration can 
remain unclear even to those professionals who handle a child’s data. Registering a risk is not 
always that complicated and risk signs are not always that ambiguous because not all doctors 
and nurses may find the registration of different types of risks difficult. Yet, the two quotes 
raised above show that a risk signal can easily obscure what the difficulties are and the 
professional decisions leading up to a risk sign in a child’s digital profile. In this regard, 
uncertainty regarding what constitutes a risk can still be regarded as an elementary problem that 
is not primarily about abiding by the rules of profiling as set by the 95/46/EC Directive and in 
the future by GDPR, but about how to conduct profiling under these conditions. In line with 
this, evaluating the extent to which the ‘principle of data quality’ is enforced (as set by Art. 6 
of the 95/46/EC Directive) is also necessary. Moreover, for future cases, when the GDPR will 
already be in force, the uncertainty regarding what constitutes a risk would challenge Art. 5 and 
Art. 6 of the GDPR. Additionally, the data controller’s obligation to be transparent regarding 
the processing of data, especially towards a child (Art. 12 GDPR) would also be challenged. 
Overall, the above issues are not something the GDPR, even when enforced in the future, can 
adequately address alone because the regulation beyond the essential principles of 
proportionality, subsidiarity, fairness and lawfulness does not prescribe specific conditions that 
can lead up to the registration of digital data, which in our case is a risk registration about a 
child. Therefore, when professionals have difficulties determining what type of a digitally 
indicated risk is associated to a child, the extent to which digitalized prevention is always 
performed in the best interest of the child needs legal scrutiny. During this scrutiny, GDPR 
prescriptions could desirably be complemented with children’s rights perspectives, such as the 
child’s right to privacy and the child’s best interest. 
Funding for registering risks? 
Ambiguity regarding risk constitutes a common problem, and can lead to what the Dutch 
government coined recently as an ‘overreaction to risk within the Dutch youth care (Ministerie 
van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013). Ambiguity regarding what a risk can 
be within digital registration work is largely a consequence of simplifying the term ‘risk’ into 
a technological sign. Notably, the digital risk data/sign after being transferred strips off the 
originating problem from its exact context for a professional, who only receives and views the 
risk signal on a monitor. The registration of risks, for instance, in the Reference Index High-
Risk Youth can also be surrounded with certain circumstantial biases. A local Reference Index 
manager shares details regarding her work in a given Dutch city as follows: 
“Since the end of 2009, there have been new funding conditions in [city name] … The 
conditions are as follows: organizations have to report to AMK and the Reference Index if they 
receive funding and are busy with youth, education, coaching or policy. If they do not report 
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about such issues, there is a good chance that such an organization (a kindergarten or other 
organization concerned with the well-being of children) loses its funding provided by the 
municipality. That is a push, so that all such organizations report about child issues to the 
Reference Index. We, as Reference Index, have to check whether they do such a reporting and 
are entitled to get their funding. 550 organizations received funding from municipality units, 
and we need to control them, whether they register risks or not and whether they get in touch 
with each other.” (RI manager, city A)  
The above insight shared by a manager demonstrates that the registration of risks in the 
Reference Index in some places16 is influenced by the ways in which financing is allocated to 
the institutions connected to the Reference Index. If posting a risk signal can be regarded as a 
representation of care, then the ways in which this care at certain times and at certain places is 
steered both financially and administratively depicts a strict control of processes. Keymolen 
and Broeders argue that a mix of care and control is present in profiling practices performed by 
the Reference Index(2011). As the above quote demonstrates, a financial (or existential) motive 
can also push professionals to actively register risks in RI in a given city17. Questions arise, 
however, regarding the extent to which this administrative set-up serves the best interest of the 
child as provided by the CRC. Furthermore, the extent to which this financial motive to register 
a risk in a child’s file is in line with principles set by Art. 6 of the 95/46/EC Directive is 
important.  Under the proposed GDPR, cases of financial steering in the risk registration are 
troublesome given both the data minimization principle and the transparency principle (the data 
controller’s obligation to inform the data subject of the conditions related to the data processing, 
in particular, when the data processing concerns children). However, perhaps an even more 
serious issue arises as to the general capacity of the GDPR to circumvent or fight the emergence 
of such financial biases within risk-profiling practices as those mentioned above. This is a 
severe issue because it cannot be identified with certainty, whether the main motives behind 
submitting a risk signal were only to serve the best interest of the child or to serve rather 
managerial and even existential interests of youth care agencies. It is at this point that the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child could afford additional protection in that it requires an 
assessment that is broader than merely data protection-related issues.   
Unfair profiling? 
The preventative, colour-code based registration of risks in ProKid happens through incident 
codes coming from two other strictly law enforcement databases: the Basic Facility for Law 
Enforcement (BFLE, or Basisvoorziening Handhaving in Dutch) and the Basic Facility for 
Forensic Investigation (BFFI, or Basisvoorziening Opsporing in Dutch). Incident notifications 
from these systems are crosschecked with the addresses of children already registered in 
ProKid. When an incident involving a child (so far unknown by ProKid) occurs, that child is 
registered at his/her home address. Yet, not all of the addresses of close family members of a 
child are ‘viewed’ in the system: 
“Address changes in the [ProKid] system are not connected to changes in the municipal 
registry18. When a police officer reports on an address, [the data] are checked automatically 
against the municipal registry. However, if parents divorce and move to two different addresses 
and they arrange co-parenthood, the child is usually registered only at the mother’s address. So, 
                                               
16 The financial steering of risk registration in the Reference Index High-Risk Youth is not a nationwide phenomenon, but it 
depends on the choices local governments make. 
17 Certainly, this observation only applies to the specific city where the interviewee coordinated and managed the registration 
of risk signals by all partner organizations linked to the system. 
18 In the Netherlands, municipalities maintain the addresses of all their inhabitants through central registries. 
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if a problem occurs at the father’s address, ProKid unfortunately misses out on that.” (ProKid 
manager, city B) 
Although the goal of ProKid is to provide a picture that is as complete as possible about the 
child, the very set-up of the system seems to unfairly profile children because children do not 
receive equal attention. Those whose family members live at the same address receive more 
attention than those whose family members live at addresses that are different from the child’s. 
Elsewhere, this has been called “a technological solidification of the social norm that children 
live with their married parents” (La Fors-Owczynik & Valkenburg, 2015). Given this 
phenomenon and refraining from advocating for the inclusion of more addresses in a child’s 
file, it would be worth discussing the extent to which the profiling of children by ProKid occurs 
fairly and lawfully, as set by Art. 3 of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. After the Police 
and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive is ratified, the principles of fairness and 
lawfulness will remain crucial and will be prescribed by Art. 4. Therefore, the capacity of the 
directive in addressing such inconsistencies in risk profiling and data aggregation, as the above 
quote demonstrates, is worth debating. Moreover, the extent to which unfair profiling falls 
entirely within the capacity of the Directive and whether it could be complemented with 
children’s rights assessments from the perspective of “the best interest of the child”(Art 3. of 
the CRC) is also worth debating. 
The above examples demonstrate that assigning a risk profile to a child is not without 
controversies, which often renders the extent to which pivotal principles of the GDPR and the 
Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive are enforced in relation to profiling and 
data processing disputable. The next section, however, demonstrates that using risk profiles 
raises additional issues. 
6.2. Using risk profile data 
 
No option to register improvements. 
When using the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the built-in norms in the system, at times, 
not only to steer(Oudshoorn, 2011), but also to dominate and limit professionals’ choices: 
“Many professionals who have been working for years within youth healthcare notice, for 
instance, that they cannot register signals in the system that reflect that things are going well for 
the child. I find it to be frustrating that I can only register negative things, only risks, and not 
that the kid is doing well19. The system only allows you to record risks—for example, that the 
child is hyperactive. It is as if children can only have problems. If things are going well for the 
child, then I would like to register that, but I cannot.” (CB nurse, city D) 
This quote shows that the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry is not only a healthcare system but 
also a de facto public safety instrument that occasionally overshadows features that a regular 
healthcare system would need to address, such as the possibility of registering improvements 
in one’s healthcare status. Because registering positive developments about a child is 
unavailable in the system, the use of risk profiles in DYHR raises questions regarding how the 
socio-technological set-up of the DYHR fosters principles relating to data quality as laid down 
by Art. 6 of the 95/46/EC Directive. Furthermore, in light of the quote, it can be discussed, how 
the principles of fairness and transparency as specified by Art. 5 of the GDPR would be of 
assistance for similar cases of risk profiling children. Furthermore, the inability to register good 
things in a child’s file raises questions regarding the extent to which the features of the DYHR 
                                               
19 This phenomenon has been raised as a problem by 2/3 of the interviewed youth healthcare professionals. 
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serve high-quality public healthcare, as required by Art. 3 of the Dutch Public Health Act (Wet 
Publieke Gezondheid, 2008) or the “best interest of the child” as laid down by the UN 
Convention on the Rights’ of the Child. 
No distinction between perpetrators, victims and suspects. 
When using risk profiles in the ProKid system, the same colour code can be assigned to victims, 
witnesses or perpetrators. For instance, the colour yellow depicts a profile, in which a child has 
been registered ‘3-9 times’ either as a victim or as a witness. Yellow is also the colour code of 
a child who has been registered once as a suspect of a light incident’(Abraham, Buysee, Loef, 
& Van Dijk, 2011).20 A professional explains the following information concerning how a 
perpetrator’s profile influences the risk profile of an eventual child witness: 
“Many times, you see, the mother is divorced and has a child, and the child gets a report as 
being hyperactive. Then, later, the mother starts a new relationship with a man, who moves in 
at the same address. If the mother’s new boyfriend, for instance, already has a police record or 
has been involved in domestic violence, this creates a high risk factor for the child (especially 
if he/she sees something similar). The child lives at one address with this man. Therefore, the 
yellow colour of the address [in the child’s record] will turn into orange [...]” (ProKid manager, 
city B) 
This set up of the ProKid system, however, if enforced, would not meet recital 18 of the Police 
and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive, which specifically states that:  
“a clear distinction should be made between personal data on suspects, persons convicted of a 
criminal offence, victims and other third parties, such as witnesses, persons possessing relevant 
information or contacts and associates of suspects and convicted criminals.”  
Although the correlations designed in the colour-coding system of ProKid between 
perpetrators, victims and witnesses are grounded in behavioural science, using the same 
(coloured) risk profile on a child witness, victim or perpetrator seems problematic in light of 
recital 18. Furthermore, the fact that no distinction is made between perpetrators, suspects and 
victims in the classification system of ProKid also collides with the enforcement of children’s 
rights, which require that “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his or her privacy” (Art. 16).  
Despite certain existing standards for police officers working with ProKid regarding the 
types of risk profiles to share with youth care professionals21, exchanging risk profile 
information is not straightforward in practice. For instance, a standard prescribes that red 
colour-coded profiles of children—the colour that signifies perpetrators—need to be submitted 
to Bureau Youthcare22(Nijhof et al., 2007)(Nijhof et al., 2007). Although the standard does not 
show that a child’s file and colour code in ProKid can influence the file of another child, this 
                                               
20 About further descriptions of colour codes in ProKid please see: Abraham, M., Buysee, W., Loef, L., & Van Dijk, B. Pilots 
ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-groep, 2011) 
21 In 2007 to facilitate collaboration between the Dutch police and Bureau Youthcare, a flagship organization within Dutch 
youth care, which collaboration also forms the basis for ProKid: “Early identification and referral” policy had been introduced. 
About this, see more in: Goedee, J., Rijkers, A. Zorgsignalen van de Politie: Over het werk process 'Vroegsignaleren en 
doorverwijzen' tussen Politie en Bureau Jeugdzorg (Ministerie van Jeugd en Gezin, 2010) 
22 The interviews that provided empirical material for this article were conducted before 2015. As of January 2015, as a 
consequence of the administrative reorganization of Dutch youth care Bureau Youthcare organizations do not exist anymore, 
but their tasks are redistributed to municipalities and newly certified agencies of youth care. The police share its concerns in 
relation to children with other parties according to the new set-up of the organizations in charge of youth care.   
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has become a daily routine of practitioners. One professional provides the following 
explanation on this issue: 
“If I see a child who only has a yellow or white coloured registration—and I know this does not 
yet qualify it for sending to the Bureau Youthcare—but the child’s friend is ‘red’ in the system; 
then I bring this extra information into the case discussion within Bureau Youthcare.” (ProKid 
manager, city B) 
A white or yellow registration usually signifies a child as a victim or a witness. Yet, the risk 
profile of this child is shared with Bureau Youthcare because a friendship relation was drawn 
between the child with the yellow profile and another child who is profiled red in the system. 
Randomly drawing such a correlation23 into a risk profile about a child by the time the Police 
and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive will be in force would question the extent to 
which Art. 4, prescribing these conditions for the processing of data as lawfulness, transparency 
and fairness, is respected. The preventative move of the professional, moreover, raises 
questions regarding the extent to which such profiling affects a child discriminatorily and 
whether the criterion “in the best interest of the child” is acted upon. 
Risk profile for a baby through indirect evidence. 
Given that data registration, in practice, involves more than just the standard that is certainly 
useful and necessary to sustain professional flexibility and allow room for improvisation. The 
fact that police officers can freely register a child in the system shows that a child can relatively 
easily become risk profiled by ProKid: 
 “[…] when our officers are at an address and find drugs, […] this information becomes 
registered in BFLE. But, if they find a baby bottle in the kitchen and ask whether there is a baby, 
and the inhabitants of the house answer: ‘No, the bottle belongs to my sister who comes here 
occasionally’. If the officer cannot find hard information about whether we need to seek care 
for the baby, or who exactly lives there, or to what extent the person is making something up… 
and the officer has a bad feeling [about it] and wants to use the information [about the bottle], 
he can register it in BFFI24. We ProKid managers can see that.” (ProKid manager, city C)  
If the directive was in place, this quote would lead to questions with respect to whether the 
transparency principle of Art. 4 in the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive is 
enforced. According to this, any personal data should be “processed lawfully, fairly and in a 
transparent manner in relation to the data subject”. The directive permits the collection and 
processing of data for purposes of prevention. However, the fact that data about the mentioned 
baby and their parents is registered in a police database without their knowledge and that 
through the link of that database to ProKid a risk profile can emerge in ProKid about the baby, 
this raises questions regarding the extent to which the processing of data and the risk profiling 
by ProKid happens lawfully, fairly and transparently. Furthermore, to address the most 
important issue at hand—namely, the potential, long term, discriminatory and stigmatising 
effect risk profiling can cause for a baby—it is essential to perform a complementary children 
rights’ assessment because these effects reach beyond the capacity of the new data protection 
regime.   
                                               
23 As the interviews demonstrated drawing random correlations in ProKid is possible, because the technological settings allow 
for a rather horizontal – information visible on more children – view of children and because the system promotes professionals 
to take up digitally depicted issues which they see as providing better prevention. 
24 The Basic Facility for Forensic Investigation (BFFI, or Basisvoorziening Opsporing in Dutch) is a law enforcement database 
of the Dutch police, where a variety of observations of police officers are registered. 
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To share or not to share (healthcare information). 
The ways in which youth healthcare information can be shared beyond the medical 
profession, especially for risk profiling purposes that are geared towards fostering public 
safety interests, is perhaps one of the most regulated areas in the Netherlands25. Yet, with the 
rise of the Reference Index High Risk Youth, the sharing of medical information has become 
situated in a context where new, digitalized prevention practices appear to redefine certain 
rules. In a large Dutch city, there is a specialized organization in youth care called the 
Municipal District Organization for Comprehensive Approach (in Dutch: Deelgemeentelijke 
Organisatie Sluitende Aanpak, DOSA). Youth care professionals can turn to this agency when 
problems in a family become too complex26. A case manager of this organization provided the 
following explanation concerning how the sharing of healthcare data is smoothened in 
practice as a consequence of the digital notification their organization receives about each 
signal and match in the Reference Index:  
“… if you have a RI match, it is an innocent thing. You can then approach a doctor and say: 
‘You do not have to open up the whole dossier in front of me, but are you busy with this child, 
are there concerns?’ Especially, if we are in touch with a GP who is almost not allowed to say 
a word according to the Dutch Individual Healthcare Profession Act […] To give an example, 
I was very happy with the information we provided. That doctor said: ‘I have here a mother 
who is always depressed and has all kinds of bodily and physical complaints. But, she does 
not want to say much, and I cannot figure out what the problem is. I can transfer her to an 
internist and give her Valium, but then I am only fighting the symptoms. Is she known to 
you?’ Then, I answer: ‘Yes she is known to us because there are serious concerns about all 
[of] the children: there is an annoying ex, the children do not do well at school, one child had 
been in contact with the police. So, it is no wonder the mother looks like she does in your 
practice.’ If the GP knows all this, then the GP can ask whether there are financial problems, 
for instance. He can ask questions more specifically, without prescribing big doses of 
medicine […]. This is the affectivity of the system […] and how far RI risk reporting can go. I 
can really benefit from such a signalling system.” (DOSA-manager, city A) 
The above example demonstrates the direct consequences of sharing medical information, 
which stem; on the one hand, from the existence of the RI system and from the ways an in-
between organization manages youth care in a large Dutch city. The 95/46/EC Directive 
provides grounds within which derogations from the restrictions on processing sensitive data, 
including healthcare data, are allowed. The GDPR extended these requirements and specified 
that sensitive data—including medical information - “in relation to fundamental rights and 
freedoms deserve specific protection as the context of their processing may create important 
risks for the fundamental rights and freedoms […]; such data should not be processed, unless 
processing is allowed in specific cases set out in this Regulation,…”(Recital 41).  
Furthermore, the extent to which the data subject (both the mother and her child) had been 
informed of this data processing (as laid down by Arts. 10 and 11 of the 95/46/EC Directive 
and in the future by Art. 12 of GDPR) would be worth investigating. Given the explanation of 
the RI manager regarding how the doctor shared health data, if the GDPR was in force, Art. 9 
would permit sensitive data processing if the processing of data concerning health is 
                                               
25 See about this the Individual Healthcare Professions Act(Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg, 1993) 
which entails confidentiality requirements for professionals about how to share patients’ data, or the Act on Medical Treatment 
Contacts Act (Wet Geneeskundige Behandelingsovereenkomst, 1994) which entails prescriptions about accessing patients’ 
files. 
26 DOSA organisations have a helicopter view of youth care related organizations and professionals and are notified about each 
risk signal and match registered in RI. DOSA professionals are not responsible for solving cases but for only assisting other 
professionals in solving them.  
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necessary, for instance “for occupational medicine […] or public health purposes”. Yet, a 
major issue would fall beyond the framework of the data protection regime. The question 
arises concerning the extent to which the ‘privacy of the child’ as a fundamental children’s 
right had been enforced when the DOSA professional exchanged information about a child 
with another doctor in a well-intended manner.  
All of the above examples demonstrate that using risk profiles, and processing data for the 
purposes of profiling via the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High 
Risk Youth and the ProKid systems can evoke rather controversial situations in practice. If 
the GDPR and the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive were already be 
enforced, these issues would challenge a set of prescriptions of these legal instruments.  
6.3. Erasing risk profile data 
 
This section addresses certain issues concerning the way in which children’s risk profiles can 
be erased. The obligation to take all steps necessary to erase incorrect data is set out by Art. 
6(e) of the 95/46/EC Directive. Art. 16 of the GDPR also discusses this in more detail when it 
deals with the right to rectification. The right to erasure or the right to be forgotten as laid down 
by Art. 17 of the GDPR, however, has been introduced as a new right. This right concerns all 
types of data, especially in relation to children, and it can be considered pivotal because risk 
profiles can significantly affect a child’s adult life as well. Therefore, the potential of the “right 
to be forgotten” or the “right to erasure” (Art. 17 of the GDPR) by deleting children’s risk 
profiles or links to their risk profiles is essential. Yet, as we will see, enforcing this right in 
practice would be quite a Gordian knot.   
Dealing with erroneous risk registration. 
A school doctor using a version of DYHR explains her difficulties in correcting data in 
children’s files as follows: 
“We can check each other (colleagues) and see what we have registered in the file about a child. 
But, we cannot correct data, even a risk, in the file, for instance, after a health check case is 
closed. Only the application manager can reopen the health check case and a child’s file. Doctors 
cannot. We need to notify the manager. […]On the top of that, it is not easy to find the 
problematic data in the file again.” (school doctor, city E) 
Another professional using DYHR shared a similar frustration concerning the shortcomings 
inherent in the set-up of the system with regard to deleting incorrect information. The 
implications of this information for the data subject can be severe: 
“Everything I register instantly goes into the computer and can be monitored. […] If a colleague 
has filled in something wrong, even a risk, then I [the manager] need to first receive an email 
query from him/her about whether I would take out the wrong information from a child’s file. 
Until then, [the wrong information] remains in the file and professionals with access can check 
it.” (CB-doctor, city A) 
The General Data Protection Regulation in recital 30 specifies how to respond with respect to 
erroneous data: “every reasonable step should be taken to ensure that personal data which are 
inaccurate are rectified or deleted […], and time limits should be established by the controller 
for erasure or for a periodic review”. Erroneous data should be rapidly corrected according to 
the prescriptions of the GDPR; the mentioned practices show that correction can indeed take a 
substantial amount of time. If the GDPR had been accepted, both examples would raise 
additional questions about how data subjects are informed when erroneous data are stored (Arts. 
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10 and 11 of the 95/46/EC Directive and Art. 12 of GDPR) and how their rights to object to the 
processing of (incorrect) personal data (recital 53 GDPR) are respected. The DYHR, however, 
is linked to the Reference Index High Risk Youth through risk signals, and therefore, any risk 
signal in the DYHR (only a signal; no further details of medical import) becomes 
simultaneously visible as an alert in the RI. This means that through automated connections, 
erroneous risk profiles can spread across systems for a longer period of time. The above-
mentioned difficulty in correcting and erasing data also demonstrates this danger. The issue 
demonstrated by the two examples also touches upon fundamental principles and raises 
questions concerning how an incorrect risk registration and, more importantly, a lengthy 
process of correction can be regarded as being in “the child’s best interest”.  
Retained data after expiration remains relevant. 
Data retention requirements for the DYHR, RI and ProKid also differ with respect to the 
conditions under which data can become erased from a child’s file. Both the 95/46/EC Directive 
and the Framework Decision 2008 point towards national legislations in regard to data retention 
limitations. Data can be retained for 15 years in DYHR, for seven years in RI and for five years 
in ProKid. Although a risk signal in RI officially expires after 12 months, signals in practice 
can be retained for varying periods, depending on which organization connected to RI 
submitted the specific signal: 
“Each signal has an expiration date. […] For instance, a police signal remains for three months; 
a signal from an educational institution for six. Signals of other organizations generally remain 
for 12 months, and we keep BYC signals for 24 months in RI. Signals can be matched only during 
these periods. […] According to the new Youth Care Act, after a signal becomes inactive, it 
remains visible for another five years on the website. Afterwards, it must be deleted.” (RI 
manager, city C) 
 
The above quote demonstrates that depending on which organization submits a signal about a 
child to RI, the data retention period can either be longer or shorter than 12 months. Signals 
after the expiration of the given period become inactive and cannot be matched anymore. Yet, 
they remain visible in a child’s file for another five years to assist other professionals:  
“An inactive signalling allows another professional to use the source of the inactive signal, in 
order to acquire information from the professional busy with the child earlier.” (RI manager, city 
D) 
The additional five years, however, is a de facto lengthening of the period during which risk 
profile data remain available for further profiling purposes concerning a child. If the GDPR 
was in force, this would run afoul to the transparency principle and the data minimization 
principle of Art. 5. Moreover, this also demonstrates that the (data retention) law on the 
books differs from the law in practice. 
In a similar manner, signals that are not based on risk profiles but are only based on 
the gut feelings of professionals—called pre-signals in RI—can also prolong the period 
under which a risk profile can be assigned to a child. In this respect, both inactive signals 
and pre-signals can be viewed as a means by which the scope of prevention and the risk-
profiling period de facto “expands in time” (La Fors-Owczynik & Valkenburg, 2015). 
Because the basis upon which a pre-signal can be lodged in the system (gut feelings) is quite 
obscure, this renders the grounds for erasure quite ambiguous as well. These features of pre-
signals raise questions on multiple fronts regarding the extent to which the transparency 
principle in the 95/46/EC is met. For future cases when GDPR is in force, the use of inactive 
signals and pre-signals can challenge the enforcement of the transparency principle and the 
requirement for the data controller to provide clarification about the data minimization 
principle for the data subject as laid down by Art. 5 of the GDPR. Because data subjects are 
informed neither about pre-signal registrations nor about the reasons for such registrations, 
   
20 
the enforcement of the data controller’s obligation to inform the data subject about the 
processing of data, as provided by Art. 12 would also be challenged. Finally, the existence 
of inactive signals and pre-signals as a routinely used means for risk profiling children in RI 
raises questions regarding the enforcement of Art. 20. The latter defines “the right not to be 
subject to a measure which produces legal effects concerning this natural person or 
significantly affects this natural person”.  
The issues raised above, moreover, show that fundamental rights are also at stake. 
Notably, beyond their envisaged preventative benefit, the extent to which inactive signals 
and pre-signals enforce the fundamental right that “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his or her privacy” (Art. 16 of CRC) is questionable. The 
GDPR specifies significant limitations with respect to profiling children. The preventative 
prolonging of the lifetime of a risk profile by pre-signals and inactive signals, however, 
raises questions about whether the best interest of the child is not overshadowed by the 
preventative public safety objectives. At the same time, when a child’s risk profile needs to 
be erased, the capacity of the GDPR to protect “the best interest of the child” proves to be 
insufficient. 
7. Discussion as to the normative state of the new data protection regime in light 
of the empirical findings 
 
As is shown by the empirical data provided in this article, the new Data Protection 
Regulation and the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive will have a strong 
impact on data protection in light of risk profiling practices on children. 
Although the GDPR introduces that “children (…) deserve specific protection of their 
personal data, as they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in 
relation to the processing of personal data”(Recital 29), it does not specify conditions for 
profiling children because it only addresses commercial parties. When children are profiled by 
government agencies, both the GDPR and the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection 
Directive apply. Both regimes allow for profiling, provided the provisions and conditions set 
under these regimes and their national implementation are respected. 
Therefore, although not yet in force, the GDPR still has relevance. The empirical 
evidence shows examples of ambiguities and difficulties when professionals must decide what 
constitutes a risk. It is at this point, for instance, that Art. 5 of the GDPR dealing with data 
quality shows its relevance.  
Art. 8 of the GDPR stipulates the conditions that are “applicable to child's consent in 
relation to information society services”. The GDPR, however, does not provide conditions for 
risk profiling practices by governments with regard to children. However, the extent to which 
the GDPR shall take up this as a purpose is of course debatable. Yet, when parents or guardians 
of a child are considered causing a risk to a child (e.g.:  child abuse) and children are profiled 
against these risks by government agencies, a special guardian would be useful to represent the 
‘best interest of the child’.     
With respect to the discriminatory effects of profiling, in regard to children, the effects 
of profiling practices can only be judged and demonstrated in the long run. However, the 
empirical evidence presented in this article clearly shows that children can run risks as a 
consequence of certain discriminatory effects inherent in the use of the three analysed systems. 
The GDPR explicitly prescribes that fundamental rights as laid down by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union shall be respected during data processing. If the 
use of digital technologies may indeed be shown to have discriminatory effects on children and 
other data subjects, Art. 33 of the GDPR prescribes that the data controller shall initiate data 
protection impact assessments. The analysis shows that such data protection impact 
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assessments should be performed coupled with relevant prescriptions of the UNCRC. Given 
the specifics of this type of data processing, this analysis would be beneficial in strengthening 
the legal position of children against discrimination.      
Art. 14 of the GDPR stipulates that the data controller shall inform the data subject about 
the processing of data, for instance, and about the data retention period. As the empirical 
findings demonstrated (e.g.: pre-signals and inactive signals in RI), the information obligation 
of the data controller (Art 14 of the GDPR) is a tool of powerful legal potential. This would 
mean that the controller is required to inform the data subject (or guardian) about the 
registration of any type of risk data about a child held and used by government agencies. Hence, 
if the new regulatory regime is indeed implemented and upheld, more transparency will be 
realised with regard to the processing of children’s data by means of the systems discussed in 
this article.   
The empirical examples have shown that when the new data protection regime is adopted 
and applied in daily practice, the new regime provides more safeguards than the 95/46/EC 
Directive. The complexity of the regulation will certainly lead to difficulties in its practical 
enforcement. However, adding children right’s based specifications to the current text could 
largely foster the effectiveness of the regulation and the legal position of children during 
government-led, preventative profiling practices directed at children in any EU member state.  
8. Conclusion 
 
“Children deserve specific protection of their personal data, as they may be less aware 
of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to the processing of 
personal data.“27 
As demonstrated above, the daily risk profiling practices conducted by the Digital Youth 
Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High-Risk Youth, and the ProKid 12–SI systems 
would collide with many of the provisions of the proposed GDPR. This certainly means that 
the new data protection regime would offer a variety of legal tools to exploit in practice when 
it comes to the risk profiling of children. However, the analysis has also shown that the data 
protection regime often becomes difficult to interpret.  
The interviews that provided empirical material in this article have been somewhat 
limited by the specific research purposes of the current research. Notably, the interviews were 
geared toward highlighting what implications can come from using these systems. To provide 
a diverse set of issues as a priority, the analysis collected as many issues as possible that were 
comparable in many practices. This has meant a limitation in the data collection and analysis. 
Still, the empirical findings to provide valuable insights in relation to controversies that are 
inherent in the design of DYHR, RI and ProKid and the construction, use and erasure of risk 
profiles. These controversies outlined the limitations of the new data protection regime. With 
regard to risk profiling practices concerning children by the government systems assessed here, 
the new data protection regime would offer a variety of legal tools. The analysis of empirical 
data further demonstrated that the data protection regime, even if it was in effect, could not 
provide protection from the long-term stigmatising effects that the creation of a risk profile can 
cause for a child in the future. The difficulties in erasing erroneous risk profile data and the 
practical prolonging of the life of a child’s risk profile have both underlined the possibilities 
that these practices infringe on fundamental principles of respect for the rights of children. The 
data protection regime in its current form could not provide adequate protection for children 
                                               
27 Recital 29 of the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union (15 December 2015) 
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from these shortcomings, which, as we have seen, are the consequences of risk-profiling 
practices themselves. 
However, practice has also shown that ambiguities around the term ‘risk’ complicate 
issues, and at times, they render it virtually impossible to interpret such principles in the context 
of the new data protection regime. The impossibility to opt-out from risk-driven monitoring 
and the use of each of these three risk assessment systems by Dutch government agencies 
cannot be discussed within the framework of the new data protection regime. The regime is 
simply not meant to address issues preceding the registration of any risk data, including data 
about children by government organisations. Furthermore, the impossibility of registering 
improvements in the DYHR, the RI or in ProKid, the financial steering inherent in the risk-
signaling processes by RI, and the unfair ways in which risks are assigned to only one address 
of a child in ProKid all point to issues that reach beyond the limitations of the new data 
protection regime. Simultaneously, these issues highlight that practical implications of a certain 
technology design and related policy goals can jeopardize fundamental children’s rights. The 
problems raised in this discussion question the extent to which a primary intention behind these 
systems—namely, to prevent harm to a child—can be achieved, when the built-in norms and 
ambiguities around the registration and interpretation of a child’s risk profile result in additional 
risks.  
The extent to which the new data protection regime could and should be equipped with 
means to address issues similar to those mentioned above remains a pivotal topic for discussion. 
This is especially so because the analysis of the new data protection regime, in light of the 
illustrations provided by the empirical findings presented above, also supports Koops’s 
argument in relation to the new data protection regime: “Law in the books does not always 
become, nor does it always resemble law in action”(2014: 256). However, in light of the 
preceding analysis, the capacity of the (current) data protection regime in providing legal 
remedy to certain side effects of risk profiling by these systems proved that the use of such tools 
as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in order to better protect “the best interest of 
the child” is indispensable. The ways in which risk profiles are constructed and used and the 
conditions under which profiles are retained and erased have shown that the new data protection 
regime would fall short of serving the “best interest of the child” as required by Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. On the one hand, a child’s risk profile can be created relatively easily, 
given the extensive set of categories and norms according to which a risk flag can be assigned 
to a child. On the other hand, examples have shown that erasing a risk profile—or even 
information contained in such a profile—is often very difficult. 
 In addition to the following prescriptions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
a more ‘context-oriented’ reading of the data protection regime could also be of help. The data 
protection regime already favours fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy or the right 
to data protection. The prescriptions towards ‘privacy by design’ and ‘data protection by 
default’ also demonstrate this. Yet, each of these principles bears ambiguities around the term 
privacy and the term data protection. To tackle the difficulties of defining and interpreting 
privacy within profiling practices in relation to children, Nissenbaum’s hypothesis of ‘privacy 
as contextual integrity’ provides a nice alternative(2004). To see and define privacy through 
norms that govern different contexts differently would allow for a variety of other values to be 
enforced. For those professionals who perform risk profiling of children through any of the 
three systems discussed above, implementing a ‘privacy as contextual integrity’ approach in 
their daily practice would be very useful to balance the interests that are more in favour of 
fundamental values. Moreover, building in ethical values (Silverstein, Nissenbaum, Flanagan, 
& Freier, 2006) when designing information technologies in relation to children is 
indispensable. For instance, registering good things or improvements in a child’s behaviour 
within the ProKid system, or as raised elsewhere (La Fors-Owczynik, 2015) by erasing risks, 
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could in some cases grant a certain ‘right to be forgotten’ to a child. This, in practice, could 
mean a ‘right to be forgiven’, as the specific risk a child was linked to via a ProKid profile 
disappears. Considering the positive effects such steps can have on the development of children 
is essential. 
Although reporting of and profiling ‘anomalies’ concerning children in the Netherlands 
pervades public discourse, the problematic consequences of digital profiling practices are far 
less prominently discussed. This article assessed the capacity of the newly proposed European 
data protection regime to adequately respond to the risks stemming from the digital risk 
profiling practices of children by the Dutch government. Risk-profiling practices by each of the 
three systems are well intended and meant as necessary solutions to prevent harm from 
occurring to children. However, raising awareness of the newly emerging risks that stem from 
the very use of these systems is essential. Furthermore, the analysis can also be helpful to 
cultivate reflexivity in the new data protection prescriptions amongst professionals who assess 
children against risks by the DYHR, RI and ProKid.  
Despite the positive results that can be attributed to these systems—for instance, the 
timely notice of child abuse—the observations concerning the drawbacks of these systems are 
informative of the implications that government-led risk profiling practices can have with 
respect to children. The analysis also underlined the necessity of assessing how the best interest 
of the child is served by these systems (including unwritten principles such as the right of a 
child to learn from small mistakes). Given the current stage and the potential direction in which 
the text of the new data protection regime might develop, the analysis in this article provides a 
glimpse of what the regime could mean within contexts of government-led risk profiling of 
children. In doing so, it noted that the new data protection regime will not and cannot be the 
single solution against the issues stemming from the creation and use of such digital risk profiles 
of children.   
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Minor protection or major injustice? – Children’s
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A B S T R A C T
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most essential place-
holder for protecting children’s rights internationally. In support of its leading principle: “the
best interest of the child” (Art. 3) a growing number of digital technologies are employed
in different contexts of life, including contexts of justice and youth care. Therefore, when
children enter the juvenile justice system and become objects of proactive, digitalised in-
vestigations, CRC rights are even more pivotal. Yet, as academic discourse demonstrates,
children’s rights are increasingly under pressure within law enforcement (Bruning, 2010;
Kilkelly, 2001). This paper sets out to explore a relatively undiscussed topic, namely the
digitalised preventative policing practices on children under the United Nations CRC.
The discussion by way of illustration centres around an initiative taken in recent years in
The Netherlands, ProKid SI 12- (ProKid). Grounded in a public rhetoric where ‘crimes against
children’ and ‘crimes committed by children’ are viewed as equally important issues to prevent,
the risk profiling system ProKid is employed by the Dutch police as a solution for both. Em-
pirical details about ProKid demonstrate, however, that its preventative profiling routines
challenge several CRC principles such as, for instance ‘the child’s assumption of a consti-
tutive role in society’, its ‘privacy’ and perhaps most importantly ‘the assumption of innocence
of a child until proven guilty’. The use of ProKid frames children as potential perpetrators
even when they are registered as victims of violence. In the light of the challenges raised,
this paper aims to open up the debate about the risks ProKid and similar initiatives bring
along for children, and their families and about the CRC’s potential to address these.








As more risks are identified in almost all aspects of citizens’ ev-
eryday life in the 21st century, risk assessment modes and
technologies are increasingly employed within professional prac-
tices inWestern societies.Ulrich Beck’s“risk society”1 progressively
has grown into what Barry calls the “blaming society”,2 which
in her view is primarily “concerned with risk avoidance and de-
fensive practices”.3Although different types of individuals have
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1 Beck, U. Risk society: Towards a new modernity (SAGE publications 1992).
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become objects of these routines, children are often a promi-
nent group within these routines, because they are seen as a
group ‘at the margin’ due to their psychological, social or legal
immaturity and less-developed awareness. Hence, their pro-
tection from a wide range of risks often justifies a significantly
larger set of prevention modes, than the protection of adults
would.Practices of care and prevention of potential harm to youth
are some prime examples internationally, where technology-
based risk prevention in assessing children, becomes prioritised
and situated higher and higher on political and professional
agendas. Specifically, child abuse and anti-social behaviour of youth
have long been prime concerns to prevent internationally.4 To
foster the prevention of such problems the so-called identity man-
agement technologies (IDM)5 for risk assessment are increasingly
seen as inevitable ‘solutions’.
Child abuse and the anti-social behaviour of youth have re-
cently been pushed to the forefront6 in The Netherlands. ProKid
SI 12- (henceforth: ProKid), a risk profiling, IDM system on chil-
dren aged between 0 and 12 years has been introduced and
used by the police in The Netherlands in order to prevent a
range of problems children might be victims or perpetrators
of. Risk signals both about ‘crimes against children’ and ‘crimes
committed by children’ are registered in ProKid and form risk
profiles of children. The in-built standards and the daily use
of ProKid are initiated to forecast potential problematic futures
children might develop by monitoring, diagnosing and signal-
ling issues associated with a child already in the present. This
article will demonstrate that although the purpose of ProKid
is to prevent law enforcement related problems associated with
a child, the very use of ProKid brings risks for children and their
families as a consequence. These risks challenge the enforce-
ment of childrens’ rights as prescribed by a prominent
regulatory instrument issued by the United Nations: the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Given that initiatives
similar to ProKid are being used in various countries, the prin-
cipal aim of this article is to explore the CRC’s potential to
address the risks stemming from the use of these systems.
The ProKid SI 12- system emerged at a time when the Dutch
government undertook two of its most comprehensive changes
in its recent administrative history: one within its justice system
and one within its youth care system. First, as of 2013, a tran-
sition affected the Dutch police corps: a picture of a more
centralised ‘national police’ emerged when 25 police corps units
became reduced to 10. Second, within the Dutch youth care
system as of January 2015 the management and distribution of
professional care for children has been moved from provinces
to municipalities. Although this comprehensive change was
argued as being necessary to reduce costs and increase effi-
ciency in the provision of care by professional organisations,
critical voices raised their concerns. For instance, the Dutch Child
Ombudsman who safeguards and controls the enforcement of
CRC inThe Netherlands shared his professional reservations about
whether the purposes of efficiency and budgetary cuts during
this transition in the youth care sector did not jeopardise such
primary principles as “the best interest of the child” (Art. 3 CRC).
Moreover, scholars shared their worries about the legitimacy of
this decentralisation in youth care with special regard to the extent
to which the government remains able to control data flows and
maintain its duty of transparency under the Dutch Data Pro-
tection Act7 and the European General Data Protection Proposal.8
The effect of both transitions should be considered against
the background of an increase in the use of “surveillance and
identification technologies”9 by the police as well as youth care
organisations.10 Although prevention had for long been a top
priority within Dutch youth care,11 the extensive use of IDM
systems, as well as the practice of sharing large amounts of
personal data between partners involved, is a relatively new
phenomenon.12 ProKid SI 12- as a system in assisting the police
to conduct digitalised preventative work is unparalleled.13
Academic literature criticised ProKid as a technology produc-
ing a certain preventative, penalising pressure or “pre-pressure”
4 For international examples, see section 2.2. The following
systems, for instance in the USA: ‘Partnership for youth at risk’
<http://www.partnershipsforyouthatrisk.org/sections/registration/
registration_main1.htm; in Australis: ‘High Risk Youth Register’
<http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/cpmanual/practice-context/children-in
-specific-circumstances/1014-high-risk-adolescents-hra-practice
-requirements/3>; or in the UK for period of time: the Contact Point
(see also Hoyle, D. ‘ContactPoint. Because every child matters?’ (2010)
The encyclopaedia of informal education <www.infed.org/
socialwork/contactpoint.htm>.
5 Identity management technologies in citizen–state relations are
digital systems which perform the identification and verification
of citizens and allow for differing levels of access control for gov-
ernment authorities. These systems serve to establish ‘identities’
(defined as personal data sets) within citizen–state relations. This
includes the identities of persons subject to the system, in this case
children and families, as well as those professionals (e.g.: techni-
cians, doctors, police men, etc.) who interact with such systems
on a regular basis.
6 The Minister of Youth and Family: André Rouvoet explained in
an interview (van Wijck, 2009), that during his 13 year carrier being
an MP he experienced no discussion on the topic of child abuse,
therefore how glad he was that the topic finally reached the top
of political agendas.
7 Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens 2000 (Data Protection Act)
Retrieved on 20th July 2014, from <http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0011468>.
8 Klingenberg, A.M. & Lindeboom, J. ‘Lost in e-government: bevat
de Algemene verordening gegevensbescherming voldoende
waarborgen voor burgers bij gegevensverwerking door de overheid?’
(2013) 6 Privacy & Informatie 273.
9 Lyon, D. Identifying Citizens: ID cards as Surveillance. (Polity Press
2009). Lyon, D. Surveillance society Monitoring everyday life (Open Uni-
versity Press 2001).
10 The Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (in Dutch: Digitaal Dossier
Jeugdgezondheidszorg) or the Reference Index High Risk Youth (in
Dutch: Verwijsindex Risicojongeren) are two examples of such
systems.
11 Gorissen, W. Kennis als hulpbron: het gebruik van wetenschappelijk
kennis bij beleidsvorming in de jeugdgezondheidszorg voor 4-19 jarigen
(University of Utrecht 2002). Mathar, T., & Jansen, Y. J. F. M. ‘Intro-
duction’ in T. Mathar & Y. J. F. M. Jansen (eds), Health Promotion and
Prevention Programmes in Practice: How Patients ’ Health Practices are
Rationalised, Reconceptualised and Reorganised (Transcript Verlag, 2012).
12 Tilley, N. (ed), Handbook of crime prevention community safety (Willan
Publisher 2013).
13 Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012), 29 279 Rechtsstaat en
Rechtsorde Nr. 147 Brief van de minister van veiligheid en justitie
aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Den
Haag.
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on children who appear on its radar.14 Yet, thus far ProKid which
is situated in a law enforcement organisation in the Dutch
justice system and connected to ‘pure’ law enforcement
databases15 has not yet been assessed from a children’s rights
perspective, as laid down by CRC.This is crucial in order to iden-
tify, which interests ProKid tends to promote: the ‘best interest
of the child’ or the ‘interest of public safety’.
Given that complete transparency about the child or in other
words the ‘complete erasure of a child’s privacy’ by govern-
ment systems such as ProKid under no circumstances could
it be viewed as being in the child’s best interest, not even if
such transparency would be argued as being in the interest of
public safety,. Hence, a high degree of privacy can be seen as
being continuously necessary and in the best interest of the
child. Consequently, in order to evaluate the implications of
ProKid on the ‘best interest of the child’ assessing the impli-
cations of ProKid on the child’s right to privacy is absolutely
critical.
Therefore, the article starts with a discussion in Section 2
of the prescriptions of CRC for digital identity management
practices and more specifically for the child’s right to privacy.
The CRC perspective provides a useful analytical lens to explore
the implications of ProKid on children’s and families’ lives.
When it comes to children, the definition of privacy in CRC is
broader than that, for instance, in the European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). This broadness is deemed jus-
tifiable as the word privacy is repeatedly used as being
inseparable from settings concerning personal data protec-
tion in the text of GDPR.16 Whereas the strength of the definition
of privacy in CRC is that it encompasses more than only pre-
scriptions about personal data processing. Certainly, the CRC
perspective also includes the prescriptions of the data pro-
tection regulation on a child’s privacy, but since it is broader
it also allows for the consideration of issues that data protec-
tion regulations usually do not. Notably, it gives room for
instance for considerations of whether or not data concern-
ing a child, should be registered in systems such as ProKid at
all. As the CRC prescribes the most universal, child specific set
of fundamental rights and values.
Furthermore, the section will also investigate how the right
to privacy is underpinned by a selection of international leg-
islative tools.These include three ECHR case laws on children’s
privacy within law enforcement. The case laws are chosen spe-
cifically in law enforcement, because in these cases the ECHR
decided in favour of a ‘child’s right to privacy’ versus ‘public
safety interests’.These judgments are crucial, because as schol-
ars have shown within Dutch law enforcement court cases CRC
rights are most rarely considered versus public safety interests.17
The chosen ECHR court cases emerge therefore as being useful,
as ProKid is an instrument that has as its main objective pre-
venting children from developing delinquency.18 ProKid also
shows a priority for safeguarding public safety interests and
as such also affects the right to privacy of a wide range of chil-
dren and others related to them on a daily basis.
Subsequently, Section 3 explores the challenges around
ProKid within The Netherlands by providing empirical in-
sights into practices, where the purpose, design and use of
ProKid challenge CRC rights and sometimes even jeopardise
the enforcement of the convention. These insights are the
results of self-conducted, semi-structured interviews with police
officers working with ProKid in different cities in The Nether-
lands prior to January 2015.19 Based on these insights, Section
4 analyses the potential of CRC as a legal instrument to enhance
the protection of children’s rights, even when it comes to risks
stemming from the very use of ProKid. The conclusion focuses
on the main challenges the Convention faces in light of the
discussed developments around systems such as ProKid. This
includes themes for discussions about how to address both the
risks ProKid is designed to prevent and the risks that stem from
those ProKid profiling methods, which frame children being
‘at risk’ of committing a crime and ‘as a risk’ in committing a
crime in the future.
2. The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) and digital identity management
(IDM) systems in children–state relations
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) was adopted in 1989. Since this event, it has been the
most essential agreement for protecting children’s rights
and values internationally.20 Because this convention
14 Schinkel, W. ‘Prepression: the actuarial archive of new tech-
nologies of security’ (2011) 15(4) Theoretical Criminology, 365.
15 About ‘pure’ law enforcement systems connected to ProKid, see
page 12 of this article.
16 About this see, for instance, Amendment 37, 43, 44 and 49 in
the text of the GDPR. Amendment 37, for instance frames privacy
along the enforcement of principles of data minimisation and
purpose limitation. Amendment 43 concerning personal data breach
uses the terms personal data and privacy almost as synonyms.
Amendment 44 in a similar manner frames personal data and
privacy as terms that can replace each other, when it praises the
potential of thorough impact assessments in protecting them.
Amendment 49, furthermore frames the principles of privacy by
design and privacy by default through the ways in which data pro-
tection restrictions need to be effectuated. The text of the GDPR
had been retrieved on 12th December 2014 from: <http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7
-TA-2014-0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.
17 About this, consult further: De Graaf, J. H., Limbeek, L. M. B.,
Bahadur, N. N. & Van der Meij, N. De toepassing van het internationaal
verrag inzake de rechten van het kind in de Nederlandse rechtspraak 1
Januari 2002–1 September 2011 (Ars Libri, 2012).
18 For more, please see the section on ProKid.
19 As of 1st of January 2015 the Institution of Bureau Youth Care
have been abolished and other institutions became certified to carry
out the tasks of Bureau Youth Care in The Netherlands. This con-
stitutes part of the large transition operation, within which youth
care tasks have been transferred to Dutch city councils. More-
over, city councils need to establish professional relations with newly
certified youth care institutions in order to safeguard the quality
of care.
20 Alston, P. and Tobin, J., Laying the Foundations for Children’s Rights:
An Independent Study of some Key Legal and Institutional Aspects of the
Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 2005).
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specifies that children need to enjoy protection from harm
and that when children are accused of criminal behaviour,
any legal procedure must occur by focussing closely on the
enforcement of their rights, the CRC is an indispensable legal
source of prevention practices aimed at forecasting problems
associated with children. The convention is particularly rel-
evant when prevention is performed associated with children
by such digital risk assessment systems as ProKid, as used
by the Dutch police. Furthermore, the CRC has had a ‘direct
working’21 in Dutch law since 1995, including legal areas for
such parties to the justice system as the police. The CRC has
already been part of a great variety of court cases,22–24all of
which demonstrate, however, that the CRC’s direct working
remains de facto indirect up until a court rules on the direct
working of its provisions.25
The convention was the first treaty to define children as
rights holders. Separate articles are devoted to define prescrip-
tions for children who are categorised as victims or witnesses
of violence or who are accused of a form of perpetration. The
fact that the Conventions speak together about all these
three categories implies the relevance of the educative char-
acter of the CRC towards all children. However, distinctions
between these categories remain highly relevant because
children categorised by any of these categories need differ-
ent forms of assistance (for instance, a child victim could
need psychological help first whereas an accused child could
need judicial assistance). Examples of CRC principles particu-
larly relevant from the perspective of prevention and such
government-owned identity management systems as ProKid,
which is geared towards assessing and categorising children
into any of the three above categories, include the following:
(1) “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his or her privacy” (Art. 16); (2) “assuming
of a constructive role in society about a child” (Art. 40); and
(perhaps most importantly) (3) “the assumption of innocence
of a child until proven guilty” (Art. 40). Such principles are
often not part of discussions in relation to such IDM systems
as ProKid because data protection regulations are usually
considered to cover them already. Notably, when data are
processed in line with such regulations, CRC prescriptions
mostly remain untouched.
The CRC is also the first legal instrument to establish the
right to privacy for children as a basic fundamental right.
However, it does not specify data protection as a separate fun-
damental right of children.26 Although the UN Human Rights
Committee, the drafter of the convention, cautioned about reg-
istering and processing information digitally on children by
either public or private parties,27 the CRC remains a less-
prominent instrument to consult regarding prevention practices
using digital systems on children. This instrument, however,
proves to be crucial for use.The CRC right to privacy has a much
broader definition of privacy than do, for instance, EU data pro-
tection instruments,28 as mentioned earlier. However, the CRC
right to privacy also can be considered a precondition to or part
of other children’s rights such as the above-mentioned Art. 40.
This proves to be highly relevant because risk registrations about
children in ProKid do affect these principles. Furthermore, chil-
dren’s right to privacy can also be viewed as a continuous
weight that can be used to counter other values and inter-
ests. Within law enforcement, for instance, it is countered by
public safety interests the balancing of which constitutes an
essential part of prevention practices and risk calculations by
ProKid. Hence, the following section assesses how children’s
right to privacy as laid down by the CRC, including their right
to digital privacy, also is strengthened by other legal instru-
ments covering children–state relations.
As we will see in the next section, the European Conven-
tion for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
strengthens CRC rights already by its applicability to all persons,
including children.The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms of the European Union enforces CRC rights by its higher
legal enforceability within the EU. Furthermore, the Proposal
for the General Data Protection Regulation of the European
Union strengthens the CRC’s capacity because it introduced
new rights and prescriptions rooted in fundamental values, for
instance, about how to design systems. Moreover, European
Court of Human Rights case laws, more specifically those three
to be demonstrated, exemplify that the ECHR is explicit about
the positive obligations of signatory states with respect to their
duty to enforce persons’ fundamental right to privacy. The
various ways in which these legal instruments reach effectiv-
ity are all applicable to children, particularly to those assessed
by ProKid.
2.1. Children’s right to privacy
First, the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human
Rights, as amended) establishes the right to private and family
life. Moreover, it provides for exceptions under which public
authorities are allowed to infringe on this fundamental right.
Although this convention does not specify a right to private
life for children, it includes children because Art. 1 states that
21 ‘Direct working’ means that after an international treaty becomes
ratified in The Netherlands it becomes directly part of Dutch na-
tional legislation.
22 HR 7 Maart 2014, 13/04683.
23 Rb. Arnhem 16 Februari 2010, BL6961.
24 HR 7 Maart 2014, 13/04683.
25 Research about the implementation of CRC within Dutch court
decisions shows that the Convention is least applied in criminal
law cases compared to other jurisdictions. Its influence is mar-
ginal as in such cases the best interest of the child is generally out-
balanced versus public safety interests. About this, see also: De Graaf,
J. H., Limbeek, L. M. B., Bahadur, N. N. & Van der Meij, N. De toepassing
van het internationaal verrag inzake de rechten van het kind in de
Nederlandse rechtspraak 1 Januari 2002–1 September 2011 (Ars Libri,
2012).
26 Van der Hof, S. ‘No Child’s Play: Online Data Protection for Chil-
dren’ in S. van der Hof and B. van den Berg and B. Schermer (eds),
Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety (Asser
Press, 2014). Hodgkin R. and Newell P. Implementation Handbook for
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 1998).
27 Detrick, S. A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999).
28 Data protection instruments are indispensable means. Yet, they
could more often be complemented with relevant prescriptions of
the CRC when it comes to the digitalisation of children’s per-
sonal data.
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it applies to “everyone” and Art. 14 allows no distinction
amongst its legal subjects with respect to their age.
Second, on the EU level, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms of the European Union29 can be considered a chil-
dren’s rights instrument. Art. 7 of the charter establishes the
right to private life and Art. 8 explicitly acknowledges the right
to data protection as a separate individual human right. The
fact that the rights to private life and to data protection are
separate rights and one can be infringed separately from the
other shows a broad interpretation of privacy,30 from which all
children’s rights can benefit. The Charter is consistent with all
human rights law and, given its purpose to consolidate human
rights law amongst EU member states, it is a unique legal in-
strument to enforce children’s rights, including their right to
privacy. Because the charter has the same legal power as any
other EU treaty, the charter in relation to ProKid can be con-
sidered a strengthening of the enforcement of CRC rights.
2.1.1. General Data Protection Regulation in relation to
privacy
Because the right to privacy and the right to data protection
are separate fundamental rights, this section is devoted to high-
lighting their close relationship in practice to a third legal
instrument, the EU proposal for General Data Protection
Regulation.
It is crucial to highlight that when privacy impact
assessments31 investigate the effects of digital identity man-
agement systems on persons’ privacy, they mostly take the
approach of investigating how data are processed, stored and
shared. In practice, this often means that although the right
to privacy and to data protection are separate fundamental
rights, how implications for the right to privacy are assessed
de facto implies assessment of implications for the right to data
protection.Therefore, this sub-section focuses on how data pro-
tection prescriptions facilitate the right to privacy of children.
To assess this from the perspective of the new EU Data Pro-
tection Regulation is useful because the latter introduces
important changes with respect to the current data protec-
tion framework.
Although the prescriptions of the current data protection
framework set by the 95/46/EC directive are implemented and
integrated in Dutch law through the Dutch Data Protection Act,
this law is quite limited on the subject of protection of chil-
dren’s personal data. Art. 21 of the current Data Protection Act
only specifies that the prohibition on sharing or using health-
care data (including the data of children) by parties in the Dutch
justice system, for instance, under the Dutch Youth Care Act
is inapplicable if the use of such data is necessary to fulfil their
work as set by law.32 Although this provision provides room for
the registration and sharing of certain healthcare data rel-
evant to children’s safety via ProKid, Art. 22 also specifies that
sensitive data and data with respect to unlawful or objection-
able behaviour of a person (including the behaviour of children)
as defined by a judge can also be shared if that behaviour is
against Dutch laws. The latter prescription can be considered
a limiting of the sharing of children’s personal data by the police
through ProKid particularly because a judge must define what
counts as unlawful or objectionable behaviour. Although the
data controller of ProKid is the Ministry for Security and Justice,
as data are registered by the police, when certain files of chil-
dren profiled by ProKid are transferred to youth-care institutions
or to city councils, the data controller also changes to the rel-
evant ministry responsible for these institutions. Thus far, no
data request or claim is known to have been submitted to any
of these data controllers on behalf of children by their parents
or guardians. This could in part result from the procedure that
only those ‘at risk’ registrations concerning children are com-
municated to their parents or guardians, although they are also
shared by the police with particular authorities responsible for
youth care.
However, the EU proposal for a General Data Protection
Regulation33 testifies to a new approach in prescribing the pro-
tection of fundamental values via data protection through
principles such as ‘value-sensitive design’ and the employ-
ment of ‘privacy-enhancing-technologies’. This also has
implications for current Dutch data protection rules and the
processing of data within and beyond ProKid. Concerning chil-
dren’s right to privacy the “current data protection regulation
lacks child-specific rules”,34 which could have been helpful in
clarifying the position of children under digital surveillance.
However, the proposal for the General Data Protection Regu-
lation is specific about children.The proposal takes, for instance
the definition of the child from the UN CRC and considers ev-
eryone below 18 years of age a child. It includes such elements
as the data subject’s ‘right to be forgotten’ and the ‘right for
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000]
OJ C364/01.
30 De Hert, P. & Gutwirth, S., “Making sense of privacy and data
protection: A prospective overview in the light of the future of iden-
tity, location-based services and virtual residence”, in IPTS, Security
and Privacy for the Citizen in the Post-September 11 Digital Age:
A Prospective Overview. Report to the European Parliament Com-
mittee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs
(LIBE), July 2003, IPTS Technical Report Series, 111–162.
31 Privacy impact assessments (PIAs) regularly ‘translate’ the as-
sessment of privacy into the assessment of personal data processing.
Although privacy includes though how data are processed, it also
includes many more aspects of life, including those aspects where
the idea of registering data at all can remain questioned or simply











32 About this, please see further Art. 21 of the Dutch Data Protec-
tion Act.
33 Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)2012/0011
– C7-0025/12.
34 Van der Hof, S. ‘No Child’s Play: Online Data Protection for Chil-
dren’ in S. van der Hof and B. van den Berg and B. Schermer (eds),
Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety (Asser
Press, 2014).
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erasure of data’ in an online environment (Art. 17). Because
these latter rights are observed to apply “in relation to per-
sonal data which are made available by the data subject while
he or she was a child” (Art. 17), the proposal introduces not
only unique rights for children’s rights to privacy but also for
their right to data protection. The EU proposal provides further
safeguards for children by the explicit prohibition of profiling
of children because this type of automated processing of data
cannot concern children. These newly established rights and
prescriptions of the General Data Protection Regulation all
support the enforcement of children’s right to privacy and other
CRC rights.
2.1.2. International case law and the right to digital privacy
of minors
The European Court of Human Rights’ case law can be con-
sidered a fourth, quite strong legal means to allow the
significance of children’s right to privacy and of CRC rights in
general to be raised. Within ECHR case law, there has tradi-
tionally been little reflection upon the protection of the digital
privacy of children. However, the number of cases in which the
Court addressed the vulnerable position of minors in the context
of their digital connections has grown in recent years.35 The
case law is chosen specifically in the area of law enforce-
ment because in these cases the ECHR clearly decided –
although by referring to Art. 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and not directly to Art. 16 of CRC – in favour of
a ‘child’s right to privacy’ versus ‘public safety interests’.36
Second, in all these cases, the ECHR issued positive obliga-
tions for states – in one case for The Netherlands – about the
child’s right to privacy. These judgments proved to be particu-
larly important because academic research already
demonstrated that within Dutch law-enforcement court cases,
a child’s right to privacy and CRC rights in general are rarely
balanced against public safety interests. This increases the ne-
cessity of the three ECHR cases in this article because ProKid,
an instrument to maintain public safety by prevention, affects
the right to privacy of a large number of children and their fami-
lies and friends on a daily basis in encounters with Dutch law
enforcement and beyond. Without precedent, judgments that
are made about the privacy effects of systems directly com-
parable to ProKid, that is, the chosen ECHR judgments, are useful
to provide general guidance about the privacy implications of
such systems as ProKid. Although the first case concerns chil-
dren’s privacy in general, it sets a remarkable precedent even
prior to the rise of the CRC with respect to this right.
In 1985, X. and Y v. the Netherlands,37 the European Court of
Human Rights for the first time convicted a state of having vio-
lated a child’s privacy. The father of a 16-year old mentally ill
girl, who had been living in a home for mentally handi-
capped children, filed a complaint. According to the father, his
daughter was raped. Because of her mental condition, he
wanted to file a report himself about the crime to the Dutch
police. However, according to the Dutch Criminal Code, only
the victim herself could report such a crime. Because the father
could not file a report on behalf of his daughter and his daugh-
ter’s mental problem made her unable to file one, no
investigation was initiated under the Dutch Criminal Code. Con-
sequently, the girl’s parents filed a complaint under Art. 8 of
the ECHR against The Netherlands. They argued that the right
to respect family life should include the right for parents to
report a crime to law enforcement authorities and allow for a
criminal investigation in case their daughter became a victim
of abuse. The ECHR found that The Netherlands provided in-
sufficient protection for the child under the Dutch Criminal
Code and that Art 8. of the ECHR thus was violated by the Dutch
state.38 This was the first time the ECHR found a state openly
guilty of breaching Art. 8 of the Convention in relation to a child.
From the perspective of ProKid, this judgment is highly rel-
evant. Although crime-related actions of parents and guardians
are influential in what risk image is projected on their chil-
dren by ProKid, the role of parents or guardians in protecting
their children from becoming victims of or from committing
such actions is not reflected equally within the risk assess-
ment schemes of ProKid. In light of the above judgment,
reflecting the protecting role and potential of parents in this
scheme could improve the ways in which parents and guard-
ians are currently viewed by ProKid.
S and Marper vs. UK39 from 2008 is the second case. The case
concerns the digital privacy of children within law enforce-
ment procedures. One of the applicants was an 11-year-old boy
who was charged with attempted robbery. His fingerprints and
DNA samples were taken and registered in the UK DNA da-
tabase. After he was acquitted he requested the police to destroy
his biometric data, but the police rejected the request. Con-
sequently, the applicant requested judicial review at the national
court and the European Court of Human Rights. At the ECHR,
he argued that the police’s retention of his biometric data vio-
lated Art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.The Grand Chamber
upheld the applicant’s complaint and agreed with the viola-
tion of Art. 8:
“the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate in-
terference with the applicants’ right to respect for private
life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic
society.”
35 See also, for instance the case of Reklos & Davourlis v. Greece
No. 1234/05, 2009, EMLR 16; Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG and Krone
Multimedia GmbH & Co KG v. Austria App. No. 33497/07, (ECtHR
17 April 2012); Von Hannover v. Germany App. No. 59320/00, 2004,
40 EHRR 1.
36 About this, see further: De Graaf, J. H., Limbeek, L. M. B., Bahadur,
N. N. & Van der Meij, N. De toepassing van het internationaal verrag
inzake de rechten van het kind in de Nederlandse rechtspraak 1 Januari
2002–1 September 2011 (Ars Libri 2012) Court cases show that the
strength of national laws, such as that of the Dutch Police Act, often
emerge as stronger reference points than the CRC or other human
rights documents. See further, for instance: HR 7 Maart 2014, 13/
04683; Rb. Arnhem 16 Februari 2010, BL696; HR 7 Maart 2014, 13/
04683.
37 App. No. 8978/80, 1985, 8 EHRR 235.
38 Groothuis, M. ‘The right to Privacy for Children on the Inter-
net: New Developments in Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights’ in S. van der Hof and B. van den Berg and B.
Schermer (eds), Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online
Child Safety (Asser Press, 2014). Haeck, Y., & Brams, E. Human rights
and civil liberties in the 21st century (Springer, 2014).
39 App. No. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 2009, 48 EHRR 50.
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Furthermore, this case includes a handful of unique ECHR
judgments in which the court emphasised the special posi-
tion of children within the criminal justice system40 and referred
to Art. 40 of the CRC:
“the retention of the unconvicted persons’ data may be es-
pecially harmful in the case of minors, given their special
situation and the importance of their development and in-
tegration in society. The Court has already emphasised,
drawing on the provisions of Article 40 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the special
position of minors in the criminal-justice sphere and has
noted, in particular, the need for the protection of their
privacy at criminal trials”.
These passages of the above judgment are of particular value
regarding how assessments are performed by using ProKid. Al-
though the registry produces risk indications about children
who are victims, accused of a crime, or who commit a crime,
the above passages of the ECHR judgment de facto condemn
the retention of data by members of the justice system when
such data concern accused persons – and the judgment can
be interpreted similarly regarding victims. Furthermore, the
judgment also underlines the necessity for distinguishing
between victims, suspects and convicts.
The third case, KU v. Finland,41 concerns the digital privacy
of children on the Internet, the only case so far that specifi-
cally addresses this issue.The case addressed cybercrime, more
specifically, the fraudulent use of a child’s personal data on
the Internet, which led to the child’s forced, digital exposure
to paedophiles. In 1999, an unknown person posted an adver-
tisement on the Internet in the name of a 12-year child without
his knowledge.The advertisement contained information about
the boy’s desire to meet others for intimate relationships. The
boy only learnt about the ad when a response landed in his
mailbox from a paedophile. The boy’s father requested the
police to find out who posted the ad, but the telecommuni-
cations provider refused the demand of the police to unveil
the identity of the ad poster because it considered itself bound
by Finnish telecommunication legislation. The police’s request
under the Criminal Investigation Act to divulge the identity of
the ad poster was also refused by the Helsinki District Court
because it found that without stronger evidence, it only con-
stituted a calumny of a person. However,
“the Court preferred to highlight the notion of private life
[Art. 8 of ECHR], given the potential threat to the boy’s physi-
cal and mental welfare and his vulnerable age.”
It formulated further a condemnation:
“The Court considered that the posting of the Internet ad-
vertisement about the applicant had been a criminal act
which had resulted in a minor having been a target for
paedophiles. It recalled that such conduct called for a
criminal-law response and that effective deterrence had to
be reinforced through adequate investigation and prosecu-
tion. Moreover, children and other vulnerable individuals
were entitled to protection by the State from such grave in-
terferences with their private life.”
The judgment sets a precedent by underlining the posi-
tive obligation of each member state to continuously update
and modify their legal system – including its criminal law and
other legal fields specialising in mass media, Internet and
telecommunications,42 so that children could enjoy sufficient
protection from risks on the Internet. The judgment proves to
be a revelation with respect to how colour-code indications are
set-up and risk indications are performed by ProKid. First, it
clearly concerns a crime related on the one hand to the home
environment of the child, but on the other hand, a crime that
is performed by persons living far away from the child’s home.
In other words, the harm came not directly from any influ-
ence of persons living in the home of the child. Second, this
judgment underlines state authorities’ obligation to take all
measures to protect individuals, particularly children, from
digital risks. At the same time, the judgment also bears the im-
plication that state authorities in particular should live up to
the above obligation, in regard to potential negative conse-
quences of risk profiling practices such as those performed with
ProKid.
2.1.3. Interim conclusion
Because of the above, CRC rights and particularly children’s
right to privacy are strengthened in different forms by legal
tools such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms of the European Union, the Proposal for General Data
Protection Regulation of the European Union and different ECHR
case laws. In three ECHR cases in particular, all concerning the
privacy of children, Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights was used as a reference source. However, because all
three cases addressed issues concerning children, they indi-
rectly strengthen children’s right to privacy including their
digital privacy as laid down by the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child. The three judgments further show that this duty
of states towards government authorities in particular, includ-
ing law enforcement authorities, must be approached strictly
because their collection and processing of personal data can
have potentially negative consequences on children’s lives and
their ability to develop their life and identity. To conclude, a
relevant lesson can also be drawn from the above court cases
for the design and use of such identity management and, in
particular, preventative, risk assessment systems on children
such as ProKid. By following CRC principles during the design
and use of such systems, future ECHR court cases on the privacy
of children could be avoided. In light of this point, the above
rulings stimulate the enforcement of the CRC.
40 Bellanova, R., & De Hert, P. ‘Le cas S. et Marper et les données
personnelles: l’horloge de la stigmatisation stoppée par un arrêt
européen’ (2009) 4 (76) Cultures & Conflits 101. Koops, B. ‘Law, Tech-
nology and Shifting Power Relations’ (2010) 25 (2) Berkley Technology
Law Journal 973.
41 App. No. 2872/02, 2008 (2009), 48 EHRR 1237.
42 Groothuis, M. ‘The right to Privacy for Children on the Inter-
net: New Developments in Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights’ in S. Van der Hof and B. van den Berg and B.
Schermer (ed), Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online
Child Safety (Asser Press, 2014).
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2.2. IDM systems and pitfalls of their use
Identity management systems serve to establish ‘identities’
(defined as personal data sets) within citizen–state relation-
ships. This includes the identities of persons subject to the
system, in this case children and families, and those profes-
sionals (e.g., police or technicians) who interact with systems,
such as ProKid, on a regular basis. Identity management
systems are used on a large scale and in different forms in-
ternationally, ranging from biometric identification systems,
e-government solutions to a growing number of administra-
tive systems introduced to assess persons against various forms
of risks within citizen–state relations.43 The dynamics by which
these systems produce vast amounts of information about citi-
zens have also been referred to as contributing to an
“information-intensive government”,44 or information-led gov-
ernment called “i-government”.45
This information intensity in itself seems to be a develop-
ment that is ‘common’ to present-day society. However, when
being used, IDM systems are highly capable of extensive sur-
veillance of persons46 and thus intrusion into individuals’
privacy and their freedoms.47 They extend an ever expanding
steering or disciplining effect on human behaviour,48 perform-
ing discriminative selections amongst citizens49 and
encompassing unintended secondary implications for citi-
zens’ lives, a phenomenon also known as function creep.50
Scholars in science and technology studies stress the norma-
tive effects emerging between IDM technologies and their users
because both continuously and mutually affect one another
throughout all the actions to which they become parties.51 Users
and their technologies both share responsibility for transfor-
mations occurring from the use of IDM technologies.52 Inspired
by these observations, an analysis of ProKid from a CRC per-
spective lends itself to being very relevant and necessary in a
democratic society.
Such an actuality results in a generally large increase in
the number of IDM technologies and the extent to which
children are exposed to digital risk assessment within youth
care and policing practices internationally. Examples of systems
similar to ProKid are operational in other countries such as
the U.S. (Partnership For Youth At Risk – PFYR).53 The Partner-
ship for Youth At Risk started in 2000 as a fire-setting-
prevention program for youth and evolved into an educational,
incident register. Each registration in PFYR happens after an
authority connected to the system, such as the police, Juve-
nile Justice Services or therapists, reports a fire-setting incident
by a young person aged between 5 and 18 years. Subse-
quently, parents also are notified by PFYR so that they can
register their child into the PFYR educational programme.
The programme is aimed at developing the registered child
into a person more reflective about his/her deeds and thus
prevent his/her recidivism.
Another registry called Contact Point in the United Kingdom
is particularly interesting from the perspective of the analy-
sis in this paper. Contact Point was only operational for a short
time. Interestingly, due to a governmental decision, Contact
Point was inactivated and the gathered data deleted as of 2010.54
The reasons given for termination included fierce criticisms
of the registry’s centralised set-up and the system’s poten-
tial for extensive and long-term surveillance of a large part of
society.55 In particular, each registration about a child updated
a central database that a wide range of professionals could
access, which was a perceived breach of children’s right to
privacy of the CRC (Art. 16) and their families’ privacy in ECHR
(Art.8). Basing reasons for the termination of Contact Point on
children and human rights arguments in the UK is a unique
and rather atypical although encouraging phenomenon that
runs counter to a current tendency in Western societies to reg-
ister high-risk youth.56 Moreover, reliance upon such registries
is growing.
43 Hildebrandt, M., & Gutwirth, S. (eds) Profiling the European citizen
(Springer Science, 2008).
44 Lips, M., Taylor, M., & Morgan, J. ‘Identification practices in gov-
ernment: citizen surveillance and the quest for public service
improvement’ (2008) 1 Identity in the Information Society 135.
45 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR)
iGovernment Synthesis Report 86 (Amsterdam University Press, 2011).
46 Lyon, D. Surveillance society Monitoring everyday life (Open Uni-
versity Press, 2001).
47 Nissenbaum, H. ‘Privacy as contextual integrity’ (2004) 79
Washington Law Review 119. De Hert, P. ‘Identity management of
e-ID, privacy and security in Europe A human rights view’ (2008)
13(2), Information Security Technical Report, 71. Hildebrandt, M.,
& Gutwirth, S. (eds) Profiling the European citizen (Springer Science,
2008). Koops, B.-J., & Leenes, R. ‘Code and the slow erosion of
privacy’ (2010) 12 Michigan Telecommunication and Technology
Law Review, 115.
48 Vedder, A. ‘Convergerende technologieën, verschuivende
verantwoordelijkheden’ (2008) 34 (1) Justitiele verkenningen 54.
49 Bowker, G. C., & Leigh Star, S. Sorting things out Classification and
its consequences (MIT Press, 1999). Van der Ploeg, I. ‘Security in the
Danger Zone: Normative Issues of Next Generation Biometrics’ in Mordini,
E. & Tzovaras, D. (eds) Second Generation Biometrics The Ethical, Legal,
and Social Context (Springer, 2012).
50 Prins, J. E. J. ‘Function creep: over het wegen van risico’s en
kansen’ (2011) 37(8) Justitiele Verkenningen 9. Van der Hof, S. &
Groothuis, M. (eds) Innovating Government Normative, Policy and Tech-
nological Dimensions of Modern Government (Asser Press, 2011).
51 Latour, B. Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers
through society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, 1987). Law, J. & Mol, A. Situating Technoscience: an inquiry into
spatialities (Lancaster University, 2003).
52 Suchman, L. Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated
Actions (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Oudshoorn, N. Telecare
technologies and the Transformation of Healthcare (Palgrave Macmillan,
2011).
53 About ‘Partnership for youth at risk’ see: <http://www
.partnershipsforyouthatrisk.org/sections/registration/registration
_main1.htm>.
54 Contact Point was in place to register ‘risk summaries’ about
all children in the UK in order to prevent potential cases of child
abuse and other crimes related to youth.
55 Hoyle, D. ‘ContactPoint. Because every child matters?’ 2010 The
encyclopaedia of informal education <www.infed.org/socialwork/
contactpoint.htm>.
56 Australia, for instance, developed a governmental protocol for
child protection professionals. The High Risk Youth practice re-
quirements serve to signal and assist youth associated with risks.
About this, see further: <http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/cpmanual/
practice-context/children-in-specific-circumstances/1014-high
-risk-adolescents-hra-practice-requirements/3>.
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2.3. Plea for a CRC-based perspective within digital
identity management of children
This paper argues that fundamental children’s rights such as
those laid down in the Convention on Rights of the Child can
be used to broaden the legal framework for the use of digital
surveillance technologies on children. Nevertheless, the role
these rights might play has not received much attention because
it is data protection regulations that are regularly brought to
the table as a source of legal ‘help’. This is due in part to the
fact that rather complex notions of identity and privacy of chil-
dren are often “translated”57 into seemingly simple problems
of personal data.58 Although the production, processing and
storage of personal data and the protection of privacy are two
different issues, as mentioned earlier, a variety of privacy impact
assessments59 shows that handling the problem of produc-
tion, processing and storage of personal data by regulation often
is considered ‘adequate’ protection of the individual’s privacy.
Consequently, the use of identity management technologies
is often discussed (only) in terms of personal data protec-
tion.This reflects a certain assessment of identity management
technologies as pure instruments through which personal data
pass unchanged. In other words, the constructive effects stem-
ming from the very use of technologies on privacy and identity
of persons are often not considered, mostly because there is
no legal liability established for technologies only for their users.
Although data protection regulations are indispensable for pro-
tecting children’s personal data, it would be worthwhile to rely
more heavily on the opportunities offered by the CRC, allow-
ing the pitfalls and risks for children stemming from the very
use of these technologies to be specifically addressed in light
of this dedicated fundamental rights regime.
3. CRC challenges in light of the initiative and
practical implementation of ProKid
To assess CRC challenges with respect to ProKid in particu-
lar, this section addresses the issue in two sub-sections. First,
the initiative of ProKid will be assessed. This includes a de-
scription of its system and an analysis of certain aspects from
a CRC perspective, which could be viewed as underpinning and
legitimising the initiative of ProKid. The first sub-section ends
with a discussion about already-raised issues surrounding the
initiative and system of ProKid. The second sub-section pro-
vides a more practice-oriented approach and details a set of
effects regarding the purpose, design and daily use of ProKid
on relevant CRC prescriptions.
3.1. ProKid: its initiative
ProKid SI 12- (henceforth, ProKid) has been initiated as a risk-
signalling system by the Dutch police to signal children under
the age of 12 years who might either be victims, witnesses or
perpetrators of some form of a crime. The basis of ProKid is
to be found in a number of Dutch laws (Social Support Act,
Public Health Act, Youth Care Act, the Compulsory Education
Act, Police Act) which describe responsibilities for state, prov-
ince and local government levels regarding the care of young
people. A number of fundamental principles underlie the legal
framework within which the development of a comprehen-
sive multidisciplinary chain approach for youth is described.
One of these principles is formulated in a working process
implemented in 2007 to foster collaboration between the Dutch
police and Bureau Youthcare that, up until January 2015, also
formed the basis for ProKid: “Early identification and referral”.60
The justifications for this collaboration and, more specifi-
cally, the initiative of ProKid have been that the police and
Bureau Youthcare could improve their information-exchange
and more successfully prevent children from developing crimi-
nal behaviour.61
These reasons remained the same; however, due to the men-
tioned administrative and legal change as of January 2015, the
sharing of information by the police and youth care institu-
tions became restructured and channelled differently. Up to
that point, the police had reported directly to Bureau Youthcare
about all concerns they had about children and that they
deemed important that Bureau Youthcare knew about. However,
as of January 2015, the existing Bureau Youthcare institu-
tions have been abolished in The Netherlands through the new
Youth Care Act, and their associated tasks have been trans-
ferred to city councils and to other newly certified institutions.
Therefore, the police must report to different institutions de-
pending on the issue with a child. For instance, child abuse
and domestic violence cases in which children are also in-
volved need to be reported to the so-called Advice and Reporting
Centre Domestic Violence and Child Abuse (ARCDC).62 For other
issues with children, including those indicated by ProKid, the
police must inform the newly certified youth care agencies or
city councils.63
The Ministry for Safety and Justice approached the devel-
opment and implementation of ProKid without a primary CRC
consideration in mind.64 However, the stated objective – to
prevent children from developing a criminal behaviour – can
be considered as serving Art. 3, “the best interest of the child”.
Thus far, the Dutch Data Protection Authority did not issue any
specific opinion about ProKid. However, the authority issued
57 Latour, B. Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers
through society (Harvard University Press, 1987).
58 About this see also footnote 29.
59 Ibid.
60 Goedee, J., Rijkers, A. Zorgsignalen van de Politie: Over het werk
process ‘Vroegsignaleren en doorverwijzen’ tussen Politie en Bureau
Jeugdzorg (Ministerie van Jeugd en Gezin, 2010).
61 About this, see further: ibid, pp. 8.
62 Advice and Reporting Centre Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
(ARCDC).
63 Schreuder, E. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) deelproject Justitiële
Keteninformatisering ‘Risico’ s en Privacy by Design bij de justitiële
ketenberichten voor de Jeugdwet’ (Net2Legal, 2014) Retrieved on 14th
December 2014 from: <http://www.voordejeugd.nl/attachments/
article/1570/Bijlage%20PIA%20Keteninformatisering.PDF>.
64 Afsluitende Uitgave Programma Aanpak Jeugdcriminaliteit (Ministerie
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a negative opinion65 concerning the registration and ex-
change of information about children aged between 6 and 12
years by a system of a Dutch cluster institution that is in-
volved with youth, called Safety House66 (in Dutch:
Veiligheidshuis): “Children aged under 12 years are not crimi-
nally prosecuted. The processing of their data in the system under
study is therefore not consistent with the objective of the [Safety House]
consultations and that is against the law.”67
Behavioural scientists from Radboud University of Nij-
megen developed the colour codes for ProKid68; white, yellow,
orange and red codes signify a growing gradation of concern.
Both children and their living addresses can have assigned
colour codes (see Table 1). Assigning children white signifies
that no risk has been identified yet, yellow represents a pos-
sible development of risks, orange indicates that problems and
even criminal behaviour have already occurred, and red
symbolises children who have repeatedly shown criminal
behaviour, or of whom multiple cases of suspicion have been
recorded. Concerning the living addresses, yellow signifies either
that earlier incidents have been registered at the address or
that a person living at the same address has multiple inci-
dent registrations69(for more yellow indicators, see Table 1).
Yellow, for instance, can signify a higher number of incidents
related to the address or of police registrations related to a
person living at the same address, or the combination of these
registrations. An orange code can signify, for instance, that the
sum of incidents registered at the address and about persons
living at the same address is greater than 15 (for more orange
65 Veiligheidshuizen onzorgvuldig met gegevens van minderjarigen: CBP
onderzoekt gegevensuitwisseling in veiligheidshuizen (CBP, 2011) Re-
trieved on 2nd of December 2013, from: <https://cbpweb.nl/nl/
nieuws/veiligheidshuizen-onzorgvuldig-met-gegevens-van
-minderjarigen>.
66 Within Safety Houses representatives of youth care, law en-
forcement and municipal administration organisations gather
and discuss cases of delinquent children (and families) in order
to initiate adequate assistance. See also: <http://www
.veiligheidshuizen.nl/>.
67 See link in footnote 59.
68 Nijhof, K. S., Engels, R. C. M. E. & Wientjes, J. A. M. ‘Crimineel
gedrag van ouders en kinderen’ (2007) 27 (1) Pedagogiek, 29.
69 Abraham, M., Buysee, W., Loef, L., & Van Dijk, B. Pilots ProKid
Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd Pilots ProKid
Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-groep, 2011).
70 Table translated into English from: Abraham, M., Buysee,W., Loef,
L., & Van Dijk, B. Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd
Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-groep, 2011).
Table 1 – ProKid colour-code classifications (including criteria for both a child and his or her living address).70
Category Behavioural indicators Living address of the child
White:
No risk indication, most
likely a safe zone
Maximum of two registrations as a victim or as a
witness
A minimum of two registrations of the living address as
the location of an incident
and
A maximum of 5 registrations of the co-habitants of the
child
Yellow:
Indication of a rising
risk potential
3–9 registrations as a victim or as a witness,
or
A minimum one registration as a suspect of a light
incident
or
One time registration as a missing person
A minimum of 3 registrations of the living address as
the location of an incident,
or
More than 5 registrations of co-habitants of the child in
the system,
or






A minimum of 10 registrations as a victim or as a
suspect,
or
A minimum of 5 registrations as a suspect of a light
incident (for instance, shoplifting)
or
A minimum of 5 registrations as a victim or as a
witness related to different types of incidents,
or
More than one-time registration as a missing person,
or
One registration as a suspect of a serious crime
The sum of the incident registrations at the living
address of the child and the registrations of co-
habitants of the child is 15–29,
or
1–2 registrations of domestic violence at the living
address,
or






A minimum of two registrations as a suspect of a
serious crime
The sum of the incident registrations at the living
address of the child and the registrations of co-
habitants of the child is 30 or greater than 30,
or
More than two registrations of domestic violence at the
living address of the child,
or
More than one registration of child abuse at the address
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indicators, see Table 1). Red can signify that the combination
of incidents registered at the same address and incidents
persons living there have been involved in are greater than 30
(for more, see Table 1). If a child already has a colour-coded
file in ProKid and an incident occurs at the living address of
the child, a darker colour is assigned to the child’s address.
That assignment also influences the colour-code of the child
living there. It becomes automatically darker (for example, from
yellow to orange). Each time the colour of the address darkens,
the code of a child darkens too, symbolising that a risk in his/
her closest social environment has emerged for a child. After
a maximum of 5 years, a registration must be deleted from
ProKid. ProKid has been operational nationwide since 2013.71
The risk categories and their attribution are explicitly aimed
at the early detection of potential criminal behaviour of chil-
dren. The assignment of colour codes is automated by means
of algorithms, and conclusions about assigning a code are drawn
from information in other large police databases.These include
the Basic Facility for Law Enforcement (BFLE, or Basisvoorziening
Handhaving in Dutch) and the Basic Facility for Forensic In-
vestigation (BFFI, or Basisvoorziening Opsporing in Dutch).
Information from ProKid is also shared amongst youth care
partners who have not yet switched to digital systems. ProKid
managers have been invited to the weekly discussions organised
by Bureau Youthcare until the end of 2014 72 in which the invited
ProKid manager could decide whether there is reason to share
information about a registered child with other profession-
als. ProKid managers have been enjoying a relatively large
freedom in defining criteria according to which they submit
cases to Bureau Youthcare, except for one general standard that
requires practitioners to consistently submit red coloured files
to Bureau Youthcare by the time such a file appears in the
system.73 As of January 2015, these files need to be forwarded
to other responsible youth care institutions depending on the
nature of a case. This specific information-sharing practice of
the police towards Bureau Youthcare and as of January towards
other institutions through ProKid is in line with the “Early de-
tection and referral” duty of the Dutch, which was introduced
in 2010.74 Because the system is considered purely a preven-
tative tool to be used by the police, ProKid is an unparalleled
example of its type because it is not a police system used during
criminal investigations. However, it is regularly and primarily
framed as a police instrument to facilitate the protection of
children both from harm coming to them and harm they might
cause themselves. Therefore, to learn how the purpose, design
and daily use of ProKid challenges CRC prescriptions, two
aspects are chosen first as being particularly beneficial to the
analysis of ProKid: its legitimisation and the controversies as-
sociated with it.
3.1.1. Legitimisation of ProKid
Art. 3 of the CRC specifies that the “best interest of the child”
as a principle enjoys utmost priority with respect to issues in
relation to children. In general, the initiative and system of
ProKid can be considered as in line with the prescriptions of
Art. 3. because it is meant to facilitate protection of children
both from forms of violence and from their developing anti-
social behaviour or certain crime dispositions. Both purposes
can be considered in “the best interest of the child”; however,
the responsibility of the state to provide such protection for
children, in this case with the help of ProKid, is not straight-
forward according to CRC principles.
Art. 18, 19 and 20 of the CRC leave the primary responsi-
bility with the parents to care for and protect their children.
Only in the case that a child’s parents become unable to
perform this duty adequately or at all should states take up
responsibility and intervene in a family’s life to provide the
best care for a child. From the perspective of children’s rights,
however the Dutch Supreme Court issued a judgment on Sep-
tember 21, 2012, perhaps the most important section of which
reads as follows:
“The state has the duty to safeguard the rights and inter-
ests of children, even in regard to minors without a permit.
These children cannot be held responsible for the actions
of their parents or other family members.”75
This judgment changed the dominant view of the Dutch
state that parents are primarily responsible for the wellbeing
of children and explicitly assigned to the state primary re-
sponsibility for the care and welfare of children. To protect
children from any forms of maltreatment executed in any physi-
cal or mental form against them, Article 19 allows for
governments to employ whatever means76 are considered most
appropriate to prevent such issues. Given the above judg-
ment of the Supreme Court, ProKid can be considered a system
legitimately installed by the government amongst others to
sustain what is prescribed by Art. 18, 19 and 20.77
Art. 6 also prescribes a duty “to ensure to the maximum
extent possible the survival and development of the child”.The
duty to prevent children from developing forms of anti-social
71 Tweede Kamer, Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (VI) voor het jaar 2013 (Tweede
Kamer der Staten General, 2012).
72 The parents of those children whose case has been forwarded
by ProKid managers to Bureau Youthcare (or to other certified youth
care institutions as of January 2015) receive a letter of notifica-
tion about this action. For more, please consult Abraham, M., Buysee,
W., Loef, L., & Van Dijk, B. Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12-
geëvalueerd Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-
groep, 2011).
73 Ibid.
74 Kruize, G. & Gruter, P. Kattenkwaad of misdaad in het verschiet? Een
evaluatie van het werkproces “Vroegsignaleren en doorverwijzen 12-
delictplegers” (Amsterdam – ATENO Bureau voor criminaliteitsanalyse,
2013).
75 HR 21 September 2012, NJ 2013/22, m. nt. Alkema, JV 2012/458,
m.nt. Slingerberg AB 2013/30, de Vries; LJN: BW5328.
76 In February 2011 a ‘General Comment 13 on Article 19 of the
Convention of the Right of the Child The right of the child to freedom
from all forms of violence’ had been adapted which outlines for
governments how to develop tools (administrative, legislative and
other) to maintain this right of children. (See also Lee, Y. & Svevo-
Cianci, K. ‘General Comment no. 13 to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child: The right of the child to freedom from all forms of
violence’ (2011) 35(12) Child Abuse & Neglect, 967).
77 For more, see also the Dutch ‘Youthcare Act’ and Goedee, J.,
Rijkers, A. Zorgsignalen van de Politie: Over het werk process
‘Vroegsignaleren en doorverwijzen’ tussen Politie en Bureau Jeugdzorg
(Ministerie van Jeugd en Gezin, 2010).
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or delinquent behaviour can also be considered in line with
this prescription. More specifically, to prevent anti-social and
delinquent behaviour of children, the ‘Youth Care Act’78 and
the ‘Social Support Act’79 set out further norms for profession-
als about how to address issues related to such behaviour of
youth in The Netherlands. ProKid can in part be considered a
system to maintain Art. 6 of the CRC. Therefore, the CRC ar-
ticles reflected upon in this section can be viewed as provide
legitimisation for the establishment and use of ProKid by the
Dutch government.
Although the introduction and use of ProKid appears le-
gitimate on the grounds raised above, developments related
to the CRC within the judicial areas in which ProKid is imple-
mented raise certain controversies. The following section
describes three main controversies concerning both the design
and use of ProKid in the affected jurisdictions. First, these com-
municate a more accurate picture of the dilemmas with respect
to the design and use of the system. Second, they are useful
for analysing the potential of the CRC within the context of
ProKid.
3.1.2. Controversies associated with ProKid
3.1.2.1. Prevention or law enforcement. The first controversy
centres on the issue that ProKid has primarily been initiated
for use by the police as a preventative system and not as one
for criminal investigations of youth. Children under the age
of 12 years cannot be held responsible within penal law
procedures.80 However, ProKid assesses precisely children below
that age. According to Art. 13 of the Dutch Police Act, however,
there is agreement “on the deployment of police forces for the purpose
of maintaining public order and assistance or care, respectively, for
the purpose of criminal law enforcement and to serve justice”.
However, the purpose, design and daily use of ProKid, as we
will see in the next sections, epitomises an evolution in which
a seemingly caring orientation by the police towards youth is
reasoned with law enforcement arguments. This in itself could
perhaps be part of a tendency in which boundaries between
youth care and law enforcement tasks in relation to youth in-
creasingly blur. However, such blurring is often controversial
and heavily criticised by legal scholars: “child welfare and public
order should not be mixed but take advantage of each other’s pro-
fessionalism and continue to pursue a clear delineation of tasks”.81
Such criticism finds even more foundation in light of Dutch
court rulings about the relevance of the CRC. As the earlier
Dutch court rulings in law enforcement cases have shown, the
CRC’s relevance is minor in criminal cases compared with other
jurisdictions in Dutch law. A major criticism is that the ‘best
interest of a child’ is regularly outweighed by ‘the interest in
maintaining public order’.82 The criticism about the scarce in-
corporation of the CRC within criminal law practices and the
urge for a more CRC-driven law enforcement is not only a
Dutch-specific issue but also is raised internationally: “crimi-
nal law fails to provide practical and effective protection for the [CRC]
rights guaranteed by Art. 3”.83
3.1.2.2. Data protection ‘light’ for the police also on children under
12?. A second controversy concerns data protection prescrip-
tions. The Dutch police as a law enforcement body according
to the Police Act are subjected to a ‘lighter’ data protection
regulation84 than are other public or private parties to allow
for the police and other law enforcement bodies to gain extra
pieces of information during criminal investigations. However,
that the police are legally not allowed to conduct criminal in-
vestigations on persons under the age of 12 and that ProKid
is used specifically for digital assessment of children under 12
years of age, surfaces not only ethical but also legal contra-
dictions. If the police do not perform law enforcement but only
prevention on children, then how can a ‘lighter data protec-
tion’ rule apply for the police concerning the use of ProKid?
This seems a fair question to raise, particularly because ProKid
is digitally connected to other Dutch law enforcement data-
bases that ‘strictly’ contain law enforcement information.These
are the already-mentioned Basic Facility for Law Enforce-
ment and the Basic Facility for Forensic Investigation.The police
have exemptions from the general data protection laws through
the Police Data Act for the gathering and processing of such
information. Such digital connections might be acceptable in
relation to perpetrators, but are legally and ethically question-
able in relation to child victims and witnesses both on the
grounds of the Police Data Act and of such CRC prescriptions
as Art. 39, which assigns special protection for child victims
and witnesses of violence.85 Furthermore, because, as men-
tioned earlier, child victims, witnesses and those accused of
perpetration require different types of assistance, upholding
the distinction between child perpetrators, victims and wit-
nesses proves to be highly desirable and very much in the best
interest of a child.
78 Wet op de Jeugdzorg 2004 (Youth Care Act) Retrieved on 5th June
2014, from http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0016637/.
79 Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 2007 (Social Support Act).
Retrieved on 29th October 2013, from http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0020031/.
80 Politiewet 2012 (Police Act). Retrieved on 10th June 2014, from
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0031788/.
81 Bruning, M. R. ‘De wettelijke taken van de jeugdbescherming.
Hoe kan vanuit de jeugdbescherming bijgedragen worden aan de
veiligheid in wijken en buurten? Mogelijkheden en
onmogelijkheden’ (2010). Speech given at Themabijeenkomst
Samenwerken op het gebied van veiligheid en jeugdbeleid Statenzaal
Provincie Zuid-Holland, May 2010.
82 De Graaf, J. H., Limbeek, L. M. B., Bahadur, N. N. & Van der Meij,
N. De toepassing van het internationaal verrag inzake de rechten van het
kind in de Nederlandse rechtspraak 1 Januari 2002–1 September 2011
(Ars Libri, 2012).
83 Kilkelly, U. ‘The Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights? In-
terpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in the Light
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2001) 23(2) Human
Rights Quarterly, 308.
84 Wet politiegegevens 2007 (Police data Act). Retrieved on 12th April
2014 from http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0022463/.
85 The ‘Guidelines on Justice and Matters involving child victims
and witnesses of crime’ which is routed in CRC prescriptions also
states that “child victims and witnesses are particularly vulnerable and
need special protection[. . .] in order to prevent further hardships and trauma
that may result from their participation in the criminal justice process”.
See further: Guidelines on Justice and Matters involving child victims
and witnesses of crime ECOSOC Resolution, 2005/20 of 22/July/2005.
Retrieved on 26th November 2014 from <http://www.un.org/en/
ecosoc/docs/2005/resolution%202005-20.pdf>.
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3.1.2.3. Anti-social behaviour is not equivalent to delinquent
behaviour. A third source of controversy lies in the fact that
ProKid is designed both to prevent problems of child abuse and
anti-social behaviour of children. There is a general interna-
tional consensus that any form of child abuse is unacceptable.
In line with this, Art. 19 of the CRC prescribes that govern-
ments “protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse”. The issue of anti-social behaviour
of children is more complicated. The CRC has no clear defi-
nition or prescription about what legal principles should guide
professionals to prevent anti-social behaviour of children, if
they have not yet committed crimes but show signs of anti-
social behaviour. The CRC only prescribes guidance for cases
when children are already in conflict with the law; for example,
Art. 40 prescribes that each child “must be treated in a way
that promotes the child’s sense of dignity”. Whether this prin-
ciple could be interpreted as a general requirement against all
children, including those who show anti-social behaviour, re-
quires children’s rights discussions.
3.2. ProKid: its practical operation
These three main controversies provide many grounds for a
thorough CRC analysis of ProKid with respect to its specific
purpose, design and daily use. First, according to prescrip-
tions of the Dutch penal law, as mentioned earlier, children
under the age of 12 years cannot be held responsible for law
breaking. However, the purpose, design and daily use of ProKid
shows an evolution in which law enforcement and care cat-
egories increasingly overlap. For instance, the fact that the status
of child victims, witnesses and perpetrators of crime can fall
under the same colour code demonstrates such overlaps and
raises questions relevant to the CRC.
3.2.1. Purpose and design of ProKid
Concerning the purpose and design of ProKid, the following
CRC articles are relevant.
3.2.1.1. Art. 16. To systematically register issues about chil-
dren in ProKid who have not committed any crime but are, for
instance, witnesses challenges Art. 16 of the CRC. Discus-
sions about whether the ProKid practices on innocent children
constitute arbitrary or unlawful interference with these chil-
dren’s privacy need to be held both in professional and public
forums.
3.2.1.2. Art. 39. The Dutch Police Act requires the police to fa-
cilitate the provision of care for children; however, such
facilitation does not directly imply that the police them-
selves would be allowed to take up the task of providing care
for children. Through the unprecedented introduction and use
of ProKid, however, the Dutch police de facto undertake a pre-
ventative youth care task. The legitimacy of the police acting
in the role of youth care provider is a crucial topic to discuss.
In light of Art. 39 of the CRC, the following question arises: to
what extent is risk profiling of children by the police comply
with the prescription, “Parties shall take all appropriate mea-
sures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration of a child victim . . . Such recovery and reintegration shall
take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect
and dignity of the child”. To what extent does the Dutch state
live up to these prescriptions and take care that neither the
dignity of the child nor the conditions of his/her social envi-
ronment are jeopardised by the very risk profiling practice of
the police? A more practical question emerges in light of the
risk profiling practice regarding the argument that ProKid is
a system used purely for preventative youth care purposes by
the police. Why keep the age limit of children assessed by the
system at 12 years and not use the age limit of 21 years pre-
scribed by the Youth Care Act? If the system does not produce
– not even in its effects – ‘criminal records’, why follow the 12-
years age limit prescribed by the Dutch Police Act? This act
prohibits law enforcement investigations against children under
the age of 12. This logic suggests an implicit law enforce-
ment reasoning behind the set-up of ProKid. This reasoning
can also be deciphered from how requirements for assigning
a colour in ProKid are arranged.
3.2.1.3. Art. 40. At first sight, colour-codes provide no dis-
tinction between victims, witnesses and perpetrators because
the behavioural scientific underpinnings of ProKid suggest that
any child registered as a victim has the potential to develop
into a perpetrator during his/her life.86 The impossibility to dis-
tinguish at first sight between victims, witnesses and potential
perpetrators through the colour coding of ProKid challenges
Art. 40 section 2(i) of the CRC. The extent to which those prac-
titioners who view the ProKid files consider profiled children
innocent because this is prescribed by the right of every child
“to be presumed innocent until proved guilty” remains unclear.
The blurring of boundaries between child victims and perpe-
trators shakes the ground upon which prevention practices for
recidivist youngsters and victims of child abuse or of domes-
tic violence have been shaped and purposefully separated by
dividing legal jurisdictions (e.g., into criminal law or youth care
law).
This occurs to some extent because the maintenance of
public order is considered a common interest, whereas the right
of the child is in practice often juxtaposed against this common
interest to imply only the right of one individual child. Cer-
tainly, children’s rights, as with any human rights, imply a
common relevance for all and should be practiced accordingly.
3.2.2. The daily use of ProKid87
The Kinderechtenmonitor88 devoted a section to advise the Child
Ombudsman about focussing on the extent to which it is trans-
parent for parents how a risk calculation is made in ProKid,
whether parents are informed about such a risk registration,
86 Abraham, M., Buysee, W., Loef, L. & Van Dijk, B. Pilots
ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd Pilots ProKid
Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-groep, 2011).
87 Parts of the empirical material in this section also appeared in
La Fors-Owczynik, K. & Valkenburg G.: ‘Risk identities: construct-
ing actionable problems in Dutch youth’ in Digitizing Identities,
(Routledge, forthcoming in 2015).
88 Kinderrechtenmonitor: in English ‘Children rights’ monitor’ is
a journal of the Dutch Child Ombudsman’s office.
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and how professionals balance between risk and protection
factors during their decision making about a child.89
The use of ProKid in daily practice shows that risk factors
come earlier than ‘protecting’ factors when deciding about a
risk profile for a child. This is in part so because in practice,
risk profiles of a large number of persons influence the risk
qualification of a child. More than only the family members’
profiles living at the same address with the child contribute
to the colour code of a child because this is formally inte-
grated into the system. A ProKid manager explains that during
assessments, growing attention is focussed on the child’s larger
social environment, from where ‘bad influences’ are regis-
tered as aggravating factors for a child’s development:
“Suppose there was a fight between neighbours. [. . .] Then,
I know that the children of the neighbours have probably
been involved in that fight, too. The police come and make
a report. Then, in ProKid, I see that a child from one address
fought with a child from the neighbouring address. I can
then check back in time, and see that these children’s fathers
also fought, two years ago. I can then connect these things,
and that is the analysis I do.” (ProKid manager, city B).
This demonstrates that the criminal profiles of neighbours
are also incorporated into the risk calculation about a child.
Furthermore, practice demonstrates that the risk profiles of a
child’s friend also become relevant for assigning risks to a child
in ProKid:
“If I see a child who has a ‘yellow’ or ‘white’ colour code,
and although officially the case is ‘not yet worth’ being sent
to Bureau Youthcare (BYC),90 but if a friend of that child is
‘red’ in the system, then I share this extra information [about
the ‘yellow’ or ‘white’ colour coded child] during the case
discussion within BYC.” (ProKid manager, city B).
The risks identified in relation to the father, the neighbour
or the friends of a child are combined and observed to provide
a ‘more sophisticated’ risk image about a child. Simultane-
ously, these associations between profiles increase the concern
about the wellbeing of a given child.
The urgency to associate and register, for instance, the anti-
social or criminal behaviour of a parent – living at the same
address with a child – as an aggravating concern for the de-
velopment of the child is based upon arguments of behavioural
science. One main argument for these is that children having
been witnesses or victims of violence at home will develop a
predisposition to crime in their future. Taking this seriously
appears to be a legitimate effort of the state and in line with
Art. 3 of the CRC as protecting children from wrong influ-
ences can be viewed as being in their best interest. However,
how this protection is put in place by ProKid requires a broader
CRC discussion. The digital registration of risk associations to
parents and, as observed, even to neighbours and friends of
a child, can also be viewed as building a de facto ‘pre-criminal’
record for the child through a quasi-determination that the past
wrongdoings of others will actually develop a criminal from
a child. These digital risk associations in ProKid are first del-
egated from the ‘guilt’ of persons who fall within the child’s
social environment to the child, although he/she has not done
anything anti-social or criminal. Second, the use of ProKid in-
tensifies a risk-based surveillance of persons associated with
children.
Therefore, on the one hand, the behavioural scientific ar-
gumentation upon which ProKid standards are based and the
ways in which practitioners address calculating and associ-
ating risks to children can be considered reifying de facto risks
as ‘real’ expectations.91 On the other hand, “risks are
uncertainties”92 about children’s futures; by digitally record-
ing such ‘uncertainties’, expectations become ‘visible’ and drive
a certain, present reality that such risk-profiled children will
become actual criminals in the future. This raises questions
about the extent to which Art. 16 and Art. 39 are respected when
ProKid is used in such predictive ways.
Beyond associating other persons’ criminal behaviour to chil-
dren’s risk profiles, practice shows that risk predictions about
a child are also based on the child’s relationship to animals:
“We also have another, somewhat strange risk factor in our
list: animal abuse. If a child abuses an animal at an early
age, then, according to the scientific findings of Radboud
University of Nijmegen, that child has a higher inclina-
tion for sexual abuse at a later age.” (Police officer responsible
for ProKid project, city B).
The author has no intention of questioning the behavioural
scientific underpinnings, such as animal abuse,93 upon which
ProKid standards are based. Furthermore, it fully acknowl-
edges the severity of issues, for instance child abuse and anti-
social behaviour constitute and that the goal to prevent these
problems includes the use of behavioural scientific research
in ProKid. However, again, when a wrongdoing of a child, in
this case animal abuse, becomes registered in ProKid, the real
expectation of a child’s criminal development grants no room
for a child to prove the opposite of this expectation. This is
largely the consequence of the technological impossibility to
register the opposites of risks, such as good behaviour, in the
system.That any prevention mode in relation to children under
12 years of age is primarily educative, challenges the prescrip-
tions of Art. 29d regarding “preparation of the child for responsible
89 Bruning, M. R.,Van den Brink,Y. N., de Jong-de Kruijf, M. P., Olthof,
I. W. M. & Van der Zon, K. A. M. Kinderrechtenmonitor 2012 – Adviezen
aan de Kinderombudsman (Universiteit Leiden, 2012).
90 According to the ProKid instructions, each case with a ‘red’ or
‘orange’ colour code needs to be forwarded directly to Bureau
Youthcare – see also Hensen, M. Op weg naar een regionale aanpak
kindermishandeling (GGD Regio Nijmegen en GGd Rivierland, 2010).
91 See also La Fors-Owczynik, K. & Valkenburg, G. ‘Risky identi-
ties: from identifying risks to constructing youth ‘at risk’ and ‘as
risk’ in The Netherlands in van der Ploeg, I. & Pridmore, J. (eds) Digi-
tizing Identities (Routledge, forthcoming in 2015).
92 Van Asselt, M. B. A. ‘De politike rol van risico-assessments’ (2012)
Magazine Nationale Veilighied en crisisbeheersing, 56.
93 For information about ‘animal abuse’ as a scientific underpin-
ning, which in ProKid is turned into a standard indicator of future
criminal behaviour, see also p. 24 in Abraham, M., Buysee, W., Loef,
L. & Van Dijk, B. Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd
Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-groep, 2011).
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life in a free society”. Questions could be raised about the extent
to which the urge to register and render risks digitally visible
associated with a child is not becoming a goal on its own? To
what extent does such digital ‘diagnostic’ registration of only
risks help the actual care process? Is such registration “pro-
portionate” to children’s circumstances (Art. 40 3b) and to their
positive development? Moreover, to what extent does the use
of ProKid still – at least in its current form – serve primarily
the “best interest of the child” (Art. 3 of the CRC) and not “in-
terests of public safety”? Although ProKid is used as a tool to
facilitate care, and not, for example, for pre-emptive punish-
ment, it is indicative of the logic that more indicators attributed
to persons surrounding the child offer more risk indicators
against which a child is to be assessed. Consequently, the like-
lihood of a child being considered ‘at risk’ or ‘as risk’ grows
exponentially.
Another example further depicts such exponential growth
in risk indicators. The following shows how a risk indicator
emerges in ‘between’ technological systems because of a police
officer’s observation at a crime scene, which observation has
no direct link to the actual crime:
“[. . .] when our officers are at an address, and find drugs,
[. . .] this information becomes registered in BFLE.94 However,
if they find a baby bottle in the kitchen, and ask whether
there is a baby; and the inhabitants of the house answer:
‘No, the bottle belongs to my sister who comes here occa-
sionally’. If the officer cannot find hard information about
whether we need to seek care for the baby, or who exactly
lives there, to what extent the person makes something
up. . . and the officer has a bad feeling[about it], and wants
to use the information [about the bottle], he can register it
in BFFI.95 We, ProKid managers, will see that.” (ProKid
manager, city C).
The ‘soft’ data about the baby bottle become a relevant risk
factor during assessments, although the information is regis-
tered in another police system that is used for purposes of
criminal law enforcement. Because data registered in BFFI are
meant to be alerting, information in such systems only in-
creases the scope of ProKid and contributes to the ambiguity
regarding what exactly leads to a risk qualification about a child.
At the same time, it only solidifies the need for the very system
of risk assessment by ProKid. The possibility for such expo-
nential growth in risk indicators throws into question whether
the system and the practices associated with it versus the ob-
jectives the system serves are proportionate (Art. 40 3b).
3.3. Interim conclusion
Based on the above insights, a conclusion can be safely drawn
that CRC rights are indeed challenged on many levels by the
working of ProKid. Challenges emerge concerning the purpose,
design and daily use of the system. Questions can be raised,
first about the extent to which Art. 40 can be safely enforced,
if algorithms in ProKid, for instance, about an anti-socially be-
having child suggest to police officers that such a child develops
into a criminal in the future. “The presumption of innocence
of the child” becomes challenged.
Second, it is questionable to what extent Art. 29 is en-
forced if, technologically, only risks can be registered.To register
only risks allows no room for building a digital record of good
deeds of a child and for enforcing Art. 29. The lack of any pos-
sibility to build such a ‘good record’ challenges prescriptions
about “the best interest of the child”. Such registration would
restore what the ‘bad deed’ register precisely does now; it gradu-
ally destructs the ‘credibility of a child’ from a law enforcement
perspective. A good deed register could allow for the restora-
tion of this credibility. For society to flourish, such credibility
proves to be perhaps even more desirable than before. Given
the ease by which a child can earn a risk registration in ProKid,
to take the effort of caring about a child’s credibility by reg-
istering good deeds could largely support that a child grows
into a responsible person in a free society (Art. 29). The latter
can be considered in particular in the best interest of a child
(Art. 3).
Third, with respect to a victim or witness child, the regis-
tration of such a child in ProKid jeopardises the enforcement
of Art. 40 2b because the underlying argument in ProKid to reg-
ister such a child is to prevent him or her from developing a
problematic or delinquent behaviour in the future.96 Further-
more, a child victim or witness in ProKid immediately becoming
associated with a perpetrator who automatically worsens the
image of the child allows for discussions about the extent to
which Art. 29, Art. 16 and Art. 3 are well enforced by this tech-
nological association between victims, witnesses and their
perpetrators.
Fourth, when using ProKid, the police rely on other police
databases that contain strictly law enforcement data and there-
fore fall under the regular regime of the Police Data Act.
Consequently, the extent to which such data aggregation en-
forces the child’s right to privacy as prescribed by Art. 16 and
is in the “child’s best interest” (Art. 3) is questionable. Art. 16
appears to be challenged already because of the use of strictly
police databases in combination with ProKid. ProKid is used
on children under 12 years of age who should not be pros-
ecuted; hence, the exceptions from the Dutch Data Protection
Act provided by the Police Data Act would not apply for police
when they use ProKid. The complementary use of other police
databases, such as BFLE or the BFFI within the network of
ProKid, however, appears to overreach data protection juris-
dictions because law enforcement data from the mentioned
two databases are used for prevention by ProKid. As long as
the Police Data Act is applicable as a ‘lighter’ data protection
regulation for regular police databases, the use of such data-
bases for preventative purposes on children through ProKid
allows for the blurring of boundaries between the data pro-
tection jurisdictions – one for the Dutch police and one for all
other data flow types. This blurring endangers the enforce-
ment of the CRC.
94 BFLE – Basic Facility for Law Enforcement.
95 BFFI – Basic Facility for Forensic Investigation.
96 About this basic goal of ProKid, see also pp. 18 in Abraham, M.,
Buysee, W., Loef, L. & Van Dijk, B. Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument
12- geëvalueerd Pilots ProKid Signaleringsinstrument 12- geëvalueerd (DSP-
groep, 2011).
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4. CRC: its potential to protect children’s
rights
Despite its imperfections and general criticism of human rights
being relative, the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child is a highly potent and unique instrument, thus
far being the only legally binding tool that considers children
as fundamental rights holders.
However, as the international and Dutch court rulings also
demonstrated, the Convention’s immense potential is always
part of a balancing of interests. Dutch criminal court cases have
shown that if a balancing finds a place between the interests
of public safety and children’s rights, Dutch court decisions
mostly favour interests of public safety. Therefore, the poten-
tial of the CRC can be better exploited if the CRC becomes
employed and enforced in mundane practices of profession-
als, in our case within Dutch policing practices in which ProKid
is used. Therefore, from a CRC-perspective, it is desirable not
to wait until an issue with ProKid reaches court. To enforce the
CRC, certain debatable children’s rights challenges related to
the daily profiling practice of ProKid, such as those detailed
earlier, need to be addressed first.
First, providing room to build a digital record of the good
deeds of a child could help to enforce Art. 29 and Art. 3. The
registration of an ‘improved image’ might possibly compen-
sate for the ‘bad image’ of a child registered earlier and favour
Art. 29. and Art. 3. Such a compensatory feature in ProKid is
desirable because with the present set-up of the system, if a
family member or co-habitant of the child has a registered
record by the police, that record further overshadows the image
of the child (see, for instance the yellow, orange and red colour-
code descriptions on the living address of the child). This
characteristic de facto raises difficulties for a child in avoid-
ing a potential criminal future.
Second, the enforcement of Art. 40 could be improved if
the ‘bad image’ of a perpetrator was not immediately associ-
ated in ProKid to a child victim or witnessed as a directly bad
influence. Art. 3, Art. 16 and Art. 29 could also be better
enforced if such technological associations between victims,
witnesses and their perpetrators had a more flexible and
differentiated, individually oriented character. Whether and
how associations between children and adult perpetrators
need to be registered and scored are in themselves not only
legal but also ethical questions. However, if possibilities for
such associations between children and adult perpetrators
are already implemented in ProKid, the option of whether
such an association of a child to a perpetrator should be
digitally registered in ProKid is a question that a ProKid user
must investigate per child. The possibility for the ProKid-
using police officer to opt out, or in other words not to
register such an association if in the officer’s view registering
such an association would not be in the child’s best interest,
should be accepted as an option. This is worth considering
because practice also demonstrated that the ease of associ-
ating not only family members and co-habitants but also
friends, neighbours and animals to the child’s profile as a
negative influence allows for a child to become easily pro-
filed as risky. At the same time, however, expunging such a
profile, which according to certain scholars can be consid-
ered “stigmatizing”,97 proves to be quite difficult. At present,
risk data are kept for 5 years; however, given the number of
persons and their problems who can become involved in a
child’s risk profiling process, the consequences of one risk
registration on another associated registration to a child, in
practice, can span a period much longer than 5 years. Al-
though the alerting potential of ProKid is necessary, to build
more flexibility into such risk registrations, enabling children
to move beyond their risk profile proves also to be in their
interest.
Third, making arrangements for a more structured usage
of strictly law enforcement databases in relation to the pre-
ventative system of ProKid would be highly desirable to
strengthen the CRC and, in particular, the CRC-granted right
to privacy. As a first step, such arrangements could take shape
by differentiating the methods by which digital connections
can be established between police databases and ProKid if the
issue at hand involves a child perpetrator, victims or wit-
nesses. This also could help clarify how the two different data
protection regulations are met – the Dutch Police Data Act by
the police and the General Data Protection Act for all other data
flows. This would allow for the combined use of strictly law
enforcement databases, and ProKid would neither cross data
protection jurisdictions nor blur their boundaries. Such ar-
rangements could be highly beneficial to enforce the CRC in
general and Art. 16 in particular.
Fourth, a CRC approach should allow for questions about
whether a data registration is desirable at all in the first place,
while bearing in mind Art. 3 of the CRC. A CRC approach allows
for debating the extent to which it is under all conditions in
“the best interest of the child” to keep a registration of a child
for 5 years and whether an earlier erasure of data could not
be better in the child’s favour. This could allow for the en-
forceability of a right that is even more applicable in light of
the troubles with which children under the age of 12 can
become associated. This right, named “the right to be forgot-
ten” in a recent European Court of Justice decision,98 became
acknowledged as enforceable under certain circumstances
within the context of Internet providers and consumers.
However, this decision is not applicable to law-enforcement
organisations within the justice system who perform preven-
tion work on children, and the enforcement of such a “right
to be forgotten” bears significant challenges for daily practices.99
However, this decision could inspire more-CRC-based reason-
ing during the prevention practices of ProKid, particularly
because within its context, a “right to be forgotten” could de
facto mean a “right to be forgiven” within the Dutch justice
system for a child.
Beyond these four specific suggestions for technological and
legal changes, the potential of the CRC with respect to ProKid
can gain a general boost from the insights of science and tech-
nology studies, such as the perspective that problem
97 Bruning, M. R.,Van den Brink,Y. N., de Jong-de Kruijf, M. P., Olthof,
I. W. M. & Van der Zon, K. A. M. Kinderrechtenmonitor 2012 – Adviezen
aan de Kinderombudsman (Universiteit Leiden, 2012).
98 ECJ, Luxembourg, 13 May 2014, C-131/12.
99 Koops, B.-J. Forgetting footprints, shunning shadows. A critical
analysis of the “right to be forgotten” in big data practice (2011)
3(8) Scripted 229.
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translations also demonstrate. To follow how problem defini-
tions of child abuse and anti-social behaviour of children are
translated into problems of information-sharing and later into
digital data processing allows asking questions about the extent
to which these problem translations actually help to address
the ‘original problems’ and whether CRC rights are consid-
ered throughout such translations adequately. Insights from
other disciplines can also be of help, such as relevant fields
of psychology. Philip Zimbardo, for instance, the psychologist
who became famous through his prison study at Stanford Uni-
versity, criticises general criminal behaviour predictions by
arguing, “Personality predicts only when people are in the same
situation [. . .] personality does not predict across time and
across very different situations.”100 This suggests that a child
victim or a witness of a crime cannot be considered with one
hundred percent certainty a future criminal, if only certain reg-
istered occasions or situations provide for such a claim. Such
observations from other disciplines, which plead to assess each
person according to his/her individual situation and needs, leave
more room for CRC considerations.
5. Conclusions
The use of ProKid SI 12- allows framing children as potential
perpetrators, even when they are registered as victims of vio-
lence: “The scientific basis for ProKid is a number of behavioural
indicators(such as truancy, bullying, cruelty to animals, profanities,
hanging out on the street without supervision or witnesses or victims
of sexual abuse or domestic violence) which have proven to be risk
factors for criminal careers.”101 The framing of children being ‘at
risk’ of a crime such as child abuse or domestic violence and
that such a digital profile by itself allows for these children to
be viewed ‘as a risk’ of becoming a future perpetrator, consti-
tutes perhaps the greatest challenge of the CRC. The fact that
children who show anti-social behaviour are observed as much
‘as a risk’ as those children who are already proven criminal
delinquents, does not allow much space for the educative com-
ponent of the CRC. These issues need to be addressed so that
the CRC can gain power in daily practices.
Therefore, the empirical examples and their analyses have
been intended, first to advocate for the building of a CRC-
informed reflexivity and awareness amongst ProKid-user
professionals concerning the potential effects from the daily
use of ProKid for children’s rights. Preferably, this should include
not only training about how to use ProKid to register risks on
children but also children’s rights training addressing what the
effects of such registrations may be in practice in light of the
convention. All this could assist in developing a CRC-driven
routine amongst practitioners.
Second, a general remark is that currently existing privacy
and data-protection impact assessments could be broadened
into larger CRC impact assessments. These would preferably
be performed not only in the test phase of a technology but
also repeatedly during the daily use of systems. This would
create a capacity to reflect upon basic children’s rights prin-
ciples that, during the ‘translation’ of children’s rights principles
into data protection rules, often become drawn into the back-
ground or viewed as being already covered by data protection
rules.
Third, the example of ProKid is of international relevance.
Legal, societal and technological conclusions from the ob-
served drawbacks of the system could be informative regarding
the working of ProKid and similar systems102 and about their
potential negative implications for the CRC internationally.
To conclude, when we examine more closely the Dutch na-
tional court rulings in law enforcement103–105and the purpose,
design, and particularly the colour-code standards of ProKid
and how these standards become interpreted by professionals106
in daily practice, a certain mindset becomes visible. This
mindset shows that the expectation that a child will become
a criminal at the end of the day often appears to outweigh the
need to protect the child’s privacy. However, this mindset should
be challenged and perhaps desirably changed in a demo-
cratic society. This is essential to meet the CRC prescriptions
and the conclusions raised by the earlier ECHR court rulings,
both being applicable for all signatory states including The Neth-
erlands. However, such a change requires a combination of
elements, which would not only include regulative changes such
as, for instance, the already mentioned ‘right to be forgotten’
during risk profiling practices on children. However, CRC-
based changes affect numerous societal, administrative and
technological parties. Changes could manifest in cases, for in-
stance, in which certain less severe risks become unregistered
or registered in a balanced manner. This could serve that the
digital construction of risk profiles about children would not
lead to some forms of major injustice towards profiled chil-
dren. Risk profiles of children, for instance, could become erased,
and long digital records of children’s deeds performed before
the age of 12 would not be kept for a long period. All this could
improve chances for minors not only to be protected and to
live with a ‘right to be forgiven’ but also, importantly, to live
in a strict but hopeful and forgiving society within The Neth-
erlands and beyond.
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Thesis chapter V. 
Migrants at/as risk: Identity verification and risk assessment technologies in The 
Netherlands 
Karolina La Fors-Owczynik and Irma van der Ploeg 
1. Introduction 
International policy discourse on migration shows a tendency to prioritize securing citizens over 
securing migrants (Tsianos & Kuster, 2010). Practices geared toward the sorting out of entitlements to 
access and residence of migrants mobilize a discourse that increasingly frames them as posing risks to 
the societies of their host countries (Leers, 2012; Leers, 2011), notwithstanding the fact that only a small 
minority of migrants are associated with criminal offences, e.g., organized crime, illegal entry, human 
trafficking, or terrorism. In the main, migrants with refugee or asylum seeker status, as well as those 
seeking this designation, arrive as a consequence of wars, natural disasters, political or economic unrest, 
human trafficking, international crime, or a combination thereof. These immigrants can be regarded as 
being at risk.  Although technological systems of migration and border control are generally installed to 
prevent threats to a country’s inhabitants, including threats associated with migrants, countries also have 
a human rights obligation to assist and protect vulnerable migrants. Today, the perspective on migrants 
as vulnerable and at risk seems to lose traction. 
This chapter discusses how migrants and travellers are increasingly framed as posing a risk to the 
Netherlands. More specifically, we analyse the way that modes of prevention (Bigo & Guild, 2005; 
Broeders, 2009), and their associated risk assessment systems have come to focus on translating specific 
problems around migrants into problems of identity fraud, illegal entry and illegal residence. The ways 
in which these problems are defined and managed has directed attention towards improving the 
establishment and the management of ‘identity’1. These identification practices have ethical implications 
because they may be instrumental in discriminative exclusion and inclusion. For this reason, we focus 
in particular on identification and risk assessment practices performed by border control, migration, and 
law enforcement agencies.  
In the Netherlands, the constellation of border and immigration agencies is known as the ‘alien chain’, 
and that of law enforcement agencies as the ‘criminal justice chain’. Establishing migrants’ and 
travellers’ identities, and organizing fraud-proof identity management systems have high priority within 
both chains. This is pursued by elaborate risk profiling practices, identity management systems, and 
sharing of information along and between the range of agencies within the chains, such as the Alien 
Police, The Royal Military Police, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). 
Whereas terms such as ‘identity’, ‘prevention’, and ‘risk’ concerning migrants suggest a certain self-
evidence at first sight, these terms derive their meaning from complex arrangements of local, national 
and international institutions, digital technologies, legal settings, and professional practices. This is also 
evident in the international commitments The Netherlands has to a broad range of information exchange 
tasks, including information on migrants and travellers. As part of the European Union, The Netherlands 
is, for instance, committed to performing policing tasks through using the national database of the 
                                            
1 In opposition to the identity management discourse, where ‘digital identity’ is often equated with a collection of personal 
data, this chapter regards identity as a ‘multi-layered concept’, as something “interactive, mediated, relational, and dynamic, 
as opposed to something pre-given to be ‘expressed’ or ‘registered’ (Van der Ploeg; 1999). 




Schengen Information System (SIS2) and exchanging data within the pan-European law enforcement 
organization, Europol3. The Netherlands is also obliged to enforce the Dublin convention4, which 
prescribes member states to determine whether or not an asylum seeker has submitted a prior application 
in another member state. As part of these assessments, the fingerprint database EURODAC5 is 
consulted. Another obligation for the Dutch government is the exchange of visa data on migrants through 
the Visa Information System (VIS6). Given that the Dutch sea border also constitutes part of the EU’s 
external border, the Netherlands actively participates within the EU’s border management organization 
FRONTEX7. For example, the Dutch also aggregate and share data on illegal entry through the EU’s 
border surveillance system, EUROSUR8. Beyond these European organizations and systems, a large 
variety of national and local organizations exist in the Netherlands that deploy local border control, 
immigration, and law enforcement procedures. The two identification systems, as well as the risk 
profiling system analysed in this chapter, are embedded within these European and Dutch regulatory 
and technological settings, yet operated solely in The Netherlands. 
These three systems are the following: first, the identification and verification console of the Dutch 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the INS-console, second the console of the information 
provision program (in Dutch: Programma Informatievoorziening Strafrechtsketen) within the Dutch 
criminal law chain, the PROGIS-console, and the Advanced Passenger Information-System, the API-
system. Although they differ significantly, as they are situated in different practices and operated for 
different purposes, this chapter aims to articulate some shared characteristics and implications of their 
use. We suggest that all three systems contribute to a shift that increasingly frames migrants as posing 
a risk, as opposed to potentially being at risk. Moreover, we aim to show how the quest for ‘accurate 
identity’, and the technologies used to approach this goal, transform the problem in specific ways, and, 
in the process, create new uncertainties and risks for those subjected to them. We argue that this happens 
because of the particular way problems of identity fraud and illegal entry are translated (Latour, 1987) 
into specific technological solutions. 
To illustrate this dynamic, the next section first introduces the systems under study, and briefly describes 
how identity verification of certain categories of migrants and risk profiling of travellers is enabled by 
these systems. The third section discusses how the ‘accuracy of identity’ and an accurate ‘risk profile’ 
are produced, by focusing on the development of ‘risk indicators’. The fourth section looks a bit deeper 
into the functioning of the systems in practice, and identifies a number of pitfalls in the socio-technical 
production of ‘identity’, and ‘risk’. The analysis is based on empirical data from interviews with 
professional users of these systems within the alien and law enforcement chains, and guided by actor-
network theory (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1987) and a material-semiotics informed approach (Law, 2009). 
The final section draws the arguments together, and concludes that the technological quest for ‘accurate 
identification’ and risk prevention introduces a range of new risks for migrants.  
2. Prevention systems in Dutch immigration, law enforcement and border 
management   
‘Risk prevention’ with regard to identity fraud, illegal entry, and international crime has a high priority 
in Dutch immigration policy (Leers, 2012). In the discourse on improving this prevention, visual 
metaphors dominate: migrants and their associated risks need to be made ‘more visible’ (WRR, 2011), 
and there is a need for more ‘complete and accurate pictures’ of migrants. A report by the Dutch 
                                            
2 SIS - <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-
system/index_en.htm> 
3 Europol - < https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-us> 
4 Dublin Convention - 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33153_
en.htm> 
5 EURODAC - <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants/index_en.htm> 
6 VIS  - <https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/Supervision/VIS> 
7 FRONTEX - <http://frontex.europa.eu/> 
8 EUROSUR - <http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur>  




Advisory Committee on Alien Affairs, for instance, describes a need for acquiring a ‘better view on 
asylum seekers’ (Tweede Kamer, 2005), and another report from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
similarly emphasizes the need for a more ‘comprehensive picture’ of migrants (Min. van Binnenlandse 
Zaken, 2013). The need for improving this ‘visibility’ is invariably addressed through the introduction 
of advanced digital technologies for identity verification and risk assessment purposes. The INS-
console, the PROGIS-console, and the API system exemplify such technologies.  
2.1. The INS-console 
The INS-console is a biometric fingerprint scanning and facial photographing system employed by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, in Dutch: Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst) of the 
Dutch Ministry of Interior Affairs. The European Council Regulation (EC) No. 380/2008 prescribes that 
all EU member states, including the Netherlands, register “a photograph […] and two fingerprints taken 
flat and digitally captured” in each residence permit issued to a third-country national. ‘INS-consoles’ 
have been installed specifically to meet this regulation by producing facial photographs and ‘high 
quality’ digitally scanned fingerprints. These data are then incorporated into the residence permits of 
non-EU migrants (“Vingerafdrukken op verblijfsdocumenten”, 2013). First, it was only allowed to 
register scanned fingerprints and personal photographs on the residence permits. But as of 1st of March 
2014 a legal change allows for the registration of the mentioned biometric features in a central database, 
in the Basic Facility for Aliens9(Besluit van 21 januari 2014 tot wijziging van het Vreemdelingenbesluit 
2000[…], 2014). During every subsequent verification process, the residence permit holder places 
his/her fingers on a reader and the images are compared with the fingerprints stored on the permit. 
Residence permits furnished with these biometric features are considered to increase certainty about the 
permit holder’s identity, and that the document truly belongs to the immigrant to whom it has been 
issued (Teveen, 2013). Enrollment in the system will eventually include all third-country nationals 
acquiring a residence permit. However, when the interviews used in this paper took place, the INS had 
only begun enrolling asylum seekers. Our analysis in subsequent sections of the ways in which ‘identity’ 
and ‘risk’ are translated and performed within this system, thereby reinforcing the trend of shifting 
perceptions from seeing them being at risk to seeing them as risk, therefore pertains only to this 
particular subgroup of migrants.  
The digital fingerprint scanning by the INS-console is considered an improvement upon previous 
enrollment procedures for asylum seekers. That procedure involved rolling the applicant’s 10 fingers in 
ink, and producing prints on paper, the so-called dactyslips. All original dactyslips are archived in the 
Dutch National Research Information Service (dNRI). Copies of these sheets are subsequently 
transferred to a central European system called Eurodac where they are checked against those already 
registered. In case of a ‘no-hit’, the fingerprints are registered, and the application will be processed. In 
case of a ‘hit’, this is taken as evidence of ‘asylum shopping’, or at least as evidence that an earlier 
application has been submitted by the same person in another EU country. Eurodac is the main tool for 
the execution of the Dublin Convention (Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000) that determined that 
one cannot apply for asylum in more than one of the EU member states, and that the country of first 
application remains responsible for that person and their application (Van der Ploeg, 1999). In addition 
to checking in Eurodac, copies of applicants’ dactyslips are registered in the Basic Facility for Aliens 
(Basis Voorziening Vreemdelingen), an IND database containing data on all migrants in The 
Netherlands, and in the law enforcement database HAVANK (Het Automatisch 
Vingerafdrukkensysteem Nederlandse Kollektie, or Automated Fingerprint system Dutch Collection).  
2.2. PROGIS system 
Prevention of identity fraud by convicted criminals is a key target within the Dutch law enforcement 
chain. Although this particular issue is part of a much wider concern, it has   recently been pushed to the 
forefront after several prisoners were found to be others than those who were actually sentenced. 
Therefore, the Dutch Act on Identification of suspects, convicts, and witnesses (Wet 
                                            
9 The new bill also enables a significant extension of use of biometrics throughout the alien chain. 




identiteitsvaststelling verdachten, veroordeelden en getuigen, 2009), prescribes law enforcement 
authorities to ‘establish the identity’ of suspects, convicts and witnesses to crimes by taking their digital 
fingerprints and facial photographs.  
In line with this law, the police and other judicial authorities introduced a new10 biometric system, the 
PROGIS-console (PROGIS), to guarantee that “the right person is punished” ('Politie: grondige 
identificatie voorkomt identiteitsfraude - Security.NL', 2012). At the end of an identity verification and 
enrollment process, which involves taking a facial photograph and scanning ten fingers, a so-called ‘ID-
state’ is produced. This ID-state meets the objective of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice in 
acquiring a “more integrated, criminal person image” (in Dutch: integraal strafrechtelijk persoonsbeeld 
(2011), in that it is claimed to ensure a person’s identity during criminal investigations.  
The enrolment of suspects and witnesses in PROGIS constitutes the entry point to the Dutch criminal 
justice system. From that point on, the ‘established identity’ on the ID-state becomes the reference point 
against which all fingerprints and facial images taken at later moments in the procedure are cross-
checked and verified. In order to use the same person's file between criminal justice agencies, each 
PROGIS ID-state is linked to a so-called criminal justice chain number (CJCN, in Dutch:  
strafrechtsketennummer - SKN), and stored in a central database, the Criminal Justice Chain Database 
(CJCD). The CJCN is meant to harmonize the administration of cases among agencies. In case of 
recidivism, this database allows for updating a criminal record. This occurs when separate criminal cases 
become associated with the same person through one CJCN. 
Remarkably, it has been the Dutch Alien police that was tasked with operating PROGIS for the criminal 
justice chain, primarily because of the experience and expertise they acquired through conducting 
identity research11 on migrants within the alien chain. However, biometric data produced by PROGIS is 
only used by partners within the criminal justice chain to verify whether a person’s data is already 
registered in the CJCD. Therefore, if an immigrant offends or becomes a criminal suspect, they, would 
be enrolled in PROGIS the same as anyone else in The Netherlands. We are less interested here in the 
specific framing of an immigrant as posing a risk in the sense of being a suspect in the context of a 
particular crime investigation.12 Our concern here regards the particular framing as risk that is performed 
with the very enrolment – either as a suspect or witness - in PROGIS. The likelihood for a migrant to 
become suspected of identity fraud, for instance, is higher than for ‘regular’ residents, since the 
identification process for immigrants is in general far more complicated than that for Dutch citizens, and 
therefore more prone to error. Along this line, section four highlights how the very use of PROGIS can 
increase the chances for a migrant to be framed as identity fraudster. 
2.3. The Advanced Passenger Information System (API) 
Within the context of border control, travellers from non-EU states are routinely assessed against risks 
of illegal entry (e.g., fraudulent visa or passport), international criminal activity, or threats to national 
security (e.g., terrorism). All these problems have contributed to the development of more orchestrated 
                                            
10 The digital fingerprint scanning via PROGIS is new compared to the classical dactyloscopy routine of law enforcement 
practices. This entails the ink-based fingerprinting of suspects in remand and convicted criminals, and the production of 
dactyslips. Dactyslips are digitally copied and saved in two major police databases: in AFDC, and in the Facility for Verification 
and Identification (FVI, in Dutch: Voorziening voor Verificatie en Identificatie, VVI)(Min. van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2011). 
(The original sheets are submitted to and archived by the Dutch National Research Information Service/dNRI/.) The 
fingerprints taken by PROGIS during the identification process are regularly compared with fingerprints stored in AFDC. If 
fingerprints have not been registered yet, dactyslips are produced and their copies transferred to AFDC. In case a suspect is an 
alien, fingerprints are also compared with the BFA.  
11 The Dutch Alien Police operates PROGIS from the back office, including an extra control function. Back office tasks were 
granted to the Dutch Alien Police based on the already accumulated experience of this unit in conducting identity research on 
immigrants within the alien chain. These tasks include establishing the identity of suspects by PROGIS, which can involve 
‘identity research’ on immigrants. (Leers, 2011) 
12 Immigrants who overstay their visa, who are not part of an asylum seeking process, or who have simply no identity documents 
all are enrolled in PROGIS as illegal residents. 




risk profiling practices of passengers internationally. Problems of international crime and terrorism 
generated new modes of data exchange, as EU agreements on the exchange of Passenger Name Records 
(PNR) of travellers with the US (2012), Canada (2006), and Australia (2012) exemplify. In fact, airports 
transformed into ever more advanced security checkpoints (Schouten, 2014), where, beyond facilitating 
the mobility of travellers, the filtering out of ‘untrustworthy’ passengers grew into a top priority.   
The Advanced Passenger Information project (henceforth: API) is situated at Schiphol Airport and is 
part of a larger programme called Sustained Border Management13 (in Dutch: Verbeterd 
Grensmanagement) in The Netherlands. API has been developed to meet EU (EC, 2004/82/EG) and 
national regulations for the sole purpose of preventing illegal entry into the Netherlands, and is used by 
Dutch border control and immigration authorities to check all travellers moving through Schiphol 
Airport against ‘API profiles’. A wide range of passenger attributes, including behavioural 
characteristics, air travel histories, modes of plane ticket purchase, and classifications of personal 
belongings, are assessed against these API profiles,  
In 2010, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) revised the guidelines for API. 
According to these guidelines, part of the flight information from the "departure control system" (DCS) 
of airlines and individual passengers’ data from the machine readable zone of the travel document and 
passengers’ seat and baggage information need to be included in the API dataset. This dataset can be 
extended to include a maximum of 39 items (depending on country-specific legislation).  The EU also 
follows the international API guidelines. Carriers of incoming and outbound flights in the EU are obliged 
by the Directive 2004/82/EC (Min. van Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2012) to submit information on 
passengers to border control authorities prior to their departure, which also applies to the Netherlands. 
Such data may be kept by these authorities for a maximum of 24 hours. Leers 2011 suggests in a policy 
analysis about the work of the Dutch Royal Military Police, Dutch Customs Services, General 
Intelligence and Security Service, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, as well as test results 
of the API project, that if these agencies could gain access to passengers’ travel document data and 
check that data against API risk profiles before travellers cross the border, this would foster security, 
more efficient processes by agencies, as well as smoother border crossing of travellers.  
API data and profiling are perceived as pivotal elements in apprehending migrants involved in human 
trafficking. While on the one hand being construed as useful in the protection of potential victims, by 
identifying those ‘at risk’ of this and other, related crimes (e.g., prostitution or exploitation of illegal 
workers), API data are, on the other hand, also considered useful in identifying those posing a risk, in 
particular regarding illegal entry. Our analysis in section four will indicate how both uses of API profiles 
can, in fact, merge into each other, thus casting doubt on the proclaimed affectivity of each. 
3. Doing risk: building ‘indicators’ 
 
The prevention of potential problems associated with migrants hinges in part upon the sharing of 
information between practitioners, organizations, and technological systems. Both the prevention of 
identity fraud through identity documents, and of illegal entry through risk profiling methods are shaped 
by the ways in which classifications, standards, watch lists, and other tools are implemented. This 
‘operationalisation’, in turn, takes the form of marking specific personal and other characteristics as 
‘indicators’. Although such indicators are seemingly straightforward characteristics, they are in fact the 
result of a considerable amount of work (La Fors-Owczynik & Valkenburg, this volume). Moreover, 
                                            
13 The Dutch Sustained Border Management programme is coordinated by the Department of Identity Management and 
Immigration of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This includes four sub-projects: Passenger Related Data Exchange (PARDEX) 
– budget for PARDEX is frozen at the moment (Sanders, 2012) -, Advanced Passenger Information (API), no queue (No-Q) 
and a Registered Traveller (RT) programme. PARDEX is a central system intended for sharing passengers’ information 
(acquired prior to their travel) with law enforcement agencies. The No-Q and RT (Registered Travellers) are aimed at fostering 
automated border passage for all EU passengers based on machine-readability of travel documents.  




framing risks, i.e. a possible future occurrence, as something detectable in the present, requires an 
expectation to be translated into observable categories, which, at the same time, renders these risks more 
‘real’. In addition, and despite their apparent simplicity, risk indicators need to be continually interpreted 
by professionals. The efforts to determine and interpret risk indicators involve an opaque set of problem 
transformations by different actors that introduce a range of ambiguities concerning the functioning of 
the technologies.  
3.1 Establishing ‘proof’ of identity’: revisiting the “entry-point paradox”  
Ambiguities around what constitutes a risk of identity fraud also emerge in the ways in which ‘identity’ 
is established within the configuration of PROGIS. Although this system is intended to provide more 
accurate ways of identifying persons by biometric and other technologies, thus to prevent the risk of 
identity fraud, enrollment in the system requires prior ‘proof’ of identity:  
 
“PROGIS-consoles do not check the authenticity of ID documents before a person becomes enrolled. […] 
so, professionals must know IDs. New European documents are all made of polycarbonate, such as Polish 
IDs, for instance. If you drop one, you hear a tinny sound. Therefore, while being busy with someone, 
policemen often let documents “accidentally” fall. If a document sounds dull, that indicates fakeness.” 
(PROGIS-professional, city A) 
 
The above quote exemplifies two points. First, ID documents are not checked for authenticity by 
PROGIS; instead, professionals must decide whether an ID document used at enrollment is genuine or 
fake. Second, the potential problem of identity fraud is transformed into observable indicators, such as, 
in this particular example, the sound of a falling ID card. Thus, a general problem of identification, one 
that Roger Clarke (1994) labeled the “entry-point paradox” resurfaces here: the accuracy of each digital 
identification or verification system, however sophisticated, is only as strong as its weakest link, which 
often lies right at the start of the whole procedure, the authenticity of ‘breeder documents’ (e.g., IDs, 
birth certificates). This clearly is an issue in PROGIS, where its claimed technologically enhanced 
accuracy, in practice, may depend upon an improvised trick that is anything but high-tech or accurate. 
In a similar vein, the INS console is claimed to provide an ‘accurate identity’ for migrants, while also 
requiring prior ‘identity proof’ from them. A professional identifying so-called ‘invited refugees’14 via 
a mobile INS-console in refugee camps explains: 
 
I: How can you be sure that the [undocumented] person you want to identify with the INS-console is the 
one he/she claims to be?  
P: That you never know. I can give you a basic answer: I can only hope that the person who said something 
about him/herself to me, said the same thing to our UNHCR15 colleagues. It can be two times a lie, but 
since I cannot figure this out, I must be satisfied with the consistency of the refugee’s story.” (INS-
professional, city D) 
 
The above excerpt indicates once more the ‘clay feet’ of many high-tech identification and verification 
systems today. Sometimes all one has to go on at enrolment is a minimum level of consistency in a 
claimed identity, life or flight story. In the final analysis, it is still the experienced worker ‘in the field’ 
whose judgement about the credibility of someone’s personal account carries weight. Whether this is to 
be seen as a strength or a weakness – some may find this remaining human element reassuring – it is a 
key element in the functioning of such systems that is usually left out of the accounts of technological 
accuracy and their role in combating identity fraud  
                                            
14Most countries have signed agreements about inviting a given number of refugees. The Netherlands invites a maximum 500 
refugees yearly. INS professionals select these refugees by visiting camps and conducting research about who shall become 
entitled to an invitation. 
15 Refugee camps are generally run by UNHCR and local authorities.  




3.2 Turning attributes into indicators for ‘illegal entry’  
Building risk profiles from indicators visible in the Advanced Passenger Information system shows 
similar shifts in localization of the problem. The problem, here, is ‘illegal entry’, and the localization 
may be quite literal, in the sense that geographical locations and travelling routes may become part of a 
particular risk profile:  
 “Ultimately, you want to focus on every flight, but you need to build this up gradually. Where does our 
first priority lie? […] if other partners also have problems with flights from a given country, than there 
must be something wrong with those flights. If 5 professionals from different organizations say the same 
about 3 places, than there is something risky with those flights.” (API-professional, city A) 
The same professional explains how a range, or a combination, of rather generic attributes and 
characteristics of passengers on flagged flights are turned into risk indicators.  
“You can discover that […] ‘facts’ about persons traveling from those risk flagged places are also 
important, these help you learn the type of persons you look for. […] you often search for particular men 
or women of a certain age, behaviour, clothing or travel companions. I often check passengers against such 
indicators.”  
As indicated earlier, API profiles are also used to prevent illegal entry connected to international crime 
like human trafficking. An IND official, who also manages API, describes how particular instances of 
this crime are sometimes spotted through the API profiling:  
“We did quite well with that profile and stopped many women who were glad and grateful for what we did. 
We were also happy we could protect them from becoming prostitutes. […] The funny thing is that a month 
after we started to screen flights against the profile, trafficked women no longer travelled directly to 
Madrid, but took the route: Amsterdam - Paris - Barcelona - Madrid. The change in the route assured us 
that the profile was good, and that criminal organizations are well informed. The API profile […] did well. 
This allowed us to indicate for the minister the usefulness of API data and the importance of binding several 
issues together in one profile.” (API-manager, city A) 
Interestingly, this quote illustrates as well how the API system based profiling may contribute to the 
convergence, if not conflation, of protecting migrants at risk (of trafficking and sexual exploitation) with 
prevention of travellers posing a risk (of illegal entry). There is no need to doubt the intentions of border 
guards in any way in order to legitimately raise the question whether stopping someone at the border 
casts them as victim or as perpetrator, as it unclear whether this is followed by sending them back, 
prosecuting them, or really helping them. The fact that traffickers changing their routes is taken as a 
sign of success of the profile, and could indicate that it is above all the mere prevention of illegal entry 
that counts. 
It is also clear that professionals do not merely follow standardized protocols or automated decision 
processes. Seeing certain attributes of travellers as risk indicators can also be based on tacit knowledge 
and acquired experience:  
“If I only consider what is registered in the system, I would only follow the system. The moment I look at 
my quantitative data analysis and indicators suggest that persons who smuggle others always have a red 
cap on, I also start ‘qualitative research’. If I only focus on persons with red caps I would not see if someone 
is smuggling people in yellow rain boots, for instance. You have to rely on your senses […] and adjust your 
profile.” (API-professional, city A) 
We repeatedly heard about professional's ‘gut feelings’ being the reason for modifying risk profiles and 
introducing new indicators. Thus a shared or hybrid agency exist between human actors and automated 
systems, that makes the process leading up to the decision who will be assigned a risk qualification, and 
who will be stopped for further inspection, rather obscure. The constant need to amend API profiles and 
the flexible conception of indicators renders the process even more elusive.  
A major part of the work in identifying risk associated migrants is about fixing the ambiguities, 
uncertainties, and (im)probabilities concerning what, in practice, constitutes such risk. Yet, the whole 
idea of detecting and preventing risk in this context requires the presumption that risks are somehow 




observable; a presumption that lies at the basis of the efforts to develop indicators for them. This section, 
however gave examples suggesting that the particular indicators used within the operation of the INS-
console, the PROGIS-console, and the API system, sometimes increase ambiguities and uncertainties 
about risks. Moreover, as the next section aims to make clear, the very use of these three systems 
generates a proliferation of such ‘indicators’, and requires workarounds to make them function, that, 
together, have the ironic effect of increasing the perception rather than the prevention of risk. 
4. Pitfalls of making risks ‘visible’ 
To distinguish those entitled to enter the country, obtain employment, or receive government support, 
from those who pose a security risk has always been a politically laden process. Pivotal in this is the 
conceptualization of identity as something fixed, and verifiable. As Caplan and Torpey (2001) argue, 
identification processes transform the ‘who’ question into ‘what kind’ of a person that someone is. This 
shifts the search for identity towards the classification of  personal characteristics into categories. 
Similarly, Btihaj argues that “this collapse of the “who” into the “what” […] indicates their 
[identification modes] inherent limitations in capturing the ambiguity of identity and the complexity of 
the lived experience”(Btihaj, 2010: 6). 
Technological innovations like machine readable passports, e-IDs, and biometric identification 
systems exemplify efforts for producing certainty about a person’s identity (Bigo & Guild, 2005; 
Caplan & Torpey, 2001; Holowitz & Noiriel, 1992; Lyon, 2009). However, this certainty rests on the 
acceptance of a series of problem translations that remain unexamined by those operating the systems, 
but that nonetheless each introduce uncertainty and possibility of error (Van der Ploeg & Sprenkels, 
2011).  
Continuing this line of thought, in this section we argue that efforts to make the risks of identity fraud 
and illegal entry visible requires a particular type of visibility, one that always could have been 
otherwise. Moreover, we show how the particular visualization of risk produced by the INS and PROGIS 
consoles and the API system inscribes these risks onto material objects such as clothing or personal 
belongings, and body parts.  
The practices within which these systems are used exemplify that ‘identity’ and ‘risk’ are increasingly 
constitutive of each other: to identify immigrants presupposes risk assessments, and to assess immigrants 
against risks involves practices of identification and identity verification. As much as identification 
practices are increasingly about extensive categorization and registration of personal attributes and 
modes to verify these, risk assessments of immigrants are increasingly about cataloguing a growing 
number of personal attributes as risk indicators. That is to say, if an immigrant’s ‘identity’ does not 
conform to a norm during a verification process by the INS- or PROGIS-console, or if certain attributes 
of an immigrant match with an API risk profile, that identifies them as a ‘risky migrant’. 
In the following we highlight how operating the systems discussed creates additional 'risks'. The systems 
all have their weaknesses and fallibilities that may be exacerbated when agencies exchange information, 
and repeat procedures in different systems. The next section demonstrates how this occurs in the field, 
and provides further examples of how problems of identity fraud, illegal entry or related crimes by 
immigrants become translated into other issues within the configurations of the INS-, PROGIS-console, 
and API system. 
4.1 False positives and false negatives 
The INS-console was intended to provide ‘improved’ biometric data for verification by skipping a 
translation step within the fingerprinting processes (see section 2). In the new system, fingerprints are 
directly digitally scanned, so the scanning of the ink-based dactyslips is no longer necessary.  
P: The problem was that if you take a dactyslip […] a fingerprint consists of lines. If you put here a 
magnifying glass, then you see that the lines consist of stripes and points, that’s a print of a scanned 
fingerprint. What happens now with the Dactyslip is that the sheets [of the inked fingerprints] become 
digitalized and the lines of your fingerprint are transformed into stripes and points. So, you have a large 




quality loss. The moment you scan fingerprints by the INS-console, the quality becomes in any case higher. 
A bad digital fingerprint scan is probably still better than the best photocopy of an original dactyslip.” 
(INS-console operator, city A) 
However, the improved quality and matching rates turn out not to be as straightforward as this. In order 
to attain the expected accuracy of verification, significant workarounds are needed, that show how risk 
assessment and identity verifications still rely on assessments independent of the system:  
“I: How about the lady with whom it went wrong? 
P: […] the system says 'no match' for her fingers […] Are we going to refuse that lady a residence permit, 
because the prints might not be hers? […] The lady was a Somali national, and although Somalis do that, 
she had not mutilated her fingerprints […], I checked her fingers myself. Then I took her prints and got a 
40 % result. I was like: what is this? […] if you clean your fingers, then the prints are worse, if they are 
greasy, you gain better prints. What are the oily spots on your skin? It is here [points to side of nose] and 
on your forehead. So, to get good prints we ask people to rub these spots […]. Yet, these techniques were 
not helpful. Finally, the project manager said, put her four fingers on the scanner and fold them a little 
around the table, then you have the right pressure. It was not easy, but we improved the fingerprint quality. 
We achieved 80 %; that was good quality." (INS officer, city A) 
What we see in this excerpt is how the accuracy of the system is in fact something that takes a lot of 
effort and additional “techniques” to achieve. More specifically, the system is made to perform well 
because the actual risk assessment is done differently, and turned out negative (‘no risk’): When her 
fingerprints fail to give a match, an asylum seeking woman from Somalia is first suspected of perhaps 
trying to sabotage the verification process by mutilating her fingertips because she is Somali (“Somalis 
do that”). The specific risk indicator for that type of sabotage (having mutilated fingertips) is 
subsequently checked visually by the IND officer: (“I checked her fingers myself”). After satisfying 
himself this way that no fraud is attempted, the negative verdict of the system is not believed, and all 
effort goes into the production of a better fingerprint scan. The belief in the first assessment is so strong, 
that even if all this fails, the project manager is asked to step in and help out to achieve a positive 
verification. 
The other side of this is that any reliance on such a system introduces significant new risks for those 
whose fate depends on being believed, and whose identity claim of being at risk. That is, a recognised 
refugee with right of stay, is ‘verified’ this way. Instead of the promised accuracy and certainty of 
digitalized biometric identity verification, a number of highly contingent factors determine whether a 
person passes this verification test, including the assessment by the operator, the manager, the 
availability of the right levels of pressure and greasiness of the fingers to be scanned.  
But often enough, if a person’s fingerprints turn out to be unreadable within the configuration of a digital 
biometric system, this is perceived as an indicator of potential identity fraud. Consequently, the owner 
of the fingerprint becomes suspect, and changes from a person claiming to be at risk into one that is 
perceived as risk. This is the case even though it is known that there are more problems with the 
fingerprinting systems.  
For example, the PROGIS-console, although equally intended to improve accuracy, is acknowledged to 
have an in-built risk of failure, stemming from a weaker predecessor system: 
 “Webfit is the predecessor of PROGIS, and was the first program using fingerprints that were taken 
digitally. In Ter Apel, the Alien Police said: we tried out Webfit, but it did not work for us and it took too 
much time to work with it. The program of Webfit was actually installed in such a way that it always 
delivered negative results for asylum seekers when verifying their fingerprints. Webfit turned out to have 
only been tested on Dutch fingers […]; despite updates, the basis for PROGIS is still Webfit.” (INS 
professional about PROGIS) 
Ironically, a system intended for the highly diverse population of international refugees and asylum 
seekers had been tested on a relatively homogeneous population (“Dutch fingers”), thus rendering it 
basically unsuitable for its purpose.  




Here we see the rather paradoxical conception of the body underlying the very idea of biometric 
technologies as automated identification and authentication tools playing out (Van der Ploeg, 2011) on 
the one hand, biometrics is based on the biological fact that every individual is physically unique. No 
two fingerprints are identical, everybody’s irises are different from those of another, the same way that 
no two faces, voices, or retinas are exactly the same. This is the condition of possibility of the very idea 
of biometric technologies as identification tools. 
On the other hand, however, there is a simultaneous assumption of similarity: every human person is 
assumed to have a clearly audible voice, a set of ten fingerprints, two irises, and a recognizable face, 
and so on. Though hardly ever mentioned as such, this assumption of similarity is as crucial to the 
functioning of biometric systems as is the assumption of uniqueness.  
With respect to the human bodily features used in biometrics, this means that there is an assumption of 
normality that is defined as a range of variations that constitute ‘the normal’. Such notions of normality 
are built into the equipment: hand scanners have particular shapes and sizes, with designated places to 
put the fingers; fingerprint systems are designed for the registration and comparison of a particular 
number of fingerprints, (most systems use one, two or ten), and a particular range of ridge definition; 
cameras to scan faces are directed at a specific height, and the accompanying face recognition software 
often works best for a particular shade range of skin colour, and so on. In the case of PROGIS, and its 
underlying legacy software Webfit, it is this assumed similarity that turns out to be unwarranted, and 
causing trouble.  
The question is, however, for whom it causes trouble. The quote shows operators disqualifying the 
system: it does not work for them, and it takes too much time to operate. The other side of the coin, 
however, is that an unsuccessful enrollment or verification may equally well be attributed to the asylum 
seeker, casting suspicion on them. In a context where policy aims  at limiting admittance of refugees, 
and prevailing distrust of migrants’ identity claims is the very reason for introducing technologies that 
come with the promise of accuracy and certainty, one may wonder who will get the benefit of doubt in 
any concrete instance of failed recognition on the work floor. This is why we suggest that these systems 
introduce new risks for the people subjected to them. 
In a different way, and for a different set of travellers and migrants, the API system based profiles 
constitute new risks as well. As described earlier, a traveller can become framed as ‘risk’ if a match 
emerges between the attributes of this passenger and an API profile: 
“[…] we were informed by Madrid that a gang is trafficking women from South- and Central America for 
prostitution. […] We learnt that these women use Amsterdam as a transit; therefore we built a profile on 
flights from South and Central-America. We wanted to see all the women, in the age group of 18-24 years, 
travelling through Amsterdam to Madrid. If a match emerged on these four criteria, then the system 
signalled that passenger. Since not all female passengers were being trafficked, you had to ask what travel 
purpose a passenger had. […] there were often no reasons for a stopping, but these are indicators you base 
your profile on.  
What the above illustrates, however, is how a particular combination of rather general attributes renders 
a person suspect if a match with the API profile occurs. The very generality of the attributes mentioned 
- a certain age range or gender - demonstrates the limitations of risk assessments by API. False positives 
are certain to be many. This highlights that an API profile, and the indicators it is built on, do not really 
‘capture’ risks, but rather mediate and displace the ambiguities and inherent uncertainties of risk. 
 
4.2 Organizational boundaries and information exchange 
‘Visualization of risk is also done by information exchange between different agencies within the alien 
and law enforcement chains. This information exchange implies a certain “partiality of professional 
knowledge” (La Fors-Owczynik & Valkenburg in this volume) as each profession focuses on different 
things, and digital technologies are perceived to overcome inter-agency boundaries between 
immigration, border control, and law enforcement practices. The following interview excerpt 
demonstrates that during these communications professional and organizational boundaries are actively 
maintained. This is in part a consequence of the ways in which knowledge exchange brings along 




overlap of tasks between separate local practices. The different identification tasks of the Alien Police 
for law enforcement and immigration demonstrate that intensive efforts, - or ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn, 
1983) – are undertaken to protect the integrity of the immigration and law enforcement chains. Yet, 
these same efforts make cooperation possible between these professions: 
 “P: INS is a distant chain partner of the Aliens Police, but not one that can access the criminal justice 
database [database for PROGIS-data]. That is separate. 
K: Yes, but the INS also does identification. 
P: Yes, […] the INS very often contacts the Aliens Police, and explains: ‘Listen, we have someone in 
detention, but we would like to present him/her [at the embassy]’. Then we [Alien Police] start an identity 
investigation, but not at the PROGIS-console, but according to our identity investigation task on aliens 
within the alien chain. So we put the whole PROGIS issue aside. As you see cooperation [with the INS] is 
there. (PROGIS professional, city B)” 
The distinct functions of the Alien Police in establishing persons’ identities within the law enforcement 
chain via PROGIS, and within the alien chain by comprehensive investigations on ‘undocumented’ 
migrants, draw boundaries between the law enforcement and immigration chains. Although these 
boundaries serve to maintain legally underpinned distributions of work, authority, and responsibility, 
they also frustrate the INS- and PROGIS-console operators:   
“We both have the same goal to prevent identity fraud, and one-time registration, and multiple use. And 
then, of course, legislation should also cooperate in this, a new bill is in progress […]. But now there are 
two parallel trajectories and I hope they will meet in the best interest of the alien. Because currently 
assessments are done double, and why? Why don't you look for cooperation? (INS-console operator, city 
A) 
As “assessments are done double” through enrolment in the PROGIS- and INS-consoles sometimes, the 
risk of something going wrong, and someone's identity thereby becoming suspect, increases. Risks are 
“situated” entities in the bodies of knowledge upon which they are based (Suchman, 2009), and 
contingent upon the different socio-technical network within which they emerge. The introduction of 
new systems, the double use of systems, and the information exchange between them and the 
organizations that operate them, thus all generate additional risks of error, the burden of which will 
befall on the people subjected to them. The new legislation currently underway referred to in the quote 
is presented to reduce the occurrence of this problem by proposing to have one central database for all 
biometric data used in the alien chain, the BVV mentioned above; at the same time, however, the use of 
biometrics throughout the various IND and border management procedures is significantly extended, as 
are the number of agencies that will be legally entitled to enter data or access this database. The Privacy 
Impact Assessment on this new legislation, conducted by the Ministry of the Interior, identifies a range 
of ‘risks’ connected to the new network of systems, such as, for instance, a risk of ‘data overload’, and 
emphasises the need for a range of risk reduction measures (Privacy impact assessment m. b. t. de 
wijziging van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 2013) 
 
5. Conclusion: technology shifts and proliferates ‘risks’ 
Dutch efforts to reduce identity fraud and illegal entry in the context of migration have come to 
concentrate on prevention in recent years. Policy makers were calling for a ‘better, more complete 
picture’ of migrants in order to enable effective risk assessment of migrants and travelers entering the 
country. This led to an increased reliance on information systems and digital identification. This chapter 
has focused on three recently introduced systems for identifying and verifying those posing a risk: the 
Advanced Passenger Information system for profiling travelers, and the biometrics based identity 
verification systems within the alien and law enforcement chains, the INS-console and the PROGIS-
console.  




Our analysis has highlighted how none of the socio-technical configurations of these technologies 
delivers the flawless accuracy hoped for. While in some respects improvements regarding the prevention 
of identity fraud and illegal entry by travelers and migrants may have been achieved, a closer look into 
the way these systems work in practice has shown how a range of potential system fallibilities lead to a 
shift in localization of the problems rather than a solution.  
With the use of the systems, new risk indicators are developed, that amount to new norms concerning 
what a valid identity is, and, hence, what a trustworthy migrant is. Conforming to these new norms is a 
challenge also for legitimate migrants and travelers, involving aspects trivial outside the context of 
digital identification: the ‘machine-readability’ and greasiness of ones fingertips, or the age at which 
one travels a particular route at a particular moment. The (in)ability to produce readable fingerprints, or 
a particular combination of rather general attributes such as country of origin and age/gender may come 
to inspire distrust in a particular traveler’s identity claim. This happens despite the fact that most of these 
systems, to some extent at least, are built on clay feet: to enter one of the systems for identity verification, 
one needs to provide a primary proof of identity, the validity of which cannot be checked by the system 
itself. Hence, a range of tricks, experiential knowledge and trust comes into play in order to assess the 
reference identity proofs on which all later translations and verifications come to rely. 
The consequences of this are twofold. On the one hand, it seriously undermines the trust put into the 
technology, and the belief that the latest technology delivers what it promises: accurate and strong 
verification, and identification of those migrants posing a risk of fraud or becoming illegal residents. In 
this sense, these technologies may foster a false sense of control, security and successful ‘prevention’. 
On the other hand, however, these ‘clay feet’ may cause a failure of protection of those most in need for 
it: from being a refugee fleeing from risk for life and limbs, an asylum seeker confronted with the 
systems set up to keep out those deemed non-eligible for the protection offered by asylum status, may 
find themselves being recast as posing a risk: a failure to enroll may be met with suspicion of a deliberate 
attempt to avoid successful registration; a false negative during subsequent verification may cast them 
as identity fraudster. They may chance upon operators, who, for some reason, and unlike the ones 
interviewed for this chapter, are little inclined to guide them carefully through either the enrollment or 
the later verification processes with the range of workarounds required to make the system perform. In 
this sense, these systems, and the belief in them, actually pose new risks for those coming to our borders 
for protection against risk.  
The Privacy Impact Assessment on the new legislation mentioned above, with its extensive enumeration 
of ‘risks’ to migrants’ rights posed by the increased reliance on, and extended use of biometrics 
throughout the alien chain proposed in the new bill within the Netherlands’ legislature, underscores this 
view. Even though it includes a range of risk mitigating measures - for this issue of false negatives, that 
is, a failure of the systems to match two sets of fingerprints from the same person, for example, it 
proposes a mandatory check by a dactyloscopic expert in case of mismatch – it remains to be seen how 
effective and feasible these will turn out to be. The proliferation of ‘risks’ when using the INS- and 
PROGIS-consoles and the API profiles underlines the pivotal need for all involved to remain reflective 
about the pitfalls the use of these systems can bring along for the lives of persons assessed by them. 
 
Bibliography 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security Official Journal 
of the European Union This. (2012). Official Journal of the European Union, (108), 5–14. 
Akrich, M. (1992). The De-scription of Technical Objects. In W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping 
Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (pp. 205–224). Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press. 




Besluit van 21 januari 2014 tot wijziging van het Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 in verband met de 
uitbreiding van het gebruik van biometrische kenmerken in de vreemdelingenketen in verband 
met het verbeteren van de identiteitsvaststelling van de vreemdeling (2014). 
Bigo, D., & Guild, E. (Eds.). (2005). Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe. 
London: Ashgate. 
Broeders, D. (2009). Breaking down anonymity. Digital surveillance on irregular migrants in 
Germany and the Netherlands. Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Rotterdam 
Btihaj, A. (2010). Recombinant Identities: Biometrics and Narrative Bioethics. Journal of Bioethical 
Inquiry, 7(2), 237–258. 
Caplan, J., & Torpey, J. (Eds.). (2001). Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State 
Practices in the Modern World. Princeton University Press. 
Clark, R. (1994). Human identification in information systems: management challenges and public 
policy issues. The Information Society, Vol. 7(No. 4), pp 6–37. 
Council of the European Union. (2004). Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data. Official Journal of the European Union, 6(1), 24–27. 
Council of the European Union. (2012). Council Decision of 22 September 2011 on the signing, on 
behalf of the Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the 
processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian 
Customs and Border. Official Journal of the European Union, 55(7), 1. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention. (2000). 
Official Journal of the European Union, (OJ L316), 1–10. 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 
laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals. (2008). Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2007(1683), 1–7. 
EU Commission. (2006). Commission decision of 6 September 2005 on the adequate protection of 
personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the 
Canada Border Services Agency. Official Journal of the European Union, 49–60. 
European Council. Richtlijn 2004/82/EG Van de Raad van 29 april 2004 betreffende de verplichting 
voor vervoerders om passagiersgegevens door te geven. , Official Journal of the European Union 
24–27 (2004). 
Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science : Strains and 
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists Boundary-work and the demarcation of science 
from non-science: strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. American 
Sociological Review, 48(6), 781–795. 
Holowitz, D., & Noiriel, G. (1992). Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American 
Experiences. NYU Press. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 




Law, J. (2009). Actor Network Theory and Material Semiotics. (B. S. Turner, Ed.)The New Blackwell 
Companion of Social Theory. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Leers, G. (2011). Kamerbrief over het aanpak van illegaal verblijf in reactie op het WODC-rapport 
illegalenschatting 2009. Retrieved from http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/07/08/aanpak-van-illegaal-verblijf/aanpak-illegaal-verblijf-in-
reactie-op-het-wodc-rapportl.pdf. 




Leers, G. (2012b). Notitie inzake openbare orde bevoegdheid burgermeester.pdf. Retrieved from 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brieven/2012/05/08/brief-
minister-leers-aan-logo-gemeenten/brief-minister-leers-aan-logo-gemeenten.pdf 
Lyon, D. (2009). Identifying Citizens: ID cards as Surveillance. Cambridge (UK); Malden (USA): 
Polity Press. 
Min. van Binnenlandse Zaken. (2013). Basis Start Architectuur Architectuur van de 
Vreemdelingenketen Kennis delen, Informatie gebruiken, Samen doen. Retrieved from 
http://www.e-overheid.nl/images/stories/architectuur/architectuur van de 
vreemdelingenketen.pdf. 
Min. van Veiligheid en Justitie. (2011). Het Fundament Progis. Retrieved from 
http://www.vka.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/Boekje Progis Het Fundament.pdf 
Min. van Veiligheid en Justitie. (2011). Protocol identiteitsvaststelling (strafrechtsketen) (pp. 1–36). 
Retrieved from http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/brochures/2011/12/22/protocol-identiteitsvaststelling.html 
Politie: grondige identificatie voorkomt identiteitsfraude - Security.NL. (2012). Retrieved September 
03, 2012, from 
http://www.security.nl/artikel/42902/1/Politie:_grondige_identificatie_voorkomt_identiteitsfraud
e.html 
Privacy impact assessment m. b. t. de wijziging van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000. (2013). Retrieved 
from http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/06/25/privacy-
impact-assessment-mbt-de-wijziging-van-de-vreemdelingenwet-2000.html 
Sanders, D. (2012). Ministerie van Veiligheid en Jusitie stopt met bouw PARDEX systeem. 
Computable. Retrieved from 
<http://www.computable.nl/artikel/nieuws/overheid/4728459/1277202/ministerie-vj-gestopt-
met-bouw-pardexsysteem.html>   
Schouten, P. (2014). Security as controversy: Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport. Security 
Dialogue, 45(1), 23–42. 
Suchman, L. (2009). Embodied Practices of Engineering Work. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 7:1, 4–
18. 




Teveen, F. (2013). JBZ-Raad; Brief regering; Reactie op de brief van de Commissie Meijers van 24 
januari 2013 over het EURODAC-voorstel (pp. 1–6). 
Tsianos, V., & Kuster, B. (2010). Mig@net - Transnational digital networks, migration and gender, 
Deliverable No. 6: Thematic Report “Border Crossings” (WP4). 
Tweede Kamer. Terugkeerbeleid (2005). Retrieved from 
http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/RM_A12a.pdf 
Van der Ploeg, I. (1999). The illegal body: “Eurodac” and the politics of biometric identification. 
Ethics and Information Technology, 1(4), 295–302. 
Van der Ploeg, I. (2011). Normative Assumptions in Biometrics: On Bodily Differences and 
automated classifications,. In S. Van der Hof & M. M. Groothuis (Eds.), Innovating Government 
- Normative, policy and technological dimensions of modern government (pp. 29–40). IT & Law 
Series, T. M. C. Asser Press, Springer. 
Van der Ploeg, I., & Sprenkels, I. (2011). Migration and the Machine-Readable Body. In H. 
Dijstelbloem & A. Meijer (Eds.), Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe (pp. 
68–104). Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vingerafdrukken op verblijfsdocumenten. (2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.ind.nl/Nieuws/Pages/Vingerafdrukkenopverblijfsdocumenten.aspx 
Wet van 18 juli 2009 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafvordering, het Wetboek van Strafrecht 
en enige andere wetten in verband met het verbeteren en versterken van de vaststelling van de 
identiteit van verdachten, veroordeelden en getuigen (2009). 
WRR. (2011). iOverheid. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press/WRR. Retrieved from 
http://www.ioverheid.nu/_pdf/9789089643094_ebook.pdf 
Monitoring migrants or making migrants
‘misfit’? Data protection and human rights
perspectives on Dutch identity management
practices regarding migrants
Karolina La Fors-Owczynik *












A B S T R A C T
Record numbers of migrants and refugees fleeing violence and poverty in parts of Africa
and the Middle East present the European Union with unprecedented challenges, includ-
ing in determining their identity as well as status. In recent years problems of identifying
immigrants have been addressed in order to fight identity fraud and illegal entry of mi-
grants. As a result, a wide variety of digital systems have been introduced to orchestrate
an effective, preventative modus of identification of migrants. Digital systems are in par-
ticular geared towards spotting those migrants who (are about to) commit identity fraud
or who enter the territory of EU member states illegally. Although the key aim of the digital
systems is framed to protect the administrative, geographic and legal borders of the member
state and the safety of its population, empirically based studies demonstrate that these
systems bring new risks for migrants themselves. This article intends to contribute to the
discussion on the use of digital systems for managing the movement of migrants by analysing
identification and risk assessment systems from the perspective of the new European data
protection regime and the European Convention on Human Rights. For this purpose, two
identification systems – the so-called INS console within the Dutch immigration and border
sector, and the PROGIS console within the law enforcement sector – are analysed. A third
is the Advanced Passenger Information system operated at Schiphol Airport by border control
and immigration services. Against the background of the position of many migrants finding
themselves at risk in their home country and of the two legislative frameworks men-
tioned above, this article addresses two issues. First, the analysis focuses on how migrants
are perceived by digital monitoring practices: are they themselves at risk, non-risk or do
they pose a risk? In the EU, migrants must prove that their case is worthy of asylum status
because they are ‘at risk’ from political unrest or other life-threatening circumstances in
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their home country. Yet, empirical data gathered through semi-structured interviews show
that simply abiding by the standards during an enrolment process of the INS console, rather
than being ‘at risk’, a migrant can easily be categorised as ‘posing a risk’ (La Fors-Owczynik
& Van der Ploeg, 2015). Second, this article aims to investigate what the capacity of the new
data protection regime is in protecting migrants from being framed as ‘a risk’ or a ‘misfit’
stemming from the use of digital systems. Given this second aim, the following discussion
also intends to explore the extent to which the European Convention on Human Rights can
provide an additional legal remedy for migrants being digitally categorised in a manner that
is detrimental to them.
© 2016 Karolina La Fors-Owczynik. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Refugees and migrants across Libya face rape, torture and ab-
ductions for ransom by traffickers and smugglers, as well as
systematic exploitation by their employers, religious persecution
and other abuses by armed groups and criminal gangs. . .1
Seventy years after the end of the Second World War, with
tens of thousands of immigrants having ventured across the
oceans in the hope of a better life, Europe’s southern and
eastern borders are now more than ever sites of mass immi-
gration from Syria, Iraq, Libya and the southern corners of Africa
where migrants are reportedly putting their lives at risk every
day. As the above quote from a recent Amnesty International
report demonstrates, the incomprehensibly horrific cruelties
that migrants have become exposed to in traditional – yet since
2009 lawless – transit states such as Libya exacerbate the risks
of crossing the Mediterranean Sea. No matter what the dangers
of the traumatising boat disasters are, or how abusive the cir-
cumstances of the human trafficking can be, migrants embark
daily on a journey with the desperate hope of sanctuary within
the EU borders. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) described about these immigrants’ journey to Europe as
the ‘most deadly route for irregular migrants’.2 Such extraor-
dinary and clearly negative circumstances these immigrants
find themselves in has prompted discussion on their human
rights and the mechanisms that can be established to protect
them from being at risk, not least from the cruel practices of
those who take advantage of their position.
However, the situation also provides ammunition for those
who advocate stricter quotas for immigrants (‘Germany presses
for quota system for EU migrant distribution, 2015) and tighter
controls on identity fraud and the status of migrants. In the
Netherlands, the discussion is focused among other things on
the opportunities as springboards that large Dutch harbours
such as Rotterdam could offer migrants travelling to the UK,
similarly to the situation in the French city of Calais. The
rhetoric therefore also shapes the current discourse in EU
member states on how migrants3 and refugees are seen. The
unprecedented challenges that the flood of migrants consti-
tute both for the EU and the Netherlands increasingly evokes
a tendency by which immigrants are framed and categorised
as posing a risk rather than being at risk (see also La
Fors-Owczynik and Van der Ploeg, 2015).
Bearing in mind the enormous human as well as political
challenges that Europe currently faces, the prime goal of this
article is to outline some less visible challenges behind the
broader theme of people immigrating to or travelling in Europe.
Key themes are the developments in and consequences of the
use of digital tools in border controls, and immigration and law
enforcement practice. The analysis, based on practices in the
Netherlands, will also show that there is a subtle interaction
between how migrants are digitally categorised or framed and
the use of digital technology in border controls, and immigra-
tion and law enforcement practices. To demonstrate this
interaction, three identity management systems4 are as-
sessed: two identification systems and one risk assessment
system employed by the Dutch authorities. The analysis of this
interaction and the empirical findings show that the use of
these monitoring systems has the effect of framing migrants
as ‘a risk’ or making them viewed as a ‘misfit’ in the hosting
society. Given this finding, the analysis subsequently aims to
contrast this effect with the relevant provisions (such as those
with respect to profiling) of the new European data protec-
tion regime. In doing this, the analysis aims to shed light on
whether the design and use of the systems used for migrant
control is in accordance with the new EU data protection rules.
Also, it offers the opportunity to reflect on whether the new
data protection regime can indeed act as an instrument to
address certain negative effects stemming from the ways in
which digital technologies are used to categorise migrants.
Finally, the article explores the extent to which a human rights
1 Libya: Horrific abuse driving migrants to risk lives in Mediterranean
crossings – <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/05/
libya-horrific-abuse-driving-migrants-to-risk-lives-in-mediterranean
-crossings/> Retrieved on 12 May 2015.
2 IOM: journey to Europe, most deadly route for migrants – <http://
www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin
-articles/844-iom-journey-to-europe-most-deadly-route-for
-irregular-migrants.html> Retrieved on 5 May 2015.
3 When I refer to migrants in this article, I consider both immi-
grants and regular travellers who want to cross the Dutch border
or pass an identification check-point for immigration or law en-
forcement and therefore are required to undergo assessments by
any of the three systems discussed in this paper.
4 Identity management systems serve to establish ‘identities’ (defined
as personal datasets).This includes the identities of persons subject
to the system, in this case migrants, as well as those profession-
als (e.g. technicians, security agents, border guards, etc.) who interact
with this system on a regular basis. These systems serve to both
determine identification and allow for differing levels of access
control in the process.
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perspective can provide additional protection for migrants, by
discussing the operation of the digital systems under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights.
The methodology for this analysis is based on legal desk
research influenced by insights from science and technology
studies (STS), specifically from actor–network theory (ANT). ANT
is particularly useful for legal analysis. First, because it helps
to show how risks emerge from the use of these systems, and
more importantly because a major part of the legal chal-
lenges are intertwined with exactly how problems become
framed and ‘translated’ (Latour, 1987) into other problems in
practice. For instance, problems of identity fraud or illegal entry
are ‘translated’ into lack of digital information and problems
of data quality, or privacy problems into data protection issues.
Empirical data5 for this assessment had been gathered via semi-
structured interviews with professionals who use these systems
in various Dutch cities.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 gives an overview of
current Dutch digital border management and immigration
practices and existing scholarship relating to the advantages
and disadvantages of biometric identification and risk profil-
ing techniques within immigration and border control practices.
The section argues for the incorporation of human rights per-
spectives during data protection assessment.
Section 3 then provides descriptions of the three systems,
and the negative consequences of using these systems on the
lives of migrants. By using examples, the section argues that
the negative consequences stemming from the use of these
digital systems can easily and often falsely categorise mi-
grants as ‘posing a risk’.
Section 4 follows up this argument and establishes the rel-
evance of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
with respect to the implications of identity management tech-
nologies and risk profiling systems on migrants. Supported by
case law, the right to asylum and the right to privacy – estab-
lished within the fundamental rights framework in its broadest
sense – are argued as being of special relevance for those mi-
grants subjected to the INS and PROGIS consoles and to
assessment by the Advanced Passenger Information (API)
system.
Section 5 then defines some relevant specifications of the
new European General Data Protection regime concerning iden-
tification practices by the INS and PROGIS consoles and for the
risk profiling practices by the API system. By means of em-
pirical insight resulting from self-conducted, semi-structured
interviews with immigration, border control and police offi-
cers in various Dutch cities, the implications of the practical
use of these systems on migrants’ lives will be assessed in part
against the existing data protection regime, and against the
relevant prescriptions of both the new EU Data Protection Regu-
lation and the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection
Directive. Finally, these implications are also evaluated from
the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Section 6 concludes by providing themes for further dis-
cussion relating to such essential principles of democracy as
proportionality and to the practical relevance of such impor-
tant questions as how to balance broader societal interests, such
as security, with the interests of individual migrants such as
the right to privacy and the right not to be discriminated
against.
2. Digitalised borders
Data have become a primary resource in today’s society. Being
part of the European Union and the Schengen area Dutch im-
migration, border control and law enforcement authorities
traditionally led the introduction and use of high-tech (often
biometric) identification technologies or other digital systems
to assess and differentiate citizens by acquiring data. Given the
record number of immigrants and refugees and the current rate
of migration from the Middle East and Africa, these systems
appear indispensable in ‘sorting out’ migrants. Since Decem-
ber 2014, for instance, the Netherlands became an active
member of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
(EC/1052/2013). Dutch participation assists in reducing the
number of illegal immigrants entering the EU by fostering data
acquisition, exchange and analytics at the external borders and
between member states. Data-led border control practice has
become typical. For instance, the Dutch Customs Services also
routinely rely on advanced analytics based on substantial data
feeds supplied via such automated systems as the Excise Move-
ment Control System6 and the Export Control System.7 EU law
(2013/1052/EC) manages and fosters population flow, such as
that of travellers and immigrants, to ensure that security threats
stemming from border-crossing activities, such as illegal mi-
gration or international crime on various migration routes are
minimised. At the same time, modern migration policy, such
as in the Netherlands (Wet modernmigratiebeleid, 2013), pre-
scribes that migrants shall be quickly and effectively sorted
out.
The following sections discuss two issues that are key in
realising the aforementioned policy ambitions being facili-
tated by the use of digital tools: identification of migrants
(including identity verification requirements) and their pro-
filing. Subsequently, various controversies and human rights
implications are discussed.
2.1. Identification
Identification is a crucial step in border control, immigration
decisions and law enforcement practice within immigration.
Migration management boils down to either permitting or
denying entry to persons, and to this end various instru-
ments aim to establish and verify the ‘accurate’ identity of
travellers and immigrants.
5 Part of the empirical data in this article was also used in ‘Mi-
grants at/as Risk: Identification and Risk Assessment Technologies
in The Netherlands’ in Van der Ploeg, I. & Pridmore, J. (eds.) Digi-
tizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World (Routledge 2015).
6 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/excise_duties/
circulation_control/index_en.htm.
7 Both systems are designed to enhance the capacity of the
Customs Services to filter out cases of fraud by identifying risk pat-
terns in transactional data feed of traded goods (‘Inzet van Analytics
bespaart douane kosten en brengt effectiviteit in grenscontrole,
2015).
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Historically, identity documents (Caplan and Torpey, 2001;
Lyon, 2009), and more recently identity management tech-
nologies, are seen as inevitable instruments to confirm that
an ID bearer is authorised to hold the document, on the basis
of which entry can either be granted or refused. Traditionally
the state used rather neutral ways to determine whether
persons were allowed or denied certain entitlements.The rapid
development and the greater use of increasingly technologi-
cally ‘secured’ ID documents and verification devices within
the context of immigration and border management, also
known as the ‘new technological borders of Europe’
(Dijstelbloem and Meijer, 2011), appear less neutral. As will be
shown, they became focal check-points for (identity) fraud pre-
vention. This practice, as will be demonstrated, is also
increasingly true for Dutch law enforcement practices.
2.2. Profiling
Within the context of border management and immigration,
to intercept the movement of migrants by profiling tradition-
ally differs from forms of identification and identity verification.
Profiling is primarily used to prevent such threats as illegal mi-
gration, human trafficking and other forms of international
organised crime. Profiling does not target particular persons
in the first instance, but rather groups of travellers (Dijstelbloem
and Broeders, 2014; Wilson and Weber, 2008) and looks for ‘types
of persons’ (Prins, 2014). Within law enforcement, in addition
to the above purposes, a profile is also often used to identify
new criminal offenders or recidivists. The characteristics are
however important for both practices of profiling and iden-
tity verification. Profiles within immigration and border control
practices are construed based on predefined characteristics of
particular persons who have previously been found guilty of
some form of crime, such as identity fraud or illegal entry.When
constructing profiles these characteristics serve as ‘historical
data’ to rely upon. Subsequently, profiles can be projected on
every traveller at border crossing points such as airports. A
profile, or the dataset generating a risk flag on a person, is regu-
larly updated over time. This is done mostly in order to adapt
to the changes in the behaviour of those persons who have
triggered the interest of profilers (Hildebrandt, 2008).
At present, the use of risk profiles constitutes an integral
part of the recent ‘information-led border control policy’ in the
Netherlands (Hoogstrate and Veenman, 2012). One of the
reasons for this is that risk profiling travellers during border
control and immigration practices is encouraged by EU law. Ac-
cording to Directive 2004/82/EC, airlines are required to
significantly broaden the set of passenger data they already
submit to border control authorities. In the Netherlands, this
broadening also serves such priorities as, for instance, stop-
ping travellers suspected of human trafficking8: ‘to have an eye
and an ear for signs of human trafficking is essential in order
to tackle it’.9 Yet, the tendency to update profiles underlines
the rhetorical belief in identity management (IDM) systems as
being adequate solutions to prevent illegal entry, identity fraud
or other forms of crime.The digital profiling of a potential iden-
tity fraudster or other ‘risky citizen’ has recently become a more
frequently used practice within Dutch citizen–state relations
including border control and immigration practices. However,
not only does illegal migration constitute a prime focus for pre-
vention, but also the economic benefits. For instance, the Dutch
‘Fraudulent Surcharges Approach Act’ (Wet Aanpak Fraude
Toeslagen, 2014) prevents government payments being sent to
social benefit fraudster migrants since January 2014. These
Dutch policy developments and related events contribute to
the fact that identification, identity verification and risk pro-
filing practices directed at migrants have increasingly become
not only the means but also the ends in border manage-
ment, immigration and law enforcement practices today.
2.3. Advantages and controversies surrounding identity
management systems
2.3.1. Advantages
The fact that these identity management systems have become
both the means and increasingly the ends in border manage-
ment, immigration and law enforcement worldwide shows great
faith in the ambitious promises these systems offer to citi-
zens and governments. First and foremost is to prevent harm,
such as terrorism, other national security threats, interna-
tional crime or related issues, coming from outside, and to
‘enact’ (Law, 2009) the protective prerequisites of a physical
border. Second, borders are demarcations that facilitate citi-
zens’ free mobility. Identification technology, such as RFID or
biometrics, has been used to secure and facilitate global travel,
immigration, law enforcement and other administrative deal-
ings with citizens for decades. This also shows that they are
seen as being successful in meeting the expectations that gov-
ernments and citizens have of them.
Following the attacks in New York, London, Madrid, and re-
cently in Paris, IDM technologies have been promoted as
indispensable means of forecasting potential ‘terror attacks’
(Aradau and van Munster, 2005, 2008) and more mundane se-
curity threats such as various forms of international crime
(Zedner, 2010) and illegal migration. Although we can never be
sure how many attacks have been prevented in using the
systems, attacks that were apparently prevented demon-
strate their success (McNeil et al., 2011). An overwhelming
majority of these systems is bound by compliance with inter-
national standards, such as those of the ICAO (e.g. biometric
standards in passports) or Interpol (records of international
criminals) and also with international agreements, such as those
between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (an
interlinked biometric database shared by these countries10), or
that between the EU and US (EU–US exchange of passenger
8 As of 1 January 2005, Art. 273a of the Dutch Criminal Code
(Wetboek van Strafrecht) came into force, which broadened the defi-
nition of human trafficking.
9 Aanwijzing mensenhandel <http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0032576/geldigheidsdatum_29-06-2013 >.
10 Lewis, P. (2008); ‘FBI to get UK biometric hook up?’, The Regis-
ter, 15 January 2008, pp. 1 et seq. <http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2008/01/15/uk_biometrics_us_canada_aus_independence_waste/>.
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name records (PNR)11). Biometric data, electronic signatures and
RFID chips, for instance, are embedded in new generation pass-
ports in many EU member states (including the Netherlands12).
The push for equipping passports with biometrics has largely
been attributed to political arguments. The US Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) claimed, for instance, that ID docu-
ments with biometrics are ‘more trustworthy’ and allow for
easier management of entry–exit systems at their borders.13
In other words, the personal datasets that are produced are
used in what Benjamin Muller has termed the ‘age of iden-
tity assurance’, in which governmental agencies use personal
information for profiling and risk assessment (2004: 285). Per-
sonal data used in such practices are essential in indicating
the need for various forms of intervention, or what Amoore
describes as ‘actionable intelligence’ (2009: 20). This ‘action-
able intelligence’ is a driving force in the ‘construction’ and
‘reinforcement’ of those citizens – through establishing and
using their status – who are considered in need of help, or who
are ‘at risk’, and those who are considered as constituting some
form of threat, or are being viewed ‘as a risk’. Muller calls such
categorisation practices ‘sovereign discrimination’, which enable
the selective goals of a government to intervene in the lives
of its citizens and of those that enter its borders (2004: 281).
Within current Dutch discourse, the new digital ways, in
which identity fraudsters have been filtered out in the past year,
are deemed a success both from the perspective of maintain-
ing security by law enforcement and of gaining economic benefit
by stopping or preventing government payments to unen-
titled citizens (Ministerie van Velighied en Jusitie, 2014).
Beyond the need to maintain security, especially if we look
at the huge numbers of incoming migrants, data-driven border
control and immigration, or in other words forms of
‘information-intensive government’ (Taylor et al., 2007), also
needs to fulfil the growing expectations of efficiency. For in-
stance, identity checks at borders can be done much more
quickly using digital identity verification than without it. Al-
though the focus is mostly on combating fraud, there is also
enormous pressure on border guards and immigration offi-
cials to control migrants efficiently. Hence, migrants leaving
their digital footprints, or what Ericson and Haggerty refer to
as their ‘data doubles’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000), is an im-
portant requirement for efficiency.
2.3.2. Controversies
Beyond the laudable reasons of security and efficiency, gov-
ernment identification and profiling activities are also subject
to both public and scholarly criticisms. The Dutch situation is
illustrative in this respect. In 2014, the Dutch Data Protection
Authority expressed reservations in its annual report14 with
respect to the privacy abusive effects that profiling practices
can have for citizens in their relations either with govern-
ment authorities, commercial companies or private parties in
the Netherlands. Numerous scholars expressed criticism from
the perspective of how these systems frame the profiled
persons’ identity as something pre-established (De Vries, 2010),
instead of framing identity as something dynamic emerging
from the relations in which it is continuously embedded (Van
der Ploeg, 2005a, 2005b). Hildebrandt defines as a major concern
that, through the ways in which profiling practices emerge, citi-
zens will have ‘no effective means to know when profiles are
used or abused’ (2008). The Dutch government also recently
shared its concerns, for instance, regarding the central regis-
tration of all air passengers’ data at EU level (‘Regeringspartijen
tegen Europees database vluchtgegevens, 2015). Its main ar-
gument is that risk profiling based on immense amounts of
traveller data could easily lead to false accusations against
travellers.
Furthermore, and often beyond the scope of the assess-
ment of digital profiling methods, IDM systems and the ways
in which they are used are not neutral. In fact, Akrich infers:
‘the composition of a technical object constrains actants in the
way they relate both to the object and to one another’ (1992:
206). These constraints become visible in practice when, for in-
stance, profile datasets are processed between databases and
used as if they were pure ‘representation of persons’. Schouten,
in his science and technology based analysis of airport secu-
rity profiling systems at Amsterdam Airport, for instance,
critically concludes that ‘translations in the airport security ap-
paratus represent a contrary movement, rendering airport
security a technical matter for experts rather than a public one’
(2014: 37).
The intense and rapid deployment of biometric technolo-
gies and risk profiling systems based on the aggregate of
travellers’ personal, behavioural and physical data is taking place
on an increasingly broad scale.The ‘informatization of the body’
by these technologies has already provoked a number of po-
litical, ethical, societal and cultural concerns (Ajana, 2010;
Amoore, 2006; Ceyhan, 2008; De Hert and Sprokkereef, 2009;
Schouten, 2014; Van der Ploeg, 2005a, 2005b). Despite interna-
tional standards, agreements and forms of political advocacy
backing such identity management systems, practice demon-
strates that these systems are indeed fallible (Magnet, 2011;
Schouten, 2014; Van der Ploeg and Sprenkels, 2011) and can
result in discrimination (Lyon, 2002, 2009). The consequences
of their imperfections for certain citizens’ lives epitomise this.
One well-publicised and still relevant side-effect of biomet-
rics is illustrated by the case of Brandon Mayfield, who was
11 Commission of the European Communities 2007, ‘Proposal for
a Council Framework decision on the use of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes’, Brussels – <http://
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/frattini/archive/
COM(2007)654%20EN.pdf>.
12 The Dutch De Telegraaf Reiskrant (2009) reports on the first bio-
metric document issued to a Dutch citizen – <http://www
.telegraaf.nl/reiskrant/4887056/__Eerste_biometrische_paspoort
_uitgereikt__.html?p=30,3> .
13 The Dutch ZDnet Nederland (2005) reports on the EU’s request
to the US for extra time to accomplish the obligatory introduc-
tion of biometric passports within the EU – < http://www.zdnet.nl/
news/44553/europa-wil-uitstel-invoering-biometrisch
-paspoort/>.
14 College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens Dutch Data Protection Au-
thority Annual Report 2014, retrieved on 12 May 2015 from <https://
cbpweb.nl/en/news/dutch-dpa-presents-its-annual-report-2014
-extra-attention-paid-profiling>.
437c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 3 3 – 4 4 9
falsely accused of having been involved in the 2004 Madrid
terror attacks based on a wrong fingerprint match.15
Although in the above case Mayfield was compensated, such
instances of failure ironically lead to rhetoric, which articu-
lates the need to perpetually improve identity documents and
systems. This is perhaps best exemplified by digital identifi-
cation cards (see Lyon, 2009). In this case, a great deal of trust
had been ‘inscribed’ into these cards (Latour, 1992) since they
contain valuable personal data for identity verification and are
made difficult to counterfeit (Dodge and Kitchin, 2004). Yet, if
these cards are evaluated closely, there is a significant weak-
ness in relation to their production and operation. A biometric
identification card requires ‘stemming documents’ – such as
a birth certificate – in order to authenticate and verify the ap-
plicant’s data before it is issued. As such, the entitlement of
a particular person to receive one of these ‘technologically en-
hanced’ cards relies on these less verifiable, less secure
stemming documents (Clark, 1994; Salter, 2003). Despite their
weaknesses and inability to continuously maintain security,
biometric systems are still looked upon as being invincible and
their continuous improvement is believed to prevent cases of
identity fraud and illegal entry. Yet, the fact that failures can
even sustain such systems is largely a consequence of the ways
in which, as Van der Ploeg argues, identification problems are
translated into other problems, and on the other hand that ‘each
translation implies interpretation’ (2005b). As Ajana asserts, clan-
destine migration remains the ‘indicator of the inescapable
failure of biometrics to be totally in control of movement’ (2010).
However, migrants perpetually adjust to the digitally me-
diated requirements of these systems that verify their identity
and require them to produce information about themselves.
Mark Salter suggests, for instance, that the way in which in-
dividuals have adjusted to the rules of airports show how
travellers have become disciplined, ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault,
1977; Salter, 2007).Travellers are prepared ‘to confess’ their per-
sonal information in front of these systems in order to gain
passage. Data are then verified against personal datasets pro-
cessed in the configuration of IDM technologies, a practice Salter
refers to as the ‘confessionary complex’ (2007: 57).
Another controversy relates to the non-neutral nature of
the use of the technologies and the manner in which the ap-
plications determine the ways in which people are dealt with.
The practices outlined above are never ‘innocent’ in that mi-
grants are ‘sorted into categories’ (Bowker and Leigh Star, 1999).
Suchman explains that, at the micro-level, categories epito-
mise how political processes for the exclusion and inclusion
of persons emerge (1994). Such selective processes have gen-
erated tension between governments and their citizens for a
long time, tensions that are evident in policy debates over in-
formation sharing and what Schwartz calls the ‘privacy collision’
between the EU and the US (2013). Other forms of tension, such
as discrimination against immigrants via digital border man-
agement are also apparent in different contexts within Europe
(Bigo, 2013; Broeders, 2009). Amoore describes the categorising
practices causing these tensions as gradually building an
‘architecture of enmity’, as the ‘projected images and stereo-
types’ that are embedded in these categories make ‘threat and
antagonism possible’ (2007: 218). This architecture aims to
secure society by first defining and separating out those who
are seen or understood as ‘others’, namely not a part of the
society to be secured (ibid.: 218).Yet, as regards biometrics being
part of this architecture, Van der Ploeg and Sprenkels explain
that digital fingerprints, photographs or satellite images are
not pure representations of migrants, but are reconstruc-
tions of migrants by digitalisation (2011). Dijstelbloem and
Broeders describe these ‘reconstructions’ circulating across da-
tabases and networks as ‘non-publics’ (2014). In their argument,
a difference between publics and ‘non-publics’ is crucial, as
these categories ‘capture specific moments in time and specific spatial
locations where the categorization of persons emerges in associa-
tion with more (green-listed), less (black-listed) or unclear, ambiguous
(grey-listed) rights’ (ibid.: 33).
Although the distinction between the publics and non-
publics is useful to make when entitlements are assigned to
migrants, these concepts still separate the virtual data from
the actual person. Therefore, Ajana’s concept of ‘recombi-
nant identity’ (2010), which is ‘the terminal point at which data
recombine into an identity in the concrete, corporeal and material sense’,
lends itself being more useful to assess the three systems in
this article. Using this concept, Ajana offers a perspective that
allows us to analyse the developments away from the oft-
used distinction between the virtual persona (data on a person)
and an actual living individual. This is essential as it requires
us to move away from the ‘pure’ data protection debate towards
a broader one, that data protection questions also incorpo-
rate a human rights perspective (i.e. dealing with values of and
respect for human individuals on the one hand and their per-
sonal data on the other).
2.4. Plea for human rights perspectives beyond data
protection assessments
The need for human rights perspectives beyond ‘pure’ data pro-
tection assessments is essential as IDM systems are often
perceived and described as ‘neutral’ instruments, as mere tools
to assist in efficient and effective migration procedures. A risk
related to such a perception is that it depicts these systems
as being merely ‘technical’, separate from the human involve-
ment necessary to operate them and give them ‘a human face’.
Often, when issues arise as a consequence of the functioning
of these technologies, such as for instance privacy invasion,
an assessment by means of the rather technical legal instru-
ment of data protection regulation is regarded as sufficient. As
detailed elsewhere (La Fors-Owczynik, 2015), privacy impact
assessments also exhibit this narrow perspective (Rijksdienst,
2013; Schreuder, 2014). Therefore, data protection assess-
ments accompanied by human rights considerations could
redound to IDM techniques not becoming such ‘ends’ or tools
in border management, which only necessitate technological
fixes when societal problems arise from their use. Such a com-
bined assessment should precede the actual implementation
of these systems in order to better facilitate the relevance and
practical enforcement of human rights principles. Before dis-
cussing this combined assessment in more detail, the following
section reflects upon the extent to which both the upcoming
15 Henry Schuster & Terry Frieden (2006); ‘Lawyer wrongly ar-
rested in bombings: “We lived in 1984”’; CNN Justice – < http://
articles.cnn.com/2006-11-29/justice/mayfield.suit_1_train-bombings
-brandon-mayfield-madrid?_s=PM:LAW >.
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EU Data Protection Regulation16 and the EU Police and Crimi-
nal Justice Data Protection Directive offer by themselves (that
is without an additional human rights assessment) sufficient
protection and remedies for the risks described in the current
use of the IDM systems (the INS and PROGIS consoles and the
API system).
3. The INS console, PROGIS console and the
API system within the Dutch legal and
administrative landscape
Although the three applications discussed below are typical
of the Dutch setting, they operate in the wider EU context and
are therefore closely linked both in their design and opera-
tion to EU systems used in the policy domain of migration.They
are part of a wide landscape of networked databases and digital
circuits where data are shared extensively. Key EU networks
that form this broader landscape are the Schengen Informa-
tion Systems (SIS I and SIS II), the EU’s Visa Information System
(VIS) (European Commission, 2015) and Eurodac (Council Regu-
lation (EC) No. 2725/2000), the last-mentioned being a central
biometric database in which the fingerprints of asylum seekers
registered in any member state are stored. The Netherlands
is also required to use Europol’s Secure Information Ex-
change Network Application (SIENA) (European Commission,
2015) as its primary channel for sharing law enforcement in-
formation, and EUROSUR17 as a channel for exchanging
surveillance information about illegal migration and cross-
border crime at the EU’s land, sea and air borders.
The working of all three systems will next be briefly dis-
cussed, followed by a conclusion that outlines some common
features concerning their operation.
3.1. The INS console
Council Regulation (EC) No. 380/2008 prescribes that all member
states of the EU should introduce residence permits for third-
country nationals.18 These are required to be equipped with a
digital ‘photograph [. . .] and two fingerprints taken flat’. The INS
console is used by the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation
Service to meet this regulation.
After a third country national is enrolled by the Dutch INS
console the registered data are encrypted on the chip of the
residence permit. The immigrant’s identity is verified against
these data and as of 1 March 2014 a photograph and the alien’s
ten fingerprints are registered also centrally with the Basic Fa-
cility of Aliens (BFA)19 (2014).20 The BFA21 is a major database
for authorised government agencies containing data about all
immigrants within the Dutch immigration and border control
chain.22 The Dutch Personal Data Protection Act applies to all
data gathered by the immigration and naturalisation ser-
vices. Further prescriptions concerning the processing of aliens’
personal data, including potentially sensitive data, for in-
stance, of asylum seekers, are set by the Dutch Alien Act. For
the retention of aliens’ biometric data, including that gath-
ered by the INS console, the Alien Act sets the limit at ten years.
The INS console is used to verify the identity of the resi-
dence permit holder as follows: the fingers of the residence
permit holder are placed on a biometric fingerprint reader; the
recorded images are then verified against those encrypted in
the permit. If there is a match, the identity verification indi-
cates that the identity of the residence permit holder is correct,
and that residence permit belongs to the bearer.The direct scan-
ning of fingerprints by the INS console fingerprint reader system
had been envisioned to provide a much greater degree of
certainty23 (Teveen, 2013) as to the residence holder’s iden-
tity than dactyslips (sheets of inked fingerprints) provide. All
third country nationals will be enrolled using the INS console.
However, when the interviews providing empirical data were
taken, the INS had started by only enrolling asylum seekers.
Although not all immigrants have yet been registered using
the INS console, officials using the system have expressed their
concerns relating to the right to privacy and even to the right
to asylum. For instance, when the fingerprint reader dis-
played a false negative result for an asylum seeker during
verification processes, a professional responded as follows:
I: How about the lady for whom it went wrong?
P: [. . .] the system showed ‘no match’ for her fingers [. . .] Are
we going to refuse that lady a residence permit, because the prints
might not be hers? [. . .] The lady was a Somali national, and
16 In December 2015 the text of the new General Data Protection
Regulation reached its fairly final form.This can be regarded as quite
a substantial achievement within the data protection history of
Europe.The new prescriptions will provide a much stricter and also
more ‘human rights-minded’ legal remedy for private citizens, such
as the rules related to ‘breach notification’; ‘privacy by design’ or
‘data protection impact assessments’ also demonstrate this. At the
same time, the new legal instruments are also promising as they
provide comprehensive legal guidance, including fines in case data
protection prescriptions are violated, for public, commercial and
other parties involved in processing personal data.
17 Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border
Surveillance System (Eurosur), OJ 2013 L 295.
18 Aliens are all citizens, not having Dutch, EU, Norwegian, Ice-
landic, or Swiss nationality.
19 The regulation allows for more than 30 authorities within the
Dutch immigration and border control chain to verify the iden-
tity of third country national immigrants.
20 Besluit van 21 januari 2014 tot wijziging van het Vreemdelingenbesluit
2000[. . .]: Due to parliamentary protests, the D66 Party achieved
that this law will be valid for seven years and then a new vote shall
take place whether to continue with the central registration of bio-
metric data of aliens. After five years, an evaluation of this law shall
take place.
21 Any Dutch immigration or border control authority can check
the identity of an enrolled immigrant against INS console data in
the BFA.
22 The BFA traditionally also contains copies of inked finger-
prints, also called as dactyslips, of third country national asylum
seekers. A copy of each asylum seeker immigrant’s dactyslip is pre-
scribed by the EU’s Dublin Convention (Council Regulation (EC) No
2725/2000) to be submitted to the Eurodac central database.
23 This was explained by eliminating a step in the process which
during the production of dactyslips was seen to decrease the veri-
fiability of fingerprints. Dactyslips are produced from inked
fingerprints by digitising the paper sheets bearing the inked prints,
yet the direct scanning eliminates the digitization step.
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although Somalis do that, she had not mutilated her finger-
prints [. . .], I checked her fingers myself. Then I took her prints
and got a 40 % result. I was like: what is this? [. . .] if you clean
your fingers, then the prints are worse, if they are greasy, you gain
better prints. What are the oily spots on your skin? It is here [points
to side of nose] and on your forehead. So, to get good prints we
ask people to rub these spots [. . .]. But, these techniques were
not helpful. Finally, the project manager asked her to put her four
fingers on the scanner and fold them a little around the table, and
then the pressure was right. It was not easy, but we improved
the fingerprint quality. We achieved 80 %; that was good quality.
(INS officer, city A)*24
3.2. The PROGIS console
Identity fraud is a major concern within the Dutch law en-
forcement chain, and the prominence of the problem has grown
every time a person has been reported as being different to
the one originally sentenced for a particular crime. In 2009 the
Dutch Act on Identification of Suspects, Convicts and
Witnesses25 was introduced to harmonise data with respect to
the identity of criminal suspects, victims and witnesses. The
Act requires law enforcement and justice authorities to obtain
ten digital fingerprints and a facial photograph of suspects and
convicts and thereby to construct harmonised, verifiable iden-
tity of a person available to every authority within the law
enforcement chain.26 The Dutch Decision on Establishing the
Identity of Suspects and Victims27 of 2009 explains in detail
that only the biometric features of suspects, convicts, former
suspects, unknown convicts and deceased persons are regis-
tered. Being part of the information provision program of the
Dutch criminal law chain (PROGIS, in Dutch: Programma
Informatievoorziening Strafrechtsketen), the PROGIS console is used
for law enforcement purposes. Hence, PROGIS data fall under
the data protection prescriptions of the Dutch Police Data Act.
The registered fingerprints and photographs are called the ‘ID
state’ of the person, the aim of which is two-fold. First, the use
of the ID state by law enforcement authorities allows for them
to verify persons against ‘integrated identity’ data (2011) and
prevents each authority from separately establishing identity
data about a criminal, witness or suspect. Second, the Dutch
Ministry of Security and Justice intends the ID state to ensure
that the person incarcerated is the same person as was sen-
tenced (‘Politie: grondige identificatie voorkomt identiteitsfraude
– Security.NL, 2012). Associated with each PROGIS ID state
is a criminal justice chain number (CJCN, in Dutch:
strafrechtsketennummer – SKN) and a biometric number. Both
numbers are registered centrally in the Criminal Justice Chain
Database (CJCD). A biometric number is associated with an ID
state, and a CJCN is associated with the criminal person.
The Dutch Alien Police operates the PROGIS console, and
the biometric information gained by enrolment using the
system is shared only among agencies within the Dutch law
enforcement and justice chain. If an immigrant is suspected
of a crime (for instance, a visa overstay, which is a crime in
the Netherlands), the immigrant is identified by the PROGIS
console as a criminal suspect in the Netherlands. Although the
purpose of PROGIS is to improve identity verification and con-
sequently certainty about the identity of a person standing in
front of the police officer, PROGIS often produces negative
results (La Fors-Owczynik and Van der Ploeg, 2015) in prac-
tice. This raises severe privacy concerns:
Webfit is the predecessor of PROGIS, and was the first program
to use fingerprints that were taken digitally. In Ter Apel, the Alien
Police said: “we tried out Webfit, but it did not work for us and
it took too much time to work with it.” The Webfit program was
actually installed in such a way that it always delivered nega-
tive results for asylum seekers when verifying their fingerprints.
Webfit turned out to have only been tested on Dutch fingers [. . .];
despite updates, Webfit is still the basis for PROGIS, and we still
often get negative results. (INS professional about PROGIS)*
3.3. Advanced passenger information system
The Advanced Passenger Information (API) system exempli-
fies a smart border system that the guidelines for which were
set up according to the latest standards of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Orga-
nization (WCO) and the International Air Transport Association
(IATA). Given that the Netherlands is signatory party to the
Schengen Agreement and the corresponding Schengen Border
Code, the introduction of the API system at Schiphol Airport
constitutes part of the control of the extensive European ‘smart-
border’ network, the set-up of which was heavily advocated
by the European Commission (2011).
The sole aim and purpose of the API system at Schiphol
Airport is to prevent illegal entry into the Netherlands, whereas
the API Directive 2004/82/EC allows for this purpose to be com-
bined with others, such as preventing international crime, such
as stopping those involved in human trafficking (2004). There-
fore, Dutch border management and immigration authorities
operate the system to sort out travellers according to risk pro-
files registered in API system. These profiles contain attributes
of delinquent passengers that range from behavioural and
bodily attributes, to accessories or clothing, to flight informa-
tion from the departure control system of air carriers, to data
from the machine readable zones of travel documents. Spe-
cifically to prevent illegal migration to the EU, API Directive 2004/
82/EC prescribes that member states, including the Netherlands,
exchange passenger data on incoming and outbound flights
prior to departure. The retention period for such data is 24
hours, within which period such data shall also be cross-
checked against API profiles. Receiving such information on
24 The quotes with an ‘*’ can also be found in La Fors-Owczynik.
and Van der Ploeg (2015) ‘Migrants at/as risk: Identity verification and
risk assessment technologies in The Netherlands’ in Digitizing identi-
ties: Doing identity in a networked world (eds. Van der Ploeg, I. &
Pridmore, J.), Routledge.
25 Wet identiteitsvaststelling verdachten, veroordeelden en getuigen, 2009.
26 The introduction of the PROGIS console kept the police’s routine
in fingerprinting suspects in remand and convicted criminals by
ink and the production of dactyslips, digital scans of the inked fin-
gerprint sheets. These sheets are still produced and transferred to
the Facility for Verification and Identification (FVI, in Dutch:
Voorziening voor Verificatie en Identificatie) (Min. van Veiligheid en
Justitie, 2011).
27 Besluit identiteitsvaststelling verdachten en veroordeelden, 2009.
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passengers before their flight departs was seen essential to
prevent not only illegal entry, but also such broader threats as
terrorism or international crime (Leers, 2012). Consequently,
as of January 2012, air carriers departing from 28 airports28 that
are considered to be high risk are obliged to submit passen-
ger data without prior request to relevant border control
agencies before their departure. The type of passenger data
is laid down by the Dutch Alien Order 2000 (in Dutch:
Vreemdelingenbesluit, 2000; Korthals & Cohen).
Legal prescriptions related to the processing of API data fall
under the Dutch Police Data Act. This is because border control
tasks are assigned by the Dutch Police Act 1993 to the Dutch
Royal Military Police.The Dutch Data Protection Authority (DPA)
in a letter to the Minister of Immigration, Integration and
Asylum expressed its concerns over privacy regarding the gov-
ernment’s intention to extend the set of API data (Kohnstamm,
2012) that the Dutch Royal Military Police can request for the
detection of illegal immigrants and prevention of related crimi-
nality. The main concern expressed by the DPA was that the
purpose and effectiveness of broadening the scope of API pro-
files have been insufficiently demonstrated by the Dutch
government. In a subsequent letter the DPA also shared its con-
cerns about whether the processing of API data meets the
requirements of the Dutch Data Protection Act. Moreover, con-
cerns relating to the question of which authority (INS, KMar
or others) at the border will be responsible for the processed
passenger data before data from air carriers are sent to border
control authorities (Tomesen, 2012).These concerns are further
aggravated by the fact that in practice API profiles often produce
false positives (La Fors-Owczynik and Van der Ploeg, 2015) and
unnecessary detention of passengers:
[. . .] we were informed by Madrid that a gang was trafficking
women from South and Central America for prostitution. [. . .] We
learnt that these women use Amsterdam as a transit; therefore
we built a profile on flights from South and Central America. We
wanted to check all women in the age group of 18–24 years trav-
elling through Amsterdam to Madrid. If a match emerged on these
criteria, then the system flagged that passenger. Since not all female
passengers were being trafficked, you had to ask what a passen-
ger’s purpose of travel was. [. . .] there was often no reason to
stop the passenger, but these are indicators you base your profile
on. (Royal Military Police officer about API)*
3.4. Interim conclusion
The above discussion shows that the three systems are clearly
different, not only in their operation, but also in their tech-
nological, legal and administrative environment. However, what
makes them comparable are their effect on travellers, immi-
grants, refugees and asylum seekers. In particular, all three
systems function on the basis of design and operational fea-
tures that frame migrants as constituting a risk (for identity
fraud, illegal immigration, etc.). One could say that the default
for the identification process is a mindset of suspicion. As such
this is not problematic. However, given the accuracy problems
that all three systems face (producing false positives, unnec-
essary detention of passengers, etc.), migrants see themselves
confronted with a situation in which they are digitally framed
as a potential risk to society. The empirical examples and find-
ings presented in this article demonstrate that an immigrant
can much more easily be framed ‘as a risk’ (La Fors-Owczynik
and Van der Ploeg, 2015) by the PROGIS console identification
and verification process, than a regular citizen. Moreover, em-
pirical data also show that when using the API system, the
potential for a match between attributes in a risk profile and
attributes of the traveller renders travellers being viewed as
increasingly suspicious of posing a risk, or ‘as being a risk’. Also,
empirical details show that the use of these profiles can lead
to false accusations against travellers and to infringements of
their right to privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR), eventually also
the right to liberty (Article 5 of the ECHR) and in some cases
even the right to asylum.
A key question at this point is then whether the current leg-
islative framework offers an adequate mechanism for
addressing situations where migrants are unjustifiably framed
as a risk, for instance facing unjustified criminal accusations
at airports. Or, in other cases even being potentially sent back
to their home country, thus not receiving the protection that
our society ought to provide them, given they are at risk in their
home country. Section 4 therefore looks at the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, followed by a discussion in Section
5 of the new EU data protection regime.
4. The European convention on human rights
The ECHR contains a wide range of provisions relevant for the
protection of migrants. Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to
respect for private life and family life is of critical relevance.
Although the ECHR does not contain this right explicitly, the
human right to asylum is also crucial for this analysis.The right
to privacy requires that each person shall be protected from
physical and also digital threats to their privacy. In this sense
the right to privacy can be regarded as a pre-requisite to other
rights, such as the right to liberty (Article 5), the right not to
be discriminated against or the right to data protection (as laid
down by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of
the European Union29).
4.1. Human right to privacy
Immigrants and travellers are exposed to intensified mecha-
nisms of security control. These groups regularly find
themselves in the middle of public safety versus privacy di-
chotomies, although in different ways. The case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)30 demonstrates that
public safety interests often override the individual privacy in-
terests of a migrant. To make the potential privacy right
limitations of the use of digital systems for all citizens,
28 The risk of illegal migration from these 28 locations is deemed
to be very high.
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [1999]
OJ C364/01.
30 App. No. 35753/03, ECtHR, 11 January 2005 and App. No. 26625/
02, ECtHR, 24 January 2006.
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including migrants, transparent is set out by law. Therefore,
to assess how the human right to privacy can strengthen the
position of migrants with respect to the negative conse-
quences that biometric identification and risk profiling practices
can cause them is critical.31
The ECHR sets out the fundamental right to a private and
family life (Article 8). The Convention also defines conditions
of exception under which government agencies are allowed to
infringe this fundamental right. ECtHR jurisprudence32 also
specifies that any form of infringement of this right shall be
in accordance with the principles of proportionality (the in-
fringement shall not imbalance the pursued objective) and
subsidiarity (the pursued objective cannot be achieved with less
intrusion on the citizens’ privacy). The collection and storage
of data must comply with these principles and the infringe-
ment of the right to privacy must be legitimised by law, must
pursue a legitimate aim and must be necessary in a demo-
cratic society. Although migrants have travelled from beyond
the legal borders over which the Convention applies, the en-
forcement of the human right to privacy by EU border control,
immigration and law enforcement authorities is essential as
these migrants’ aim is to enter the EU. For such authorities to
set an example how human rights are enacted in practice, while
operating digital identification or risk profiling systems, is of
the utmost importance.
Over the years, the ECtHR has ruled several times on issues
where the privacy or private life of migrants in the broadest
sense was at stake. Several of these cases are of relevance for
the protection of migrants when technology is used to process
them and thus frame their position.
On 16 July 2009, for example, the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR issued a judgment in the case of Féret v. Belgium33 in
which it strictly condemned the state for its use of language
on its internet publications, which incited discrimination and
racial hatred against immigrants:
Political discourse which incites hatred based on religious, eth-
nical or cultural prejudices represents a danger for social peace
and political stability in democratic States.
Furthermore, the ECtHR:
attaches particular weight to the medium [the Internet] used and
the context in which the impugned remarks were expressed in the
present case, and consequently their potential impact on public
order and social cohesion.34
This case is relevant to our discussion as among other things
it requires the agency using the technological application to
mediate and therefore address the potentially negative impli-
cations of a particular government communication that is
technology-based. Given that both biometric identification and
risk profiling systems have mediating and therefore poten-
tially aggravating effects (e.g. when they distribute wrongful,
potentially discriminative information on migrants), the above
judgment offers an indication that the potential harmful effects
of a specific technology used should be considered and if nec-
essary addressed by the state.
On 4 December 2008, in the case of S. and Marper v. UK, the
Court ruled on the situation of an 11-year old applicant who
was accused of attempted robbery. His fingerprints and DNA
were registered with the UK DNA database. After the charges
against him were dropped, he requested the removal of his reg-
istered data. This was turned down. Subsequently, he filed
charges against the UK police at the ECtHR, and stressed that
the retention of his data by the police violated his right to
privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR). The Court indicated that:
the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference
with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and cannot
be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.
This judgment is important in light of this article’s theme,
given that it relates to the retention of biometric data on in-
nocent persons by police authorities. It is therefore of relevance
for biometric identification practices of law enforcement au-
thorities using the PROGIS console. The ECtHR ruled in favour
of the right to privacy when fingerprints are retained non-
proportionately by law enforcement authorities:
The Court accordingly considers that the retention of finger-
prints on the authorities’ records in connection with an identified
or identifiable individual may in itself give rise, notwithstand-
ing their objective and irrefutable character, to important private-
life concerns. [. . .]the Court [. . .] considers that, while it may be
necessary to distinguish between the taking, use and storage of
fingerprints, on the one hand, and samples and profiles, on the
other, in determining the question of justification, the retention
of fingerprints constitutes an interference with the right to respect
for private life.
A final example of a ruling relevant to our discussion is the
case of Thlimmenos v. Greece,35 in which the ECtHR ruled spe-
cifically in favour of the right not to be discriminated against:
the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the
rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States
without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat dif-
ferently persons whose situations are significantly different.
This judgment is of vital importance in light of profiling prac-
tices by Dutch border control and immigration authorities. Its
importance is particularly relevant when it comes to potential
31 On this, see the United Nations Human Rights Committee (CCPR)
General Comment No. 16 (8-04-1988): The right to respect of privacy,
family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and
reputation (Art. 17). See also Council of Europe (2005), Human Rights
and the Fight against Terrorism – The Guidelines of the Council of Europe,
Guideline VI: ‘Measures used in the fight against terrorism that in-
terfere with privacy [. . .] must be provided for by law’.
32 App. No. 28341/95, ECtHR, 4 May 2000 and App. No. 30562/04 &
30566/04, 4 December 2008.
33 App. No. 15615/07, ECtHR, 16 July 2009.
34 Ibid. 35 App. No. 34369/97, ECtHR, 6 April 2000.
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false negatives produced by biometric registration and verifi-
cation via the INS or PROGIS consoles.
4.2. Human right to asylum
Given the problems with the working of the three systems (false
positives, false negatives) outlined earlier, migrants are at risk
in that they can potentially be digitally framed as posing a risk,
thus giving them the status of persona non grata. This categori-
sation can indirectly contribute to the rejection of their asylum
request and to their deportation, and consequently can lead
to further exposure to torture and inhuman treatment in their
home or a transit land. Although the ECHR does not contain
an explicit right to asylum in itself, the Court has created an
opening for such a right given that it has established the right
to asylum as a fundamental human right, which will have posi-
tive implications for future asylum cases. A number of such
cases will be briefly described below. It should be noted that
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Eu-
ropean Union,36 which was introduced to harmonise and
enforce (ECHR) human rights law within the context of the EU,
also introduced the right to asylum as a separate fundamen-
tal right.
On 17 July 2008, the ECtHR ruled in NA. v. United Kingdom37
that the United Kingdom could not expel an applicant (of Tamil
origin) because that would breach Article 3 of the ECHR. If ex-
pulsion were to take place, there was sufficient evidence to
prove that the applicant would be exposed to inhuman treat-
ment in his home country, Sri Lanka, due to his ethnic origin.
In another judgment, the Court went even further by finding
violations of the ECHR by EU member states. On 21 January
2011, in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,38 the ECHR rep-
rehended both Belgium and Greece for automatically applying
the Dublin Convention to an asylum seeker. The applicant, an
Afghan national, claimed that his rights under Articles 3 and
5 would be infringed.
The third judgment with respect to the right to asylum is
unique of its kind. On 23 February 2012, in the case of Hirsi Jamaa
and others v. Italy,39 the Court ruled for the first time against
an EU member state on immigrants’ interception at sea. The
applicants, 24 Somali and Eritrean nationals, alleged that Italy
violated their right to be protected from torture as laid down
by Article 3 of the ECHR, when Italy attempted to deport them
back to Libya. The Court found that Italy violated Article 3 and
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,40 which prohibit collective expul-
sion. Furthermore, the Court found the Italian government guilty
of breaching Article 13 of the ECHR and required the govern-
ment to pay fines amounting to more than EUR 15,000 per
applicant. Apart from the unique precedent this judgment set
concerning seaborne immigration to the EU, the decision es-
tablished crucial extraterritorial relevance for the European
Convention on Human Rights. This judgment strengthens
human rights remedies for all asylum seekers.
4.3. Interim conclusion
The above Court rulings on both privacy and asylum provide
useful guidance for cases in which biometric identity man-
agement and risk profiling systems on migrants, including
immigrants and travellers, are used. In the specific situation
of asylum-seeking immigrants, the right to asylum and the right
to privacy are closely intertwined. This is because the nega-
tive consequences that digital enrolment and verification
mechanisms by the three systems can have on asylum seekers
could result in infringement of both their right to privacy as
well as their right to asylum. This only further emphasises the
need for strengthening the legal position of this group.
The ECtHR cases on the right to privacy enshrine the ne-
cessity for states to give utmost priority to the enforcement
of such rights within the contexts where the INS console,
PROGIS console or API system are used. To enforce these rights
in practice is essential as they provide immigrants and trav-
ellers with a broader protective legal environment against the
downsides of identification and profiling practices than the ex-
isting, and in part also the proposed, data protection regime.
5. The new European data protection regime:
identification and risk profiling of migrants
All three technologies discussed in Section 3 target individu-
als either directly or indirectly. Whereas the INS and PROGIS
consoles are aimed at establishing and verifying a person’s iden-
tity, the API system is geared towards sorting out persons based
on the characteristics built into a risk profile. Although the INS
and PROGIS consoles are both identification systems, because
of their legally and administratively strictly separated set-
tings, they deal with persons differently. The consequences of
using these systems are useful in assessing the provisions of
the new EU data protection regime that are related to identi-
fication and profiling. The new regime will replace Directive
95/46/EC, and Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on policing
related personal data will provide substantially broader legal
protection and remedies for citizens from the effects of digital
technology use. The immense growth in digitalisation within
all aspects of citizens’ lives in the past 25 years has necessi-
tated new data protection prescriptions. The new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)41 and the Police and Criminal
Justice Data Protection Directive42 will be in effect as of the end
of 2017.
36 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [1999]
OJ C364/01.
37 App. No. 25904/07, ECtHR, 17 July 2008.
38 App. No. 30696/09, 2011, ECtHR 108.
39 App. No. 27765/09, ECtHR, 23 February 2012.
40 N. Frenzen, ‘Hirsi v. Italy: Prohibition of collective expulsion
Extends to Extra-territorial actions’ Migrants at sea (Los Angeles,
23 February 2012), retrieved on 10 May 2015 from <http://
migrantsatsea.org/tag/european-court-of-human-rights/>.
41 In this article I use the latest version of the GDPR accepted on
15 June 2015 by the European Council and the European Parliament.
42 In this article I use the version from 2012 of the Police and Crimi-
nal Justice Data Protection Directive.
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5.1. Data protection and human rights controversies in
day-to-day use of the INS and PROGIS consoles and API
system
5.1.1. Establishing ‘accurate identity’
5.1.1.1. . . . using the INS console. Data protection regula-
tions, including the new GDPR, do not deal extensively with
issues preceding the digital enrolment of persons into iden-
tity registration processes. However, this omission is highly
influential in determining the reliability and quality of digital
data, which are supposed to prove the accuracy of an immi-
grant’s identity. Biometric information datasets, as also
generated by the INS console, are claimed to be more trust-
worthy as persons cannot easily fake their biometric features
(La Fors-Owczynik and Van der Ploeg, 2015). Yet, paradoxi-
cally, within the immigration chain, this information is often
based on quite weak credentials. An INS officer operating a
mobile version of the new INS console in a refugee camp related
the following:
I: How can you be sure that an [undocumented] person you want
to identify using the INS console is who he/she claims to be?
P: That you never know. To give you a simple answer: I can only
hope that a person who says something about him/herself to me,
says the same thing to our UNHCR colleagues. It could be a lie
both times, but since I cannot figure this out otherwise, I must
be satisfied with the consistency of the refugee’s story. (INS pro-
fessional, city D)*
This quote demonstrates that such an easily falsified cre-
dential as the same personal history told twice can routinely
provide a basis for enrolment by the INS console. Certainly,
the difficulty for refugees to provide more trustworthy cre-
dentials to INS officers shall not be underestimated. Yet, it is
worth discussing whether this significant deficit in relation
to the reliability of the registered identity data on an immi-
grant does not undermine the ‘principle of data quality’ as
set out in Article 6 of the 95/46/EC Directive. If similar cases
emerge in the future and the new GDPR is already in effect,
evaluating the implications of weak credentials on the ‘accu-
racy’ principle as set out in Article 5(d) during digital
identification would be essential.
The above example also demonstrates the trust INS offi-
cers must place in the immigrant’s personal history.
Furthermore, this shows how a migrant’s right to asylum
becomes enforced in daily practice and it also provides a posi-
tive example for framing migrants as being ‘at risk’.
5.1.1.2. . . . using a PROGIS profile. Establishing a PROGIS
profile should serve to increase the accuracy in identifying a
person, including a migrant. However, the diversity of con-
soles and the network of systems PROGIS is built up from often
require multiple attempts to enrol a migrant or criminal, and
produce verifiable fingerprints:
I: How about the standard criteria? I also saw that when a fin-
gerprint is indicated as green, this means a reasonably good quality,
right?
P: Yes, but the fingerprints read by the scanner are linked to another
system [than those which are registered in the CJCD]. It may happen
that one scanner on a console will do everything neatly and display
fingerprints as green. But the systems behind the scenes, which
actually read the fingerprint, need a higher quality, because they
need to display images as clearly as possible. So, a fingerprint that
looks good at first glance may sometimes be still rejected.
I: How does this happen?
P: The Royal Military Police has many such problems. They also
have PROGIS consoles. [. . .] Their systems are based on WebFIT
stations (a system behind the scenes in PROGIS) which are only
for aliens. But because the WebFIT stations had only been tested
on Dutch fingerprints, the fingerprints of aliens were always re-
jected, and the Royal Military Police had to retake fingerprints four
or five times from the same alien. Since fingerprints are tagged
with a barcode, the system says: this barcode is already known,
retake the fingerprint. (PROGIS police officer, city B)
The above problem cannot be addressed through the ex-
isting 2008 Framework Decision. However, in future, Article 4
of the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive will
provide better remedy for migrants should a border guard re-
quests migrants to retake their fingerprints. This Article
prescribes such ‘principles relating to personal data process-
ing’ as whether the data have been obtained fairly and lawfully.
Besides, what ‘Dutchness’ shall mean in the context of PROGIS,
the fact that a migrant being ‘non-Dutch’ has to be enrolled
more often than a Dutch citizen challenges the prohibition of
discrimination as set by Article 14 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and by Article 21 of the Charter on
Fundamental Rights of the EU.
5.1.2. False negatives during verifications
5.1.2.1. . . . using the INS console. The case highlighted in
Section 3.1 of a female asylum seeker is not unique, but occurs
relatively frequently within the Dutch immigration system.
Since the accuracy rate of the INS console is 79% (Ministerie
van Veiligheid en Jusititie, 2014) this means that in 21% of the
cases, the INS console would categorise an asylum seeker as
posing a risk of identity fraud. Article 6(e) of Directive 95/46/
EC and Article 5 of the new GDPR both specify that personal
data ‘must be kept in a form which permits identification of
a data subject’. Yet, Directive 95/46/EC has no requirements as
to how this ‘form’ shall be achieved, or how the data are to
be obtained, only that the data have to be processed fairly and
lawfully. Neither does it state what conditions apply if persons
(in our case, asylum seekers) are confronted of being framed
as potential identity fraudsters just because their finger-
prints cannot be verified. Article 6(e) of the new GDPR is very
clear that data processing shall be ‘necessary for the perfor-
mance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller’. This
purpose in the case of identification by the INS console is of
course beyond doubt. When the Regulation takes effect and
cases similar to the false negatives generated during identi-
fication processing of asylum seekers using the INS console
emerge, Article 33 of the GDPR lays down a potential legal
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remedy. It prescribes for data controllers to carry out data pro-
tection impact assessments, if the introduction of a high
technology system and its purpose is ‘likely to result in a high
risk for the rights and freedoms of individuals, such as discrimina-
tion, identity theft or fraud’. Moreover, if the new Regulation was
in force, the additional requirements regarding female asylum
seekers (see Section 3.1) to produce ‘verifiable’ fingerprints could
have also been assessed against Article 5 of the GDPR.The latter
sets out that the processing of data shall be made transpar-
ent for the data subject.
Both migrants and the new data protection regulation could
furthermore profit from provisions of the ECHR – Article 8 on
the right to a private life, and Article 14 on the ‘prohibition of
discrimination amongst others on grounds of race, ethnic origin, genetic
features and religion’. In addition, relevant ECtHR case law can
provide a useful remedy. The Schengen Border Code could also
be of help, as this prohibits discrimination by immigration and
border control authorities throughout the EU. Consultation of
these legal documents is essential, as the INS console can clearly
frame an asylum seeker who is regarded being ‘at risk’ as
someone who poses ‘a risk’ (of identity fraud). Consequently,
such a digitally mediated framing and categorisation can rela-
tively easily put the legal status of an asylum seeker in jeopardy.
5.1.2.2. . . . using the PROGIS console. During identity veri-
fication processes using the PROGIS console, false negative rates
are also around 21% (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Jusititie, 2014).
Given that only suspects, criminals (and deceased victims) are
registered, all (living) persons identified via PROGIS are re-
garded being ‘as a risk’. Apart from the crime that usually
frames and categorises a person within law enforcement as
being a risk for society, the high sensitivity of the PROGIS fin-
gerprint reader can also lead to frame someone as posing a(n
additional) risk: identity fraud.
Imagine that a man is accused of a crime a month later and he
has no ID on him than we consult this database (CJCD). If he is
known, than there is a possibility for verification on the PROGIS
console and we will identify him through two of his fingers. If he
is identified then the criminal justice chain number is used, because
according to the database he is the person he says he is. The da-
tabase then displays additional information about him.
Subsequently, two fingers are placed separately on the reader. This
will check where the digital fingerprints are registered. If the fin-
gerprints match, then that is displayed. In case there is no match
then a red cross appears. In such a case, either there is some-
thing wrong with the fingerprints, which could be the case at that
moment, or we identify the person a second time using two other
fingerprints. If the fingerprints are rejected again, then this man
will be accused of having given a false name. (PROGIS operat-
ing police officer, city D)
The 2008 Framework Decision on Policing does not deal with
issues related to the quality of data or how that data have been
obtained. Therefore, it cannot provide a remedy for when a
migrant is accused of identity fraud due to non-verifiable fin-
gerprints. The Police and Criminal Justice Directive, however,
specifies in Article 6 the principles for data accuracy and re-
liability, and in Article 7 the provisions for the lawfulness of
data processing. After the Directive comes into effect, these
provisions could provide a legal remedy against unjust, digi-
tally mediated accusations against anyone. Such accusations
can be regarded as an infringement on one’s right to privacy
as set by Article 8 ECHR, and one’s right not to be discrimi-
nated against as set by Article 14 ECHR. For asylum seekers,
ECHR case law on the right to asylum can also provide
assistance.
5.1.3. False positives via API profiles
When the criteria in the API profiles are set up and risk pro-
files are used, false positive results for passengers are
unfortunately a common occurrence (Hoogstrate and Veenman,
2012). Consequently, unnecessary detention of passengers regu-
larly occurs as this has also been demonstrated in Section 3.3
by the empirical example on API.
Whereas the purposes for installing the API system and risk
profiles are covered by EU and national laws, there is no legal
permission for producing false positives and for stopping and
interrogating persons just because their personal character-
istics match a risk profile. Hence, any passenger wrongly
detained could ask for a proportionality check from a border
guard. This principle is laid down by Article 3 of the Frame-
work Decision and if similar cases occur in the future, after
the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive comes
into force, Article 4(a) relating to fair and lawful processing,
and also Article 7 on conditions for lawful processing also
provide remedies. Furthermore, wrongly detained (accused)
persons could also seek a remedy through their fundamental
right to a private life as set by Article 8 of the ECHR, and through
their right not to be discriminated against as laid down by
Article 14 of the ECHR.
Cases of ‘ad-hoc’ detention using the API system are also
on the increase:
Airlines are obliged to supply data for API. We put together what
they need to deliver [. . .] This data comes to us in a system and
in that system we build in such items as watch lists. [. . .] In fact,
a watch list means that you search with known information for
known persons. [. . .] In addition, manual assessment or opera-
tional analysis also takes place. Basically a trained border guard
officer assesses the information on the complete passenger list with
his own eyes. He looks at the list of a flight from China, and on
that flight from China there are three Nigerians. That might be
illogical on that route. This could require some extra attention paid
to that flight. This will then be a filter for that particular flight,
but will not become an additional profile on other flights. This
simply exemplifies how a filter can be applied because certain
people became interesting and merit further investigation. The use
of such filters is much more in the direction, for example, of pre-
venting terrorism, or things like that. Because you always look
for unknown data on unknown persons: someone who, for what-
ever reason, is simply conspicuous. (Royal Military Police officer,
city A)
Although the aims of the API system are legitimate and
founded in both EU and national laws, ‘ad-hoc’ detention of
passengers referred to in the above two quotes could be as-
sessed from the perspective of Article 3 of the Framework
Decision. This provision prescribes that during data collec-
tion, principles of lawfulness, proportionality and legitimate
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purpose shall be defined prior to the collection. As the quoted
example and also other criticisms (Van Brakel and De Hert, 2011)
demonstrate, police forces often rely on their gut instincts when
identifying suspicious citizens, in the above case, selecting ‘con-
spicuous’ passengers. Such ad-hoc selections however challenge
the principles of proportionality and also question the extent
to which the prescriptions of lawfulness, proportionality and
legitimate purpose, as set out in Article 3 of the Framework
Decision, are enforced. The extent to which an ad-hoc selec-
tion, which aims to filter out terrorists or serious criminals,
can be regarded necessary and proportionate in a democratic
society is highly contentious. In a recent letter to the Dutch
government, the Meijers Committee43 underlined the need to
assess whether the API system achieves its purpose. The Com-
mittee strongly questioned the necessity and proportionality
of introducing any filtering activity on passenger data for the
purposes of fighting international terrorism and serious crime
(Meijers Committee, 2011). These principles are also en-
shrined by the new Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection
Directive, and therefore in future cases the Directive can also
be consulted. The implications of ‘ad-hoc’ detention on pas-
sengers’ fundamental right to a private life as laid down by
Article 8 of ECHR would also be worth assessing. Stopping
regular travellers can easily frame travellers as posing a risk.
In cases of false accusations, Article 8 can provide a broader
scope for protection than either the existing or the drafted data
protection rules.
5.2. Interim conclusion
Unintended, discriminative consequences are inherent in socio-
technical practices (Prins, Broeders, Griffioen, Keizer, and
Keymolen, 2011).The above section also demonstrates that such
discriminative consequences are also inherent in the use of
the INS and PROGIS consoles and the API system.
Despite the quite different legal, organisational and ad-
ministrative settings in which these three technologies are
embedded, empirical examples demonstrate how a migrant
subjected to digital identification and verification practices via
the INS or PROGIS consoles, and to risk monitoring practices
via the API system are very much prone to be framed ‘as a risk’
(on this, see also La Fors-Owczynik and Van der Ploeg, 2015)
or be viewed as a ‘misfit’. This is quite worrying, especially
because generating data using these systems has become ex-
tremely simple. Both the threshold for achieving high quality
in biometric identification and the extensive and easily vari-
able markers, for instance, in API risk profiles have meant an
exponential growth in cases of false positives and false nega-
tives occurring. Consequently, occurrences of false accusations
of immigrants and travellers will become more frequent in the
future. If we put this into perspective, currently one out of every
five persons can already be falsely accused using INS or PROGIS
consoles because good data quality in these systems is mea-
sured at 79%. Thus, the greater the risk categories become, the
easier is to frame someone being risky. Another aspect of the
problem relates to the fact that in a time where big data
increasingly became common resource, to find and erase data
that have led to wrongful accusations would be extremely
labour-intensive and complicated, and at times even impos-
sible to accomplish. The implications of such accusations and
the existence of wrongful data is unpredictable; therefore it
is better explored, for instance, through scenario-building by
the new data protection regime. Article 33 of the GDPR could
inspire a legal practice that is more directed towards the im-
plications of technologies.
The issues raised call for new forms of data protection. In
comparison to the relevant, already existing data protection
rights and principles, the potential of the new GDPR and Police
and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive has been as-
sessed. First, in light of empirical details, the question of data
accuracy and reliability has proved to be a recurring issue in
all cases. The new GDPR in its Article 5(d) and the Police and
Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive in its Article 6 provide
significantly improved safeguards with respect to data quality.
Second, in all cases where migrants’ lives are adversely af-
fected, the principles relating to the lawfulness of data
processing in the new data protection regime provide more ex-
tensive safeguards than in the already existing legislation. Article
5(a) of the GDPR and Article 7 of the Police and Criminal Justice
Data Protection regime prescribe a wide set of principles for
the lawfulness of data processing. Given that the existing Frame-
work Decision applies only to cross-border data processing, the
prescriptions of the new data protection regulations provide
a far more encompassing legal remedy. By the time the GDPR
comes into force, the prescription to carry out data protec-
tion impact assessment (Article 33) prior to the introduction
of technologies could help to prevent or limit the recurrence
of wrongful, digitally mediated accusations of migrants.
Third, the proportionality principle is also enshrined in the
current data protection regime (see Article 13 of the 95/46/EC
and Article 17 of the Framework Decision). However, the new
data protection rules, when ratified, will enforce this prin-
ciple and the subsidiarity principle more thoroughly than
current provisions. Given that these principles are also human
rights principles, their improved enforcement within the new
data protection regime can be seen as a win–win situation also
for those migrants adversely affected by the Dutch govern-
ment’s use of technology.
6. Discussion: what can data protection and
human rights regulations do for migrants framed
digitally as a ‘risk’?
The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on
any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph. (Protocol No.
12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms)
The Netherlands ratified the European Convention on
Human Rights in 1954. In addition, in 2005, the Netherlands
also ratified Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the
43 Meijers Committee: a Dutch standing committee of experts on
international immigration, refugee and criminal law – <http://
commissie-meijers.nl>.
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
is an anti-discrimination treaty. Article 21 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union also clearly prohibits dis-
criminative practices. Based on all these instruments, the new
data protection regime will have great potential in offering rem-
edies against government practices that have discriminative
and other privacy-invasive effects on migrants in the
Netherlands.
The above analysis has however shown, first, that despite
the advantages of digital systems in government use, the fun-
damental right to privacy and the right not to be discriminated
against are at times put under pressure. Monitoring practices
of migrants by the INS and PROGIS consoles and the API system
can by default make certain innocent immigrants be viewed
as a ‘misfit’, ‘as a risk’ for the society of the hosting country.
The current data protection regime has been shown to provide
unsatisfactory protection when it comes to such negative effects
as a consequence of the use of these three systems.
Second, empirical insight sheds light onto an important de-
ficiency of the new data protection regime, as mentioned in
Section 2.4. The new regime allows for the blurring of bound-
aries between the definitions of the fundamental right to data
protection and the fundamental right to privacy. Notably, the
regulation (still) ‘translates’ (Latour, 1987) broader problems of
privacy into issues of data protection. Such an approach leaves
only limited room for discussion on other fundamental values
related to privacy such as non-discrimination and autonomy,
or on the enforcement of democratic principles such as pro-
portionality. This is also evident in how the enforcement of the
right to privacy tends to be evaluated. In practice, as far as data
protection rules are concerned, this often implies that the right
to privacy is enforced. Privacy impact assessments (PIAs) ex-
emplify this (La Fors-Owczynik, 2015). PIAs are intended to
assess implications on the fundamental right to privacy, yet
what they in fact evaluate are implications on the right to data
protection, when dealing with the processing of data. The fact
that PIAs are rather focusing on data protection issues than
on various aspects of privacy has also been raised by other
scholars (Milaj, 2015; Wright, 2012; Wright and De Hert, 2012).
Because the definition of the right to privacy in the ECHR
is much broader than many of the definitions set by data pro-
tection rules, complementing data protection assessments by
evaluation against Article 8 of the ECHR can provide a very
useful remedy for migrants who are subject to the unpredict-
able privacy implications of systems such as the INS and PROGIS
consoles or the API system. Complementing data protection
assessments with human rights evaluations is much needed,
especially for immigrants, who have a more vulnerable legal
position than regular citizens. These legal tools have the po-
tential to clear migrants who have been falsely accused.
Moreover, they can allow migrants to be regarded being ‘at risk’
(e.g., an asylum seeker can be regarded being ‘at risk’) or simply
not being viewed as posing a threat (e.g., a traveller matching
a risk profile is not necessarily a criminal).
A third issue concerns the potential long-term implica-
tion of false risk profiles on migrants’ lives. Time limits for
retaining data on migrants vary, depending on whether the data
derive from INS consoles (10 years), PROGIS consoles (5 years)
and especially from the API system (retention rules set differ-
ent limitations of 24 hours, a month or a number of years,
depending on the purpose of retention). Although prescrip-
tions concerning the erasure of false data in the new data
protection regulation are strict, it is essential to provide the
data subject with transparency as to how long the false data
are retained and when, where and how such data can be erased,
especially in light of a recent ECJ judgement. The European
Court of Justice (2014) rendered the EU Data Retention Direc-
tive 2006/24/EC invalid and argued that the retention of massive
amounts of commercial communications data and the possi-
bility for law enforcement authorities to access the data
seriously interferes with such fundamental rights as the right
to data protection and the right to privacy of citizens. Al-
though in the case of the INS and PROGIS consoles and the
API system, the amount of data involved is not extensive,
caution shall be taken as the downside of using these tech-
nologies puts not only the privacy, but also the autonomy of
immigrants and travellers under pressure.
For professionals and policy makers to stress the impor-
tance of privacy and autonomy to citizens – in this case to
migrants – and take account of these concepts in their broad,
human rights-oriented sense requires them to reflect upon what
the pitfalls of using these technologies can be. Breaking with
schemes in which virtual data are regularly separated from the
actual person is a prerequisite to developing such a reflective
approach. As the empirical examples have also shown, virtual
data and the actual person are constitutive of each other and
this becomes clear when looking at the implications of these
technologies.
To conclude, the insights gained by this analysis were in-
tended to prompt greater awareness of the new data protection
rules and the potential of the European Convention on Human
Rights for practitioners using such and similar identification
and risk profiling systems internationally as those evaluated
in this article. This analysis advocates the reopening of politi-
cal and public debate within the Netherlands and the EU as
to what degree of false positives during risk assessment prac-
tices and false negatives during identity verification practices
can be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Such
discussion should evaluate whether the price we pay, for in-
stance, for framing immigrants and regular travellers digitally
‘as a risk’ does not lead to the slow erosion of such funda-
mental principles as proportionality, subsidiarity and even such
democratic values held high in Europe as liberty and equality.
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Thesis Chapter VII. 
Prevention strategies, vulnerable positions and risking the ‘identity trap’: 
Digitalized risk assessments and their legal and socio-technical implications on 
children and migrants  
 
Karolina La Fors-Owczynik 
 
Abstract 
At first sight, the prevention of abuse of children, anti-social behaviour of children or migrants’ 
identity fraud or illegal entry are quite different objectives which require different professional 
skills and legislative background. Even the digital technologies introduced to boost the 
prevention of the above problems are quite different. However, this article, aims to show that 
the implications of the design and use of these systems cast quite similar ‘risk shadows’ on both 
children and migrants that can be conceived as an ‘identity trap’ risk. The aim of this article is 
therefore to look for similarities and acquire a better insight into the use and implications of 
digital tools within policy areas that focus on vulnerable groups in our society such as children 
and migrants. A second aim is to explore how the legal framework, in particular the new EU 
data protection regime soon to be formally adopted, can assist actors involved to remedy the 
negative implications on children and migrants’ positions, which stem from the use of 
preventative identity management systems. In addition, the article also pursues possibilities of 
guiding professionals in becoming reflexive about the detrimental implications of digital 
technologies and testing the normative potential of the legal framework regarding the 
vulnerable position of children and migrants. For finding ways in which professionals can 
become more reflexive about the potential negative implications of preventative identity 
management technologies is critical in order to create a context that is much more than merely 
law on the books. 
 








“The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the institutions and 
practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and 
concrete, wires, and transistors, nuts and bolts.”1 
Langdon Winner came up with this provocative statement thirty five years ago. These lines also 
succinctly cover many salient points about the implications of the use of digital technologies today. The 
current use of the so-called preventative identity management technologies2 is illustrative of this, for 
instance, within youth care, law enforcement, border control and immigration. Besides the good-willed 
intentions and protective purposes behind these tools, potential negative implications of these 
technologies on children’s and migrants’ lives are also evident. The objectives and implications of these 
systems differ significantly depending on their specific targeted groups, for example young people or 
migrants. However, at a more general level, important similarities in the implications of using such 
systems can be discerned.  
The aim of this article is first to look for such similarities in order to acquire a better insight into 
the use and implications of digital tools within policy areas that focus on vulnerable groups in our 
society. A second aim is to explore how the legal framework, in particular the new EU General Data 
Protection Regulation3 and the new EU Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive4 soon to 
be formally adopted, can assist actors involved to remedy the negative implications on children and 
migrants’ positions which stem from the use of preventative identity management systems. Also, the 
following analyses aim to determine to what extent differences arise in the position of the individuals 
involved, given youth care is primarily a national policy domain, whereas immigration is addressed at 
EU level. Finally, the article pursues the possibilities of guiding professionals in becoming reflexive 
about the detrimental implications of digital technologies and testing the normative potential of the legal 
framework regarding the vulnerable position of children and migrants. For professionals to improve 
their legal awareness and become more reflexive about the potential negative implications of 
preventative identity management technologies is critical in creating a context that is much more than 
merely law on the books.  
Given these aims, the following sections focus on identity management systems that are used 
for prevention in youth care, law enforcement, immigration and border control. First, the discussion will 
bring the commonalities between the systems used in these domains to the fore and assess the extent to 
which the legal framework properly addresses the implications of risk assessment technologies on the 
lives of children and migrants. The analysis also sheds light on how the combined context of 
technologies, laws, policy areas and issues emerging in professional practices influence and shape the 
ways in which children and migrants are regarded as being ‘at risk’ and increasingly ‘as a risk.’ These 
insights are helpful in assessing what conditions contribute to their vulnerable position and what kind 
of legal remedies could address the vulnerabilities.  
Secondly, the analysis deals with the question of whether the legal framework reinforces or 
mitigates the vulnerable position of the individuals affected by the use of these systems. Subsequently 
the discussion investigates whether differences in the position of both groups emerge as a consequence 
of differing policy ambitions. Challenges within the area of immigration are primarily EU-wide 
concerns, whereas those in youth care are primarily addressed at national level. To research the 
                                                        
1 Winner, L. ‘Do artefacts have politics?’ Daedalus, 109(1) (MIT Press, 1980) 128 
2 Identity management technologies (IDM) discussed in this article are technologies used for the registration and processing 
of personal data within citizen-state relations. 
3 General Data Protection Regulation, (COM)2015 
4 Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive, COM(2012) 10  
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implications of preventative identity management technologies on those subjected to these systems in 
national policy domains, the systems used in The Netherlands are taken as an illustrative example.  
Finally, in order to assess whether the normative potential of the legal framework can provide 
adequate remedy against the vulnerable position of children and migrants, the following analysis 
assesses and conceptualizes the validity of certain data protection and human rights principles. Here, 
insights into how identity management systems affect the lives of children and migrants in day-to-day 
life are used by way of illustration. These insights intend to further establish the need for a legal 
framework which is much more oriented toward the implications of preventative technology use on 
children and migrants and not primarily toward the purpose of such technologies. This also includes a 
final plea in this article for raising awareness and stimulating reflexivity amongst professionals 
regarding the potential side-effects and detrimental implications of using these systems on children and 
migrants and especially regarding the potential of the legal framework to address these effects.    
 
2. Commonalities between migrants and children: identity management to ease 
their vulnerable positions?  
The key reasons for the vulnerable position of children and migrants can be viewed in the dynamic 
changes their lives go through from being ‘at the peripheries of citizenship’ toward becoming full-
fledged citizens. These changes involve their increase in knowledge, the phases in which they gain 
more legal entitlements, claiming a position within society and being no longer dependent on the 
aid, assistance as well as formal intervention of others. For instance, after passing a certain legal 
age limit, children can earn entitlements to vote, drive or use other services that adult citizens are 
already entitled to use. Migrants can become entitled to hold a residence permit in a host country 
only after passing exams and administrative immigration checks. Putting this in-between position 
of these groups against a background of a substantial reliance on digital risk evaluation procedures 
by governments is illustrative of a certain multifaceted concept of ‘security.’ This is characterized 
by the diverse modes within which both children and migrants are increasingly considered, 
identified and framed being either ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk’ in The Netherlands5 The connection 
between being ‘at risk’ and being perceived ‘as a risk’ constitutes a conceptual symmetry between 
these groups in the research that provides the foundation for this paper. The following two sections 
specify some forms of how this symmetry plays out through the ways in which risks are increasingly 
digitally mediated in relation to these groups. In this paper the notion of mediation is conceptualized 
as something encompassing technologies, laws, policies, professional practices and specifically 
both the rather purpose-oriented6 perception of data protection rules as well as the more implication-
oriented perception of human rights perspectives on modes of personal data processing. The notion 
of mediation allows better framing of how human rights perspectives can enrich data protection 
assessments regarding the technologies in question in this paper. 
                                                        
5 La Fors-Owczynik, K., & Valkenburg, G. (2015). Risk identities: constructing actionable problems in Dutch youth. In I. 
Van der Ploeg & J. Pridmore (Eds.), Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World. New York: Routledge. 
La Fors-Owczynik, K., & Van der Ploeg, I. (2015). Migrants at/as risk: Identity verification and risk assessment technologies 
in The Netherlands. In I. Van der Ploeg & J. Pridmore (Eds.), Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World. 
Routledge. 
6 The new data protection regime incorporates a handful of new principles that go beyond purpose-oriented data protection, 
such as privacy by design, privacy by default, data minimization. Yet, an era of Big Data and arising necessities for 
digitalized prevention in more and more policy areas to some extent undermine the practical enforcement of these more 
‘technological implication-oriented’ principles.  
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2.1. Securing children, securing citizens: Digitalized risk evaluations in 
youth care 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the situation in The Netherlands will be used by way of example in 
this article. An initial relevant observation here is that the Dutch policy domain of youth care 
increasingly shapes and is shaped by public safety. This inter-relationship has become technically 
enabled by recently introduced systems to secure children in the first place and indirectly also to secure 
citizens. A series of dramatic cases, e.g. the tragic death of Savanna,7 stirred particular interest in 
concerns about children being ‘at risk.’ In this case, youth healthcare workers and other agencies 
involved with the 3 year old girl were blamed for not having shared data on the child adequately, and if 
they had done so the fatality could have been prevented. Not only this dramatic event, but also various 
other examples of child abuse and anti-social behaviour towards children were translated in the political 
debate that followed into problems of information-sharing, for the prevention of which digital 
information sharing systems were seen as important facilitators.  
The first of these systems is the Digital Youth Healthcare Registry (hereinafter, DYHR). DYHR 
is an information management system for the registration and processing of children’s data within the 
youth healthcare sector. The second system, the so-called Reference Index High Risk Youth (hereinafter, 
RI), is a risk-profiling, public safety system connected to a large variety of Dutch youth care institutions 
that is introduced for evaluating risks against youths. The third system is a preventative system of the 
Dutch police, called ProKid 12- SI (hereinafter, ProKid), which is aimed at scoring children and their 
direct living environment against a set of risk categories. The established connections and overlapping 
concerns between policy domains of youth healthcare, youth care and public safety are visible in the 
convergence of these three initiatives. Through the combined use of the DYHR, the RI and ProKid, risks 
are projected for all children nationwide, and these children become understood in light of these risks. 
There is an overlap in function between the DYHR and the RI. In the RI, risk signals are sent in from 
other, linked technological registration systems youth care institutions. The DYHR’s section of risk 
registration is connected to the RI and upon registration, risk signals are automatically sent from the 
DYHR to the RI. Information based on ProKid risk signaling by the police is shared manually with 
youth care workers. The three means of technology-based intervention and the means for mediation 
within the processes of prevention are graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
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On the far left of Figure 1, the threats children face or the threats that children may cause are 
intertwined with what it means to be ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk.’ These are intimately connected with extensive 
media attention, specifically in relation to child abuse cases and instances of criminal activity performed 
by children. As the Figure demonstrates, children are largely considered being ‘at risk’ because they are 
seen as vulnerable to persons who may have hostile intentions towards them. To a lesser extent children 
are also perceived ‘as a risk’ based on their potential involvement in criminal activities, drug use, 
bullying or dropping out of school. The section on mediation demonstrates the means by which the 
government agencies and other organizations engage with prevention practices in The Netherlands. The 
mediation involves, for instance, personal data gathering on threats; and data analysis by youth 
healthcare, care and police professionals using the DYHR, the RI or ProKid. The manner in which 
certain problems are framed is significant for children’s lives, since these problems become referential 
to the type of intervention process that will be imposed on them. The extent to which the notions of 
being ‘at risk’ and ‘as a risk’ are interrelated within the digital arrangements of the DYHR, the RI and 
ProKid have been demonstrated in earlier work8. Furthermore, in the abovementioned work the ways in 
which ‘risks’ - in various forms of negative implications on children’s lives - can emerge from 
digitalized mechanisms of prevention have also been shown. The extent to which the current as well as 
upcoming personal data and fundamental children’s rights instruments can provide adequate normative 
protection from the pitfalls of digitalized risk assessment by the DYHR, the RI and ProKid have also 
been analysed earlier9. Pitfalls demonstrated in this analysis involve, first, that the same colour-code is 
used for victims, witnesses and perpetrators which thus blurs boundaries between these categories in 
                                                        
8 La Fors-Owczynik, K., & Valkenburg, G. (2015). Risk identities: constructing actionable problems in Dutch youth. In I. 
Van der Ploeg & J. Pridmore (Eds.), Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World. New York: Routledge. 
9 Ibid, and K. La Fors-Owczynik ‘Profiling anomalies and the anomalies of profiling: Digitalized risk assessments on Dutch 
youth and the new European data protection regime’ In R. Leenes, N. Purtova, & S. Adams (Eds.), Under Observation: The 
Interplay between eHealth and surveillance. (Springer Netherlands, 2016, forthcoming). 
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ProKid10. Secondly, relations between children their relatives, friends and animals are rendered available 
for risk evaluation in ProKid, meaning that not only the privacy of individual children is at stake, but 
also all others related to them. Thirdly, inherent in the modus operandi of the DYHR is that ‘good deeds’ 
and positive developments are not registered and thus not used in the analyses. The system merely 
focuses on risks concerning children. Moreover, potential negative effects on children’s lives also 
emerge from the obscurity of the decision making process by professionals with respect to what can lead 
up to a ‘simple’ digital flag and to the difficulty for professionals in deciding whether or not to register 
issues under the banner of risk11. Fourthly, insights into the practices using the DYHR, the RI and ProKid 
have also shown that the ease by which information can be shared among professionals by the help of 
these systems results in extremely lengthy and labour-intensive procedures to deal with incorrect data 
on risks, which can consequently have long-term stigmatizing effects. 
2.2. Securing Citizens, Securing Migrants: Identification and risk 
profiling of migrants12 
 
The current political discourse within The Netherlands and the EU concerning migration, and the 
unprecedented flow of migrants in particular, shows both positivism and willingness to help the crowds 
of immigrants fleeing injustice, but also confusion. In a recent report of Human Rights Watch13 on the 
developments concerning immigration to Europe in the previous year it has even been pointed out that: 
“The politics of fear led governments around the globe to roll back human rights during 2015.” Beyond 
these large, very important political and democracy affecting questions, the digital identification and 
risk profiling practices present less visible issues that can have detrimental implications on migrants’ 
lives as well as on the force of fundamental rights in a democratic society such as The Netherlands.  
When we look at the daily work involved in digital identification, verification and risk evaluation 
systems, we see that extensive standards embedded in digital systems in professional practice allow for 
spotting deviance among migrants earlier than among citizens who do not have to submit themselves to 
evaluation by these technologies. Threats such as identity fraud, illegal migration and related crime 
constitute problems for which digital identity management technologies are presented as the best 
answers. Consequently these threats are ‘translated’14 into digital forms of information-sharing15.  
Three technologies have been analysed in earlier research16. The first is the relatively recently 
introduced biometric identification system for immigrants, called the INS console within the Dutch 
immigration and border control sector. The second is the biometric identification system for suspects, 
criminals and (deceased) victims, called the PROGIS console within the Dutch law enforcement sector. 
The third system is the Advanced Passenger Information (hereinafter, API) system operated at Schiphol 
Airport by border control and immigration agencies in order to improve the sorting out of dangerous 
travellers by profiling them against a set of risk categories (API risk profiles).  
                                                        
10 La Fors-Owczynik, K. ‘Minor protection or major injustice? Children’s rights and digital preventions directed at youth in 
the Dutch justice system’ (2015) 31(5) Computer Law and Security Review, 651. 
11  Ibid. 
12 By the term migrants in this article, I refer both to immigrants and regular travellers who cross over the Dutch border or 
pass a check-point for Dutch immigration or law enforcement. 
13 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 (New York, 2016) 
14 Latour, B., Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. (1st edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1987)  
15 Ibid footnote 9. and 
La Fors-Owczynik, K. ‘Monitoring Migrants or Making Migrants “Misfit”? Data protoction and human rights perspectives 
on Dutch identity management practices regarding migrants’ (2016) Computer Law and Security Review, 
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2016.01.010 
16 Ibid. and see also references in footnote 4. 
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Upon entry into the EU, a first priority is to establish the status of immigrants (e.g. distinguishing asylum 
seekers from legal immigrants). This is done by means of the aforementioned systems by projecting 
risks of identity fraud and illegal migration on all immigrants within the context of the INS console. 
Within the context of the API system this is done by projecting these risks on all travellers passing 
through API check-points. The relationships between migrants being considered ‘as a risk’ and ‘at risk’ 
for the three IDM technologies and other means for mediation within the processes of prevention are 
graphically depicted below in Figure 2. 
PROGIS console




























On the far right of Figure 2, the threats faced by migrants or the threats that migrants are perceived to 
constitute, continuously shape and are shaped by what it means to be ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk.’ The 
perception of who is regarded ‘as a risk’ is influenced by political intervention such as the recent 
comments by the EU Vice-President about 60% of all immigrants to the EU from last year having been 
economic migrants who need to be returned17. Furthermore, extensive media attention and the political 
rhetoric specifically in relation to terrorism and instances of criminal activity, such as the instances of 
assault against women in Cologne on New Year’s Eve18 also shape immigration policies throughout 
Europe. Yet, as Philip Zimbardo argues19, the fear that terrorist attacks evoke conveys the message that 
all citizens in the threatened societies are vulnerable. As a reaction to these negative emotions, enemies 
have to be identified, rendered visible and even named. As Zimbardo infers, this can often lead to 
prejudice towards groups of society, including migrants20 (the abovementioned Cologne attacks also 
exemplify this). Media information about the fact that, for instance, two immigrants who were involved 
in the attacks in Paris in November had been registered earlier as asylum seekers in Greece21  lead to 
                                                        
17 Euractiv.nl, European Commission: Schengen suspension could be extended, 60% of migrants should be sent back. (2016). 
Retrieved on 22 of January 2016 from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/commission-schengen-suspension-
could-be-extended-60-migrants-should-be-sent 
18 Connolly, K. (2016). ‘Cologne inquiry into “coordinated” New Year’s Eve sex attacks’The Guardian. (London, January 
5th, 2016)  
19 Zimbardo, P. G. ‘The Political Psychology of Terrorist Alarms’ (2003), 1–7, available online: 
<http://zimbardo.com/downloads/2002%20Political%20Psychology%20of%20Terrorist%20Alarms.pdf>  
20 Ibid. 




reassuring Dutch media news with respect to having detected no signs of terrorism amongst asylum 
seekers to The Netherlands22. As Figure 2 depicts, evidence of certain migrants having been involved in 
terrorism allows for a picture that migrants can constitute a risk. Political rhetoric stresses that asylum 
seekers are indeed persons who need shelter because they are ‘at risk’ in their home country. The latter 
view of migrants is based on their vulnerability to human trafficking, exploitation of labour, integration 
problems, isolation, their limited financial resources and other conditions. Yet, in practice, identification 
and identity verification methods are strengthened and digital technologies only gain prominence in 
facilitating this23. The extent to which certain automatically enabled processes contribute to the 
construction of new risks, such as the false accusation of certain immigrants, has been demonstrated in 
earlier work24. This analysis demonstrated that the consequences of (too) sensitive biometric screening 
technologies and too wide variables for building a risk profile in the Advanced Passenger Information 
systems allow for false accusations of migrants. Furthermore, research based on empirical details 
assessed the data protection and human rights implications of the design and daily use of the INS and 
PROGIS consoles and the risk profiling system of API at Schiphol airport25. The analysis showed that 
the current legal framework is failing, and the proposed new data protection framework, although having 
greater potential, would also fall short of providing sufficient normative protection for migrants from 
the downsides of monitoring by these systems. Unintended implications of the use of these systems 
often contribute to frame migrants as ‘misfits’ in society even though they do not pose a risk or in more 
severe cases they would need the opposite: assistance and protection because they are ‘at risk’ of 
violence. False accusations of identity fraud can emerge as a consequence of mismatching fingerprints 
on the biometric reader of the INS and PROGIS consoles, and false perceptions of illegal migration can 
emerge because certain characteristics of a(n innocent) traveller match an API risk profile26. 
2.3. Interim conclusion 
 
The previous two sections have shown that technologies as means by which government agencies 
engage in prevention practices, on the one hand frame children and migrants through the lens of 
constituting ‘a risk,’ and on the other hand, this framing can reinforce the vulnerability of both of these 
groups and can even put them into vulnerable positions. This constitutes a commonality between 
children and migrants that requires critical assessment. If the negative implications of using these 
technologies on the lives of these groups reinforces their vulnerable position then that can also frame a 
(less democratic) image of the society where the use of such technologies is seen as being ‘fair,’ 
‘acceptable’ and ‘necessary.’  Furthermore, the previous two sections also demonstrated that 
commonalities between children and immigrants emerge not only based on their vulnerable position or 
potentially endangering attitude towards others. Such extremes could certainly also characterize regular 
citizens. But, it is far more their in-between status of becoming a full-fledged citizen but not yet being 
one legally that brings their first important commonality to the fore. For instance, a child whose digital 
record shows a risk of domestic abuse (in which the involvement of parents or guardians is implicit) and 
therefore he/she cannot rely on legal aid by his/her parents or guardians, or for instance an unenrolled 
asylum seeker who is practically without a status up until the token of his/her legality, a resident permit 
                                                        
22 Nos.nl, ‘Medewerkers asielzoekerscentra kunnen terrorisme herkennen’. (2015). Retrieved on 12th December 2015 from 
http://nos.nl/artikel/2059507-medewerkers-asielzoekerscentra-kunnen-terrorisme-herkennen.html 
23 EUObserver, Tusk: “Wave of migrants too big not to to be stopped.” (2015). Retrieved on 2nd February 2016 from 
https://euobserver.com/migration/131363 
24 See footnote 4 and 14. 
25 La Fors-Owczynik, K. ‘Monitoring Migrants or Making Migrants “Misfit”? Data protoction and human rights perspectives 





would have been issued, for these persons creates a vulnerable position in themselves. (To this position 
I refer later on in this section as an ‘accountability vacuum.’)  
A second commonality is that both children and migrants are exposed to a broad variety of 
digital risk evaluation. Earlier research about children and digital risk assessment within youth care 
demonstrated that, despite the noble intentions behind digital systems, the digitalized risk categories use 
in these systems tend to reify risks27. The lengthier and more comprehensive the screening by digital 
risk categories and the quicker the ‘risk’ information exchange on a person, the higher the likelihood 
that the identity of a person - in our case of a child or migrant - becomes ‘trapped’ in a potential ‘tunnel 
vision of risk’ or a certain ‘risk identity’ provided by these assessments. Furthermore, the correction of 
false information is extremely lengthy and labor-intensive. 
The fact that both children and migrants - although to differing degrees - are increasingly 
considered and identified being either ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk’ in The Netherlands28, from a legal 
perspective leads to a third commonality: they both need support to be held accountable for their 
deeds. Full-fledged citizens do not need that. Under the age of 18, children can be held accountable 
for their deeds only via their parents or guardians, and under the age of 12, children cannot be 
prosecuted according to Dutch law. Yet, given events of domestic violence or child abuse, all 
parents registered in ProKid, for instance, are also digitally codified and checked against standard 
risk categories for constituting potential threats to children. This has been demonstrated earlier 
through examples of the RI and ProKid. This digitally codified change in assessing all parents or 
guardians in practice as a potential actor with a negative influence on the development of children 
can also weaken the position of children themselves. By framing a parent or guardian as a potential 
threat to children results in a situation where children have no direct (legal) support in enhancing 
their accountability and to some extent also their rights. This is especially worrying when it comes 
to traumatized child victims. More or less the same applies to immigrants. They are also, in 
particular before and during the process of receiving their residence permit, in a weak position as a 
consequence of their status. Migrants have less legal support in terms of being accountable for their 
deeds and more importantly for the suspected deeds authorities of receiving states can confront 
them with, as compared to local citizens. This can be thought of as an ‘accountability vacuum’ 
regarding children and migrants. In practice, through the use of digital risk assessment systems, 
both groups are held more accountable for their deeds, for their potential deeds and often even for 
the deeds of their relatives, friends or traveling companions by government authorities, than regular 
citizens who are not subjected to such systems. This clearly constitutes a pressure. Stemming from 
this pressure, another commonality can be defined between the two categories. This commonality 
is that - because of their in-between position – those children and migrants in particular who are 
exposed to digital risk assessments have insufficient mechanisms to shape their position within 
society and often cannot stand up for their rights. From a legal perspective they are either dependent 
on their parents, or on an assigned lawyer in order to effectuate their rights. Hence, paradoxically 
this lack of practical autonomy in standing up for their rights renders them vulnerable and 
consequently more exposed and often regarded as being prone to ‘problems’ such as anti-social or 
delinquent behaviour, identity fraud or illegal entry.   
Therefore, given the example of Dutch residence permits, they are currently established by 
highly sensitive biometric readers through the help of the mentioned INS consoles. The sensitive 
features in these consoles are than deemed to substantially increase trust with respect to the claimed 
                                                        
27 La Fors-Owczynik, K., & Valkenburg, G. (2015). Risk identities: constructing actionable problems in Dutch youth. In I. 
Van der Ploeg & J. Pridmore (Eds.), Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World. New York: Routledge. 
28 See footnote 4. 
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identity of a person. The digitalized path for identification, including risk assessment against 
potential identity fraud, can in practice further jeopardize the legal position of immigrants in a 
hosting country. Because on the one hand, any mismatching of fingerprints frames disbelief in the 
claimed identity of an immigrant and on the other hand this also prompts a request for explanation 
and proof of their identity claim. Given that full-fledged citizens are not exposed to such practices 
and consequently do not end up in a position where they have to prove their identity, or worse, their 
innocence, both children29  and migrants exposed to false accusations by these risk assessment 
systems can experience discrimination. Furthermore, detrimental implications can be what Schermer 
calls issues of “de-individualisation”30, in other words that an individual who is accused of being a 
member of a certain group can personally suffer from the negative implications of the risk profile of the 
whole group. In a recent report to the Dutch government, researchers from the University 
Amsterdam warned about creating day-to-day situations in society, where some persons might feel 
they are treated unfairly or discriminated against, because this can trigger radical reactions31. 
Radical reactions are often coupled with a lack of belief in such basic democratic principles as 
liberty and equality and can undermine openness, mutual respect and the importance of and need 
for diversity in society. Therefore, to redress these principles and values by diminishing the 
vulnerable position that children and migrants can experience as a consequence of the pitfalls of 
identification and risk assessment practices is pivotal. In line with this, the next section looks into 
certain data protection and human rights principles and scenarios as potential counter measures 
against such vulnerability.  
3. Data protection and human rights principles as counter measures against the 
vulnerability of children and migrants 
 
The vulnerable position of children and migrants is often reinforced by the fact that these technologies 
are designed and used with a somewhat purpose-oriented stance and not with one that is primarily 
concerned with the implications of using these systems on the lives of those persons subjected to them. 
Given the pace of current technological developments (e.g. the rise of Big Data and Open Data) this is 
problematic in itself.  
Preventative technologies or security enhancing technologies always have legitimate purposes 
in a democratic society, in other words if they infringe upon the right to privacy, that infringement is 
legitimized by law32. Despite this question of legitimacy, the design and introduction of such 
technologies in the majority of cases is never accompanied by a democratic legitimization process, such 
as the processes accompanying legislation. A legitimization process would optimally include an 
                                                        
29 Bruning, M. R. et al.. Kinderrechtenmonitor 2012 - Adviezen aan de Kinderombudsman (2012) (De Kinderombudsman, 
Den Haag) 
30 Schermer, B. W. ‘The limits of privacy in automated profiling and data mining’ Computer Law and Security Review, 
(2011) 27(1), 45 
31 Feedes, A. R., Nicholson, L., & Doosje, B. Triggerfactoren in het radicaliseeringsproces. (2015) (Expertise-unit Sociale 
Stabiliteit, Amsterdam University, Amsterdam) 
32 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation. (Commission of the European Union, 
2013) 
Bellanova, R., & De Hert, P. ‘Le cas S. et Marper et les données personnelles : l’horloge de la stigmatisation stoppée par un 
arrêt européen’. (2009) 4(76) Cultures & Conflits, 101; Handbook on European data protection law. (Publication Office of 
the European Union, Luxembourg, 2014); Prins, J. E. J. ‘Digital Diversity : Protecting Identities Instead of Individual Data’ 
In L. Mommers & A. Schmidt (Eds.), Het binnenste buiten: Liber amicorum ter gelegenheid van het emeritaat van prof. dr. 
Aernout Schmidt. (eLaw Leiden, 2010) 
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evaluation of potential side-effects. On the other hand, the policies33 and laws serving to legitimize these 
systems are also somewhat purpose-oriented. One of the main principles of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC), the ‘purpose limitation’ principle, also exemplifies this. This principle remains prominent 
in the new General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter, GDPR). The text of the new GDPR had 
already been finalized in December 2015. In this section, I focus on the normative potential of the 
GDPR, more specifically on some of its most essential principles, such as the purpose limitation 
principle. Furthermore, I explore the validity of human rights principles that are relevant from the 
perspective of both the purposes and the implications of technologies. I investigate these legal 
instruments regarding whether they can provide sufficient counter measures to remedy the vulnerable 
position of these two groups or whether they reify their vulnerable position.  
This is essential because governments, including in The Netherlands, are empowered by their 
citizens to maintain security, yet in their monopolistic positions government authorities often miss out 
on adequately redressing the downsides of preventative security measures.  Even though the error rates 
of identification and risk assessment technologies on children – e.g. false alarms rates of child abuse34- 
and on migrants – e.g. false positives and false negatives35 - are relatively high, counter measures to 
compensate those persons exposed to the negative implications of these systems are still scarce.  
3.1. Purpose versus Implication? 
 
3.1.1. The right to data protection and the right to privacy 
 
By directing attention towards the vulnerability of children and migrants and the implications of 
preventative risk assessment systems on this vulnerability, the debate related to values of privacy versus 
security requires addressing. When doing so, particular attention will be given to two perspectives that 
are geared toward how legal prescriptions related to identity management technologies shall be 
enforced: either by focusing on the purpose(s) of technology or on the implication(s) of it.  
The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (hereinafter, Convention 108) of the European Union as a pioneer legal instrument paved 
the way for implementing the protection of personal data in different legal frameworks and mechanisms 
in the EU. Through the introduction of Directive 95/46/EC, the right to data protection became 
implemented into secondary law within the EU. Later on, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced data 
protection also into the EU’s primary law by its Article 286. The Treaty of Lisbon (hereinafter, TFEU) 
also brought significant changes regarding data protection in the EU. It abolished the three pillar 
structure of the EU by which the direct relevance of EU legislation for national laws of member states 
became codified. Since then, Article 16 of the TFEU introduced the right to data protection as a 
fundamental right that also became a direct influence on national legislation. With the introduction of 
the TFEU, the right to data protection has also been strengthened because the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union came also into force, Article 8 of which codified the right to data 
protection as a fundamental right. On the road to establish data protection as a fundamental right of 
everyone in Europe, Directive 95/46/EC has been of great influence. To improve the enforcement of 
this right and also the right to privacy, among other things, the new data protection regime provides an 
up-dated, technology-informed set of new legal tools and measures. 
                                                        
33 Identiteitsvaststelling in de strafrechtsketen: Wet en Protocol (2010). Ministerie van Justitie. 
34 Pronk, I. ‘Het gezin is helemaal weg.’ (2010) Trouw, Retrieved on 22nd January 2016 from 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1583323/2010/02/09/Het-gezin-is-helemaal-weg.dhtml 
35 Hoogstrate, A. J., & Veenman, C. J. Informatiegestuurde grenscontrole Verkenning ten behoeve van het gebruik van 
selectieprofielen in het kader van grensbeheer (2012) (Nederlands Forensich Instituut, Den Haag) 
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The right to privacy and data protection are two separate fundamental rights (Article 8 of the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union), as the European Court of Justice also 
clarified in the case of Osterreichischer Rundfunk36 by inferring that “data processing does not by 
definition fall within the scope of private life of Article 8 of ECHR.” Privacy and data protection are, 
however, intertwined concepts especially if we look at the implications of monitoring technologies on 
citizens’ lives. To remedy the often detrimental implications of such digital practices and to foster the 
enforcement of both the right to privacy and the right to data protection, the potential of data protection 
legislation should not be underestimated. Therefore, the next section explores whether a focus on the 
purpose of technology from a data protection perspective can strengthen the legal position of children 
and migrants exposed to preventative digital monitoring.  
3.1.2. The purpose limitation principle and security 
 
Purpose limitation 
One of the cornerstones of the Data Protection Directive and also of the new Data Protection 
Regulation is the principle of purpose limitation. Given that the legal framework was initially meant to 
allow for the free flow of personal data and secondly meant to protect individual citizens37, the purpose 
limitation principle has remained an “essential first step in applying data protection laws and designing 
data protection safeguards for any processing operation” ever since.38 This had in particular been the 
case during the most recent, comprehensive data protection reforms. The purpose limitation principle is 
also a crucial pre-requisite for other principles such as transparency, fairness, lawfulness or legitimacy 
in data processing, therefore its effective enforcement is pivotal. Yet, criticism arose concerning 
loopholes in the new regulation39 (De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2012; Gonzalez Fuster, 2014). For 
instance, with respect to the purpose limitation principle, Ferretti criticized the new regulation for 
allowing data controllers far greater potential for justifying data processing than the earlier rules. Article 
7(f) GDPR states that “processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or a third party.” Yet Ferretti argues that the “current provision should be narrowly interpreted 
in light of the case law of the Court of Justice, so as to give effect to the Charter which provides that 
any limitation of the rights it contains must be provided for by law”40. This criticism is especially relevant 
when it comes to preventative data aggregation regarding children within areas of youth care, law 
enforcement and regarding migrants within immigration and border control practices. The Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party (hereinafter, WP) shared its concerns in relation to the future of the 
purpose limitation principle, especially at a time where the growing use of Big Data - including its use 
by government authorities - seems unstoppable. The WP expressed its concerns about the unfolding 
trend within which “the elasticity of purposes for which personal data are being collected” and the 
eagerness for “data maximization” provide significant risks both to the private life of citizens and the 
enforcement of data protection rules41. Nissenbaum even argues for the abolishment of ‘old’ data 
                                                        
36 Joined cases C-465/00, C-139 & 139/01, Osterreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989. 
37 Hijmans, H. The European Union as a Constitutional Guardian of Internet Privacy and Data Protection : the Story of 
Article What the European Union does and should do to make Article 16. (2016) (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, Free 
University of Brussels) 
38 The introduction of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) also fostered this principle as it had set out that the processing of 
data should be “strictly proportionate” and “necessary in a democratic society.”  
39 De Hert, P., & Papakonstantinou, V. ‘The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound 
system for the protection of individuals’ (2012) 28(2) Computer Law & Security Review, 130; Gonzalez Fuster, G. The 
Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (Springer International Publishing, 2014) 
40 Ferretti, F. ‘Data protection and the legitimate interests of data controllers: Much ado about nothing or a winter of rights?’ 
(2014) 51(3) Common Market Law Review, 843  




protection principles such as the purpose limitation principle42. She advocates data protection measures 
that would assess the contextual implications of digital technology use in relation to how technology 
use can reshape the context. For instance, how technology use can rearrange social norms that had earlier 
been regarded as part of the mutual respect for those sharing the relationship. Nissenbaum gives the 
example of information shared between a doctor and a patient being sold to a commercial company 
being a severe infringement of (the norms underlying the concept of) privacy in that context43. Aside 
from the legal challenges of attempting to frame and interpret privacy and data protection through 
contexts, the principle of purpose limitation will remain part of the current data protection regulation. 
Hildebrandt and De Vries argue however, that the purpose limitation principle, even in its new form in 
the regulation, has to be to give redress, for instance in the anticipated growth in function creep44 cases 
in part stemming from the increase in use of Big Data and Open Data45. Moerel and Prins also advocate 
a reformative perspective on the purpose limitation principle. They argue that “this principle is still 
relevant, but […] it should be tied in with the interest served rather than with the original purpose for 
data collection”46. In this way they argue that a ‘legitimate interest test’ would much better suit how 
data should be processed in the age of Big Data rather than purely testing whether data has been collected 
and processed according to the pre-defined purpose(s): “The time has come to recognise the legitimate 
interest ground as the main legal ground for each and every phase of the data lifecycle”47(Moerel & 
Prins, 2015).  
 However, the new data protection regulation with its broadened scope specifies that data 
processing shall be lawful and legitimate and consequently limits the purpose of data processing. For 
instance, via Article 23 it prescribes new principles that are also relevant for limiting the purpose of data 
processing. The principles of privacy by design and by default inscribe the de facto protection of a 
person’s privacy into a fundamental pre-requisite of any data processing. Yet, Koops and Leenes 
critically point out the downsides of taking a strict ‘code’ view of these concepts. They argue for a 
perspective on ‘privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default’ that much rather takes the form of 
‘communication strategies’ than the form of strict ‘codes’48. These would strengthen and also reform 
the purpose limitation principle and all in all achieve improved protection of personal data and privacy. 
Security 
Security as a goal and a value often presents a strong means of legitimization when it comes to violating 
the purpose limitation principle and the right to data protection and indirectly the right to privacy in 
general. This trade-off model is still the formula for balancing between these values. The fact that 
privacy is often framed as a trade-off against security can be traced back to the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe 
(also called Convention 108). The first legal instrument to protect individuals against the detrimental 
effects of data processing, this stated that “restrictions on the rights laid down in the Convention are 
only possible when overriding interests (e.g. state security, defence, etc.) are at stake.” In legal 
scholarship, this trade-off between privacy and security is further reinforced: “restrictions on privacy 
                                                        
42 Nissenbaum, H. ‘Privacy as contextual integrity’ (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 119 
43 Ibid. 
44 Function creep: when data gathered for one specific purpose is also used for other purposes not indicated originally. 
45 Hildebrandt, M., & De Vries, K. (Eds.). Privacy, due process and the Computational Turn: the Philosophy of Law meets 
the Philosphy of Technology. (1st edn, Routledge, 2013) 
46 Moerel, L., & Prins, C. ‘On the death of purpose limitation’ Privacy Perspectives Where the Real Conversation in Privacy 
Happens (2, June, 2015)  
47 Ibid. 
48 Koops, B.-J., & Leenes, R. ‘Privacy regulation cannot be hardcoded. A critical comment on the “privacy by design” 
provision in data-protection law’ (2014) 28(2) International Review of Law, Computer and Technology, 159 
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must be accepted provided this serves the purpose of security”49. However, citizens also desire security 
and expect that state authorities will protect them from threats. According to surveys, citizens are willing 
to give up their privacy and subject themselves to scrutinizing surveillance modes, such as security 
checks at airports or CCTV cameras in different public spaces, in order to increase their security. Despite 
the legal framework, notions of security are not by definition in opposition to notions of privacy. The 
fact that private interests can often equate to security interests is also demonstrated by ECtHR case law.50  
Yet, scandals of breaches of privacy rights (such as issues related to the revelation of Snowden and the 
NSA) shake up any balance between privacy and security and tend to undermine citizens’ trust. As 
Hijmans and Kranenborg state: “the restoration of this trust is the most pressing challenge”51. A crucial 
element of difficulty in restoring this trust is what Koops points out concerning the new data protection 
regulation as “the fact that people have little over how their digital personae and data shadows are being 
treated”52. To tackle this challenge, a handful of cases that condemned signatory states of the European 
Convention on Human Rights for having breached the fundamental right to privacy of citizens are 
pivotal in attempting to restore such trust.53 Such body of case law is also essential to complement and 
strengthen data protection regulations54.   
Yet, the vast amount of data that can be made available for algorithmic purposes presents new 
challenges and also shifts the perspective of a trade-off model between security and privacy to unknown 
territory. Scholars from different disciplines have criticized and pointed out the pitfalls of this 
opposition55. For instance, Solove argues that the ‘zero-sum’ game type of policy and legal stance taken 
regarding security and privacy forces a choice between these values and he furthermore asserts that 
“protecting privacy is not fatal to security measures”56. Furthermore, Valkenburg, from empirical details 
on body scanner use, shows that the purpose of security is in practice often achieved by a far more 
comprehensive infringement of the right to privacy of a traveller than anticipated within the processes 
legitimizing the purpose and use of these technologies57. Besides the more severe implications on the 
right to privacy in order to achieve the purpose of security, as Boyle and Haggerty assert, in practice 
these technologies are far from being silver bullets. They argue that many security officials believe that 
the potential for “zero risk is unattainable” given the vulnerabilities of security itself. This is also 
                                                        
49 Hijmans, H., & Scirocco, A. ‘Shortcomings in EU data protection in the third and the second pillars. Can the lisbon treaty 
be expected to help?’ (2009) 45(6) Common Market Law Review, 1485 
50 ECtHR Klass v. Germany, No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978; ECtHR Malone v. United Kingdom, No. 8691/79, 2 August 
1984; ECtHR Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81, 26 March 1987, ECtHR; Gaskin v. United Kingdom, No. 10454/83, 7 July 
1989.  
51 Hijmans, H., & Kranenborg, H. (Eds.). Data Protection anno 2014: How to Restore Trust? Contribution in honour of Peter 
Hustinx, European Data Protection Supervisor. (1st edn, Intersentia, 2014). 
52 Koops, B. ‘On decision transparency, or how to enhance data protection after the computational turn’. In M. Hildebrandt & 
K. De Vries (Eds.), Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 
53 ECtHR Niemietz v. Germany, No. 13710/88, 16 December 1992; ECtHR Halford v. United Kingdom, No. 20605/92, 25 
June 1997; ECtHR Amann v. Switzerland, No. 27798/95, 16 February 2000; ECtHR Rotaru v. Romania, No. 28341/95, 4 
May 2000; ECtHR Soro v. Estonia, No. 22588/08, 16 September 2015.   
54 Hustinx, P. J.’EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation’ Collected Courses of the European University Institute’s Academy of European Law, 24(January 2013), 1, 
Retrieved on the 22nd of January from 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Publications/SpeechArticle/SA2014 
55 Costa, L., & Poullet, Y. ‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012.’ (2012) 28(3) Computer Law & Security Review, 251; Milaj, 
J. ‘Privacy, surveillance, and the proportionality principle: The need for a method of assessing privacy implications of 
technologies used for surveillance.’ (2015) 8(69) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 1; Mironenko, O. 
Body scanners versus privacy and data protection. (2011) 27(3) Computer Law and Security Review, 232; Nissenbaum, H. 
‘Privacy as contextual integrity’ (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 119; Prins, J. E. J. Digital Diversity : Protecting 
Identities Instead of Individual Data. In L. Mommers & A. Schmidt (Eds.), Het binnenste buiten: Liber amicorum ter 
gelegenheid van het emeritaat van prof. dr. Aernout Schmidt. (eLaw, Leiden, 2010); Schermer, B. W. ‘The limits of privacy 
in automated profiling and data mining’ (2011).27(1) Computer Law and Security Review, 45 
56 Solove, D. J. Nothing to hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security. (Yale University Press, 2011). 
57 Valkenburg, G. ‘Privacy Versus Security: Problems and Possibilities of the Trade-Off Model’ In. Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R.; 
De Hert, P. (Eds.) Reforming European Data Protection Law (Springer Science, 2015) 
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reflected by the fact that “security risks proliferate and exceed the capacity for officials to fully manage 
or even identify [persons]”58 , and ultimately it “becomes a pressing challenge to maintain the 
appearance of absolute security”59.  
In light of the recent terrorist attacks and humanitarian crisis, answering the classical question of 
‘How much privacy shall be given up to gain how much security?’ seems even more ill-judged than ever 
before. Mostly, because whereas surveillance methods geared toward forecasting and acting against 
‘particular types of individuals’60 - also common in practice in Dutch youth care, law enforcement, 
immigration and border control - are advancing rapidly, there is little assessment of the actual outcome 
of these security practices. Ex ante assessment could put the trade-off model under critical scrutiny by 
asking, for instance, whether it was worth giving up ‘that much’ privacy for gaining ‘that much’ security. 
For instance, the data protection impact assessment requirement set out by Article 33 of the new GDPR 
could be inspirational. It demonstrates not only a stronger orientation towards exploring the implications 
of technology use on values such as privacy, but it does not frame this as being in opposition to security. 
Although conducting data processing for preventative or security purposes falls under the scope of the 
2008 Police and Criminal Justice Directive and therefore Article 33 of GDPR is not applicable, this 
Article could still be inspirational for public authorities in processing citizens’ data to evaluate the 
impact of these measures on both security and the privacy of citizens. Moreover, to evaluate whether 
there is any threat to society that justifies any security measure in the first place, the proportionality test 
of the European Court of Justice could also be used as a strong legal tool. Furthermore, as Hijmans 
points out: “the absence of a connection between a threat to public security and the retention of data 
was an element in the ruling of the Court in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger leading to the 
annulment of Directive 2006/24 on data retention.”61 
To conclude, the new data protection regime provides a far more comprehensive set of tools to 
enforce the right to data protection and privacy. However, as long as certain modes of reflection are not 
codified and institutionalized concerning the effectiveness of digital security measures, preventative 
digital technologies will remain widely used silver bullets to maximize security62.  
3.1.3. Remedying negative implications on privacy by enforcing data 
protection principles? 
False accusation of migrants as a consequence of identity verification through the INS and PROGIS 
consoles often occurs, as the 79% accuracy rate of these systems indicates. Furthermore, examples of 
false positives in part stemming from the broadness of variables for building risk profiles show that the 
Advanced Passenger Information system can frame migrants ‘as a risk’ of committing identity fraud (La 
Fors-Owczynik, 2016).  
                                                        
58 Boyle, P., Haggerty, K. ‘Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex’ International Political Sociology 
(2009) 3(3) 257 (263) 
59  Ibid. 
60 Van der Hof, S., & Prins, C. ‘Personalisation and its Influence on Identities, Behaviour and Social Values’ In Profiling the 
European citizen Cross-disciplinary perspectives (Springer Science, 2008) 
61 Hijmans, H. The European Union as a Constitutional Guardian of Internet Privacy and Data Protection : the Story of 
Article What the European Union does and should do to make Article 16. (2016) (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, Free 
University of Brussels) 105 
62 Amoore, L., & Hall, A. ‘Border theatre: on the arts of security and resistance’ (2010) 17(3) Cultural Geographies, 299; 
Broeders, D. Breaking down anonymity. Digital surveillance on irregular migrants in Germany and the Netherlands. (PhD 
thesis, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, 2009); Ceyhan, A.  Technologization of Security : Management of Uncertainty and 
Risk in the Age of Biometrics. (2008) 5(2) Surveillance Studies, 102; Salter, M. ‘Governmentalities of an Airport: 
Heterotopia and Confession’ (2007) 1(1) International Political Sociology, 49; Thomas, R. (2005). ‘Biometrics, International 
Migration and Human Rights’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law, 377; Van der Ploeg, I. ‘Security in the 
Danger Zone: Normative Issues of Next Generation Biometrics’ In E. Mordini & D. Tzovaras (Eds.), Second generation 
biometrics: The ethical, legal and social context (Springer, 2010)  
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Forecasting problems of anti-social behaviour towards children on the basis of ‘deviant’ parents 
or friends and on the basis that a child had already been a victim of abuse according to the ProKid system 
raises questions of children’s rights (La Fors-Owczynik, 2015). 
Furthermore, false reporting of child abuse cases by using such risk evaluation systems as the Digital 
Youth Healthcare Registry, the Reference Index High Risk Youth or ProKid are argued to have 
stigmatizing effects on children (Bruning, Van den Brink, de Jong – de Kruijf, Olthof, & Van der Zon, 
2012). Various examples demonstrate that false reporting of child abuse cases can have devastating 
effects. According to certain victims, such reporting can put them into a highly vulnerable position and 
even render them “paranoid” about and “mistrusting” of the youth care institutions and risk registration 
systems to which these institutions are linked63. Yet, the director of a main organ responsible for the 
reporting of child abuse cases in The Netherlands, called Advice and Reporting Centre Child Abuse, 
admitted in an interview that, for instance, 10% of false positive reporting of child abuse cases should 
be regarded as the price we must pay for the 90% of cases when reporting was adequate and necessary64. 
All these instances would need a legal remedy and counseling to compensate those who were victims of 
false accusations by these systems and whose position became vulnerable as a consequence of using 
these systems.   
When it comes to digital data exchange, the right to data protection and the right to privacy are 
two separate fundamental rights, and the implications of technology use on persons’ lives are often not 
covered in their broadest sense within data protection regulations65. As De Hert and Gutwirth argue, this 
springs from the two main reasons behind the underlying rationale of the Directive – one being the 
achievement of an Internal Market, and the other being the enforcement of fundamental rights – so that 
in practice not human rights but rather economic interests prevail66. As they further infer, the 
introduction of the right to data protection can be regarded as remedying this deficiency in general. 
However, when it comes to mitigating the vulnerable position of children and migrants who are exposed 
to digitalized risk monitoring, ECtHR case law enforcing main principles of the data protection 
regulation in its broad human rights-oriented sense can be viewed as more useful in offering more 
specific, practical and also technical legal aid.      
 
Data protection principles as fundamental values 
The immense growth in digitalization within all aspects of citizens’ lives in the past 25 years 
has provided an urge for new data protection prescriptions. An important event within this process, in 
December 2015, the final version of the text of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 67 
was accepted. The Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive68 will replace Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA on policing-related personal data. Until the Directive comes into force, 
Directive 95/46/EC implemented by the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (2001) will remain in force 
in The Netherlands. Yet the new regime provides substantially broader legal protection and remedies 
for citizens against the side-effects of digital identification and risk profiling practices than the earlier 
data protection tools. Therefore, the extent to which the normative potential of the new regulative 
principles is effective in mitigating the vulnerable position of children and migrants is worth assessing.  
                                                        
63 Van der Meer, M. (2013). Ik ben bang van vantrouwend geworden. Oudersonline.nl. Retrieved on 18th December 2015 
from http://www.ouders.nl/artikelen/ik-ben-bang-en-wantrouwend-geworden 
64 See footnote 4. 
65 See footnote 53. 
66 De Hert, P., & Gutwirth, S. Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalism in Action. In 
Gutwirth, S. et. al. (Eds.) Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer Science, Dordrecht 2009) 
67 The latest version of the GDPR was accepted on 15 December 2015 by the European Council and the European Parliament 
(Council of the European Union, 2015) and I use this version in this article. 
68 In this article, I use the version from 2012 of the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive. 
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A crucial, positive effect of the new data protection regime compared to the earlier data 
protection rules is that it has significantly broadened its orientation towards the potential implications 
of the use of digital technology. Beyond expanding upon such essential principles as already enshrined 
by Directive 95/46/EC, such as proportionality, fairness, lawfulness and transparency (Articles 10, 11), 
the new regime introduces additional principles that are anchored in fundamental rights traditions. For 
instance, prescriptions such as those regarding ‘consent and lawful authority’ (Articles 7, 8), 
specification as to the ‘retention period of the data’ (Article 13), ‘right to erasure / right to be forgotten’ 
(Article 17), ‘data protection by design and by default’ (Article 23), ‘data breach notification: when, 
how and to whom?’ (Article 32), and ‘data protection impact assessment’ (Article 33 of GDPR).  
The principles that are reflected upon more thoroughly later in this section will also be assessed 
in light of relevant ECtHR case law. This is important, because since the Charter of the European Union 
on Fundamental Rights and the Lisbon Treaty69 came into force in 2009, ECtHR cases have been 
referenced less frequently by the CJEU. The CJEU became the judicial guardian by which the 
prescriptions of the Charter would be enforced within the EU. Given that the EU as such is not a 
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention does not directly apply to the 
EU. However, the Convention applies to all individual member states as they have individually signed 
up to it. Referring to ECtHR cases is important as the Court often uses a broader definition of private 
life when it comes to the implications of digital technologies. Furthermore, all the case law referred to 
in the following section has the commonality of being based on a broad human rights-oriented 
interpretation of current data protection principles, and specific surveillance practices condemned by the 
ECtHR, including preventative surveillance practices by state authorities as violating a person’s 
fundamental right to privacy as laid down by Article 8 of the ECHR. This case law therefore provides a 
useful basis showing how the right to privacy and data protection rules in general can be strengthened 
through a stance that is oriented towards the implications of technology use on citizens’ rights, including 
the lives of children and migrants.   
The first principle set out by Article 6 (GDPR), which was also enshrined in Directive 95/46/EC, 
is an explicitly purpose-oriented one: the purpose limitation principle. According to this principle, data 
should be processed for one or more specific purposes and used only for those purposes which are 
compatible with the original purpose(s) and a check against this principle also entails determining 
whether the processing of data is legitimate or against the law. The purpose limitation principle does not 
prohibit data processing for other purposes and the use of data within analytics as long as this activity is 
fair. Fairness entails, for instance, that the data processing has proportionate implications on one’s right 
to privacy. The importance of this principle has also been strengthened by ECtHR case law, as the cases 
of Peck v. United Kingdom70 and Perry v. United Kingdom71 also demonstrate. In the case of Peck v. 
United Kingdom, the applicant complained of having suffered infringement of privacy as he was 
recognizable in CCTV footage that had been broadcasted on BBC news and other television programs. 
Whereas the national authorities did not recognize that the disclosure of the given video footage entailed 
a breach of the applicant’s privacy, the ECtHR ruled that the disclosure of video footage violated the 
privacy of the applicants. In the case of Perry v. UK, the applicant complained of having been the victim 
of covert surveillance during a police investigation in which he has been accused of robbery. The 
applicant claimed that this surveillance practice was illegal and infringed his right to privacy as he had 
not previously received information any that such video-taping of him would take place. In both cases 
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the Court found that the purpose of data aggregation and processing was illegitimate, violated the right 
to privacy of the applicants and was not “necessary in a democratic society.” All this underlines further 
the pivotal necessity of the purpose limitation principle. The second principle is the transparency 
principle, Article 5 (GDPR), which is closely linked to the purpose limitation principle as this prescribes 
that the subject shall receive information about the purpose of the data processing, who the data 
controller is and any other information to ensure the processing is fair and lawful. If information is not 
collected for law enforcement purposes, the GDPR specifies that information shall be made more easily 
accessible for citizens. Furthermore, the GDPR specifies that all data processors are obliged to ask 
citizens for their consent and ‘demonstrate’ by providing evidence that they have asked for consent 
(Article 7) before they started to process the subject’s data. The GDPR broadened the form of the 
‘consent’ principle in Directive 95/46/EC, as the Regulation provides greater control for individual 
citizens including a set of specified criteria (e.g. ‘informed,’ ‘freely given’) for consent (Article 7) and 
also through including specifications about consent when it comes to the processing of such sensitive 
personal data as that of children (Article 8).  A legal means to enhance transparency is also guaranteed 
by Article 13 GDPR as it prescribes that the ‘retention period of the data’ shall be clearly stated. Yet, 
the definition of retention period remains ambiguous when it comes, for instance, to Big Data. In the 
current form of the regulation to interpret retention periods pertaining to Big Data could even lead to 
more confusion than transparency. To clarify this is necessary because the prescriptions relating to how 
long data can be retained has essential implications on the quality of data, which is another principle 
closely linked to transparency. 
Enforcing transparency also often remains an issue for the ECtHR. The cases of Roman 
Zakharov v. Russia and Shimovolos v. Russia72 also demonstrate that the practical enforcement of the 
transparency principle and the right to data protection is often under great pressure and the ECtHR can 
provide significant help by its condemnatory judgments in order to assist in the practical enforcement 
of this right. In the case of Zakharov v. Russia, the applicant, who was editor-in chief of an NGO that 
monitors whether the Russian state fosters freedom of expression in the country, complained of having 
been subjected to illegal, permanent mobile phone interception by the Russian Federal Security Service. 
After his case had been dismissed several times at national level, the ECtHR ruled that his right to 
privacy had been violated and the Court condemned in general all non-transparent practices of state 
surveillance. In the Shimovolos v. Russia case the applicant was a human rights activist, and such 
activism is considered extremism by Russian state practices. The applicant complained that the state 
authorities kept a secret record of him in order to prevent him joining social gatherings that were related 
to human rights related protests.   
In both cases the ECtHR stressed that transparency of state surveillance practices shall be upheld 
and the legitimacy of such practices shall not be exhausted by a simple compliance check with domestic 
laws. Such checks are not sufficient to decide whether the human rights prescriptions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights are enforced. A compliance check shall entail whether the rule of law as 
enshrined by the preamble of the Convention is respected. The transparency of data processing is pivotal 
to uphold and the ECtHR enforces this, for instance, also by ruling in favor of fostering citizens’ access 
to information about themselves.73   
A third important principle is the data quality principle. Article 5 of the new GDPR specifies 
that data shall be processed ‘fairly’ and ‘lawfully’ and collected data must be ‘adequate,’ ‘necessary,’ 
                                                        
72 ECtHR Zakharov v. Russia, No.  47143/06,  4 December 2015; Shimovolos v. Russia, No.  30194/09, 21 June 2011.  
73 In the ECtHR case Gaskin v. United Kingdom the Court held that access to records which relate to a person’s family life 
must be secured by state authorities and this was not granted to Gaskin when he requested access to his personal data. In the 
Haralambie v. Romania case the ECtHR ruled that the right of access to information was not properly enforced by the 
Romanian state authorities and this resulted in detrimental implications on the private life of the applicant. ECtHR Gaskin v. 
United Kingdom, No. 10454/83 07 July 1989 ; ECtHR Haramblie v. Romania, No. 21737/03, 27 October 2009. 
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‘accurate,’ ‘kept up to date’ and ‘kept in a from which permits the identification of the data subject no 
longer than is necessary.’ Yet, by their various definitions and the possibilities to interpret them, these 
a priori specifications are ambiguous. Taking a broad human rights-based definition and interpretation 
could assist in solving these ambiguities. Hence, the data quality principle can only be tested when the 
implications of data processing on the subject are assessed in their broadest human rights sense.  
The ‘right to erasure’ or the ‘right to be forgotten’ (Article 17) and ‘data protection by design’ 
and ‘data protection by default’ (Article 23) entail such technical specifications as anonymization, 
pseudonimization and encryption. Therefore, these rights and principles are unprecedented legal 
requirements and guarantees that can assist in the practical enforcement of the right to data protection 
and also the right to privacy. When put into practice, these new rights could provide also clarification 
with respect to the ambiguities around such terms as, for instance, ‘adequate, accurate or up to date’ as 
set out by Article 5. These novel legal requirements put the data quality principle (also known from 
Article 6 of the earlier Directive) in a new dimension, as before its registration data shall comply both 
by design and default with privacy and data protection rules.  
Until the GDPR is in force, and also afterwards, ECtHR cases, such as Khelili v. Switzerland,74 
demonstrate how the data quality principle can be enforced. The judgment in the Khelili v. Switzerland 
case is explicit about how the registration and retention of wrongful information by state authorities can 
have significant detrimental effects on a person’s private life. In Khelili v. Switzerland a French woman 
complained of having been wrongly classified by the Swiss police authorities as a prostitute and that 
this wrong information remained in the Geneva police’s database for five years. Consequently, the 
ECtHR ruled that the wrongful and prolonged retention of such data constituted a violation of her right 
to private life.   
In the ECtHR case M.M. v. United Kingdom75  the applicant disappeared with his baby grandson 
for a day in order to prevent his son moving to Australia after his marriage had broken down. The police, 
after having investigated the case, only registered a caution in the grandfather’s records. Yet, this 
registration remained for a prolonged period of time and resulted in the applicant being denied a job due 
to his criminal record. This case also underlines that the retention of ‘caution’ or risk-related information 
by state authorities can indeed have detrimental effects on a person’s life, which state authorities should 
adequately compensate for.  
The latter two cases are especially useful to demonstrate preventative risk assessment modes by 
state authorities on children, since the registration and retention of wrongful, risk-related information 
and the non-proportionate, extended retention of risk data in police databases about children could also 
significantly hamper their life chances. 
The fourth principle that deserves attention is the data protection impact assessment (Article 33 
GDPR). Given that data protection impact assessments are codified, their implementation will be 
fundamentally different from earlier assessments as the supervisory authority can directly screen the 
results. Yet, the inclusion of this new principle also created controversies around its interpretation and 
practical implementation. Controversies include, for instance, risks stemming from the data processing 
to the rights of a data subject. Van Dijk, Gellert and Rommeveit argue, for instance, that “merging risks 
and rights in the proposed fashion could change their meanings into something hardly predictable”76. 
Such controversies could also have implications on the enforcement of the closely linked rights of 
access, rectification and opposition of the subject, which prescribe that to those subjected to digital 
surveillance shall be granted the right to receive a copy of all data processed about them. In some cases 
the right to object to the processing of their data shall also be granted. The clarification of ambiguities 
                                                        
74 ECtHR Khelili v. Switzerland, No. 16188/07, 18 October 2011. 
75 ECtHR M.M. v. United Kingdom, No. 24029/07, 13 November 2012. 
76 Van Dijk, N., Gellert, R., & Rommetveit, K. ‘A Risk to a Right? Beyond Data Protection Risk Assessments’ (2016) 32(2) 
Computer Law & Security Review, 31 
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around the practical enforcement of Article 33 of GDPR will be a time-consuming process, yet the 
principle in itself is a great addition to enforce the human right to privacy in a broad sense.  
A fifth important principle is the security principle. Article 32 GDPR codifies that data 
controllers shall issue ‘data breach notifications’ including when and how data breaches happened and 
to whom. Given that data breaches shall be communicated within 72 hours and the data protection 
authorities have the power to issue significant fines if companies commit a ‘data breach,’ this also 
codified their direct liability for any personal data collected by them. The data controller shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to prevent accidental loss or destruction of data. 
Furthermore, the processor shall have “sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical security measures 
and organizational measures governing the processing.” Although specific ECtHR case law is quite 
limited on this principle, a recent development by the Dutch government is significant. In May 2015 the 
Dutch government introduced the Bill on Notification of Data Leaks77, a law that gives significantly 
higher authority to the Dutch Data Protection Authority. By obliging data controllers to notify the Data 
Protection Authority of each case of a data leak, the DPA can impose substantial fines on parties guilty 
of personal data leaks. By this new Bill, the Dutch government has established also a strong precursor 
for the new EU data protection regime. 
 
3.1.4. Legality and democracy 
The specific negative implications of risk assessment technologies on children’s lives detailed in section 
2.1., and the drawbacks of identification and risk profiling systems on migrants’ lives detailed in section 
2.2. beyond the assessed relevant data protection principles and ECtHR case law, could also be checked 
against a rule of law test, meaning whether the existing domestic legislation provides sufficient 
safeguards to maintain the ‘rule of law’ in a given (in this case Dutch) democratic society. 
When the human rights and also the new and past data protection framework define legal exceptions 
that allow for infringement on the right to privacy (as laid down by Article 8 of the ECHR) - in its broad 
sense – this is again framed as an opposition to security. In Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of ECHR, conditions 
for arbitrary tampering with the right to privacy, freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 
9), freedom of expression (Article 10) and freedom of assembly and association (Article 11) are, first of 
all covered by the legality principle. This means that any infringement of these rights (Articles 8, 9, 10 
and 11) shall be made “in accordance with the law.”  However, a number of ECtHR cases show how 
state authorities have been condemned because the Court found that domestic legislation provided 
insufficient safeguards to maintain, beyond the right to privacy, also such democratic values as 
legitimacy and legality78. In the Malone v. United Kingdom79 case, the applicant asserted that he has 
been a victim of telephone wire tapping on the authority of a warrant issued by the Secretary of State. 
He further argued that there was no supervision of how such warrants are executed, therefore they should 
be considered illegal. In the ECtHR judgment, the Court held that UK law did not provide sufficient 
safeguards to protect the applicant’s right to privacy. Furthermore, it stated that: “the minimum degree 
of legal protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society is lacking.” 
Certainly such a conclusion requires careful assessment of all legal, societal, technological and other 
                                                        
77 Wijziging van de Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens en enige andere wetten in verband met de invoering van een 
meldplicht bij de doorbreking van maatregelen voor de beveiliging van persoonsgegevens alsmede uitbreiding van de 
bevoegdheid van het College bescherming persoonsgevens, Eerste Kamer (2015) 33662. Retrieved on 16th January 2016 
from https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20150210/gewijzigd_voorstel_van_wet 
78 ECtHR Huvig v. France, No. 11105/84, 24 April 1990; ECtHR Halford v. United Kingdom, No. 20605/92, 25 June 1997, 
ECtHR  Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81, 26 March 1987. 
79 ECtHR Malone v. United Kingdom, No. 8691/79, 2 August 1984. 
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conditions. The fact that the Court can give such a judgment underlines however the potential of the 
ECtHR in enforcing and guaranteeing fundamental rights and democratic values.   
3.2. Interim conclusion: incorporating data protection and human rights 
principles into professional work 
The decision to reflect upon the negative implications of the use of Dutch identity management 
technologies on children and migrants’ lives in light of the current Dutch data protection principles, and 
to also reflect upon these principles via ECtHR case law and the principles of the new EU Data 
Protection regime was taken for a number of reasons. First, given the relative novelty of these 
technologies, and their implications, rendered children and migrants comparatively vulnerable groups. 
The second reason is that many of the consequences of these systems on children’s and migrants’ lives 
are long-term and could be better addressed from a combined data protection and human rights 
perspective. In light of these developments, to evaluate the abovementioned negative implications of the 
DYHR, the RI and ProKid on children’s lives, and of the INS and PROGIS consoles and the API system 
on migrants’ lives, via the relevant prescriptions of the principles of the new EU data protection regime 
is not only timely but it is useful to discuss options offered by more advanced data protection and human 
rights remedies for children and migrants in order to mitigate their vulnerable position as a consequence 
of digitalized risk assessments. Assessing a selection of data protection principles and human rights case 
law has also been useful in order to test the normative state of the current and future EU data protection 
regime. Yet, more importantly, this analysis was meant to help to draw the attention of professionals 
who use preventative digital systems for the assessment of children and migrants to the drawbacks of 
these systems. The analysis also intended to highlight for professionals what data protection principles 
and ECtHR case law can offer in order to mitigate the vulnerable position of children and migrants 
assessed by these systems. Furthermore, this research would like to clearly acknowledge the high 
workload of professionals in the relevant fields, and their genuine interest in conducting their work well 
and avoiding the drawbacks when operating these systems. For professionals, however, employing a 
mindset that is inspired by Article 33 of GDPR, for instance, and carrying out their assessment work 
while bearing in mind the implications of the use of technology on data protection and human rights 
principles is crucial. To remain proportionate, not to discriminate, and perhaps even more importantly 
to reevaluate priorities between privacy and security interests on a case-by-case basis could help prevent 
children and migrants becoming trapped in a digitalized ‘risk identity’ that is imposed upon them and 
retained for a long period of time. Why? Because each time a violation of the right to privacy, autonomy 
or non-discrimination against citizens occurs these fundamental rights, although upheld in the statute 
books, are not enacted in practice as universal rights. Since children and migrants, partly as a 
consequence of the use of preventative identity management systems, are placed in a certain 
‘accountability vacuum’ and would perhaps be in most need of their human rights, privacy, dignity and 
equality being respected, to evaluate whether risk-based monitoring practices comply with principles of 









4. Conclusion  
 
“By far the greatest latitude of choice exists at the very first time a particular instrument, system, 
or technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, 
economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes 
once the initial commitments are made. In that sense technological innovations are similar to 
legislative acts or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that will 
endure...”80) 
The status of democracy in a society is never absolute but continuously changing: democracy after the 
Second World War or in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was quite different than it is today. Yet, despite its 
imperfections, to keep its fundamental principles such as liberty, equality and non-discrimination intact 
in day-to-day practice is perhaps the most important goal to strive for in order to allow democracy 
endure, even in a highly digitalized society.  
This is especially crucial for novel forms of digitalized prevention practices. The possibility of a 
threat within digital prevention mechanisms often becomes a real expectation of a threat. Risk profiling 
criteria in digital systems are regularly based on threats that have happened in the past, and when such 
projections of past experiences prove not to constitute sufficient basis for risk calculations because of 
the emergence of new threats, as a reaction these new threats should also be incorporated into the risk 
calculation as new(ly experienced) possibilities of threats for the future. This often results in the 
introduction of new systems or the improvement of old ones. However, the possibilities of extending 
such a ‘threat-response’ cycle and allowing for the implementation of more and more digital 
technologies in order to perform forms of prevention without proper legal countermeasures seem to be 
almost infinite.   
Therefore, despite the noble purposes behind each of the abovementioned digital systems, the 
detrimental implications of the current use of the six identity management technologies in The 
Netherlands in order to protect children and migrants against a variety of risks can also be regarded as 
experimenting with the day-to-day value of the right to privacy, the right not to be discriminated against, 
but also with the right to liberty and security. Hence, these implications should be taken seriously. 
Article 5 of the ECHR allows for infringing upon the right to liberty of a person ‘subject to lawful arrest’ 
such as ‘arrest of reasonable suspicion of a crime or imprisonment.’ Yet, the current preventative modus 
of digitalized identity monitoring of children and migrants by typifying bodily and behavioural 
characteristics as ‘risk indicators’ in the name of security put the boundaries of ‘reasonableness’ in our 
current society to the test. Terrorist attacks exemplify events which are often unpredictable and 
irrational. The preventative measures introduced to prevent such attacks are mostly based on incidents 
that are incomparable perhaps only except for their devastating implications. Consequently, prevention 
techniques are not based on statistics but on random data, which leads to profiling practices using such 
stretched scales that are geared toward searching for the infamous “unknown unknowns.” The 
orchestrated digital techniques that are used to identify the potential perpetrators better and faster in 
practice gradually cut the boundaries and limit the extensions of diversity under the banner of security 
measures that are considered and believed being ‘acceptable and necessary in a democratic society.’ 
Despite the proven imperfections of risk profiling81 and identity management technologies in 
maintaining security, these systems remain successful in sustaining the impression of security, at least 
until a new event occurs that these systems were supposed to prevent. The worry is that in the long run 
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democratic society might just lose its democracy. This is something Dutch sociologists are also 
concerned with when it comes to the digital risk profiling of children’s behaviour: 
“Education [in The Netherlands] became an individual project, a type of behaviour therapy. But 
is a child actually well educated if he has not become a criminal or, if he has not fallen prey to a 
pimp? […] education, training and youth policy should be about much more than dealing with 
behaviour. It should, for instance, much rather be about how to learn, understand and internalize 
democratic citizenship, humanity and freedom and about what it means to live in a democratic 
society in which you are entitled to your own identity, but where you also have to grant others the 
same right. How do you offer alternatives to the tempting ‘us-and-them’ way of thinking, which 
on the one hand provides a secure sense of belonging, but on the other bears the risk of 
dehumanizing and excluding the other?”82  
Although children and immigrants differ significantly, the first experiences of children in their 
social relationships to others and how they begin to understand and practice democratic values such as 
mutual respect and human dignity can be compared with how immigrants gather their first impressions 
of others in their new home country and how they learn to internalize democratic rights and values.  The 
principle of treating others well because we would also like to be treated well can be regarded in general 
as a crucial precept to live by. However, when it comes to assessing children and migrants against risks, 
being cautious and attentive of potential discriminative effects is essential, because each of those 
practices which result in detrimental implications on children and migrants can have prevailing 
implications. Because children will become grown-ups and migrants will become integrated citizens 
who together form a future society that has to care about bringing up new children and integrating new 
immigrants. Therefore, for youth care, law enforcement and immigration professionals to orchestrate 
and perhaps re-prioritize digitalized prevention techniques with other methods such as education and 
more social cooperation and to balance and compensate the negative legal and societal implications of 
digital identification and risk assessment techniques on these groups in day-to-day practice is crucial 
and something to strive for. This is the case because the fundamental values of democracy, human rights 
and also those values enshrined by the new data protection regime, beyond national and international 
court decisions, are much rather enforced by setting examples in daily practice.  
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Digitizing risks and risking citizen rights: 
Prevention practices and their legal and socio-technical implications on children’s 
and migrants’ lives 
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The digitalized prevention of threats and risks has earned growing prominence within different 
Dutch government policy areas in the past decades. Youth care, law enforcement, immigration 
and border control are policy areas where such technological developments have emerged 
rapidly and extensively. The consequences for citizens’ lives are regularly underestimated. 
Therefore these areas necessitate careful legal and socio-technical analysis.  
The focus of these policy areas are among others children and migrants. Both can be 
considered as vulnerable groups with respect to their social status, legal position and often 
awareness of ‘threats’. Digital technologies have been implemented to prevent or react upon 
such threats, given these systems facilitate generating proactive knowledge on situations and 
circumstances that might become a threat for them. However, risks might also stem from the 
very design and daily use of such systems. For in implementing and using these systems, to 
different degrees both groups can be regarded being at the ‘peripheries of citizenship’ and to 
some extent these groups might even fall prey to unintended exclusions. To conduct research 
about these potential ‘peripheries’ is therefore pivotal, as this can provide useful reflections 
upon the conditions of citizens’ rights within society as a whole. As a conceptual symmetry, I 
analyzed the regulatory framework that applies to the use of personal data of children as well 
as migrants and assessed the implications of preventative identity management systems on their 
lives, especially how they have been digitally framed as being ‘at risk’ or ‘as a risk’. This 
particular symmetry assisted in unpacking the modes in which digital mechanisms of exclusion 
and inclusion regarding these quite vulnerable groups take place. 
In focusing on children, it becomes clear that, on the national level several well-
mediated incidents of child-abuse and anti-social behaviour of youth have been catalysts for the 
introduction of a variety of digital, risk prevention systems. The introduction of these systems 
also coincided with the historical transformation of Dutch youth care in terms of comprehensive 
changes in the legal framework regarding youth care and the redistribution of tasks among 
government and youth care authorities. The following three systems introduced and used within 
this period constituted part of the analysis in this thesis: the Digital Youth Healthcare 
Registry(DYHR) within youth healthcare, the Reference Index High Risk Youth(RI) within 
youth care in general and the preventative system used by the Dutch police: ProKid 12- 
SI(ProKid). Each of these systems are geared toward preventing risks related to violence 
towards children and to varying degrees also toward preventing violence committed by 
children. The DYHR is a system used uniquely by youth healthcare professionals, where 
   
 
professionals can register risk data about children below the age of 19 and can also signal their 
concern within the connected Reference Index High Risk Youth. The Reference Index is a 
certain safety net of alarm bells among professionals in youth care. The prerequisite of 
professionals to inform each other and co-operate regarding a child case is digitally wired 
within the web of RI. In its set up a broad variety of institutions involved with youth are linked 
to each other via risk signal submission to RI. A so-called ‘match’ is triggered if more risks 
have been registered about the same child under the age of 23 by different youth care workers. 
The ProKid system is unique on its own, as by its use the police took up for the first time a 
systematic prevention task by monitoring, signaling and registering risks with respect to 
children under the age of 12 as well as their families and friends.  
In looking at the second group – migrants – it becomes clear that border control and 
immigration, both on the EU level and the national level, as well as combatting illegal entry, 
identity fraud and related crimes committed by migrants have been regarded as high priorities 
during the past decade. The randomness and consequently difficult anticipation of international 
terrorism has paradoxically contributed to an exponential growth in highly sensitive identity 
management technologies in order to filter terrorists from travellers and immigrants Digital 
identity management and risk profiling technologies for screening immigrants and travellers 
have been regarded as ‘ultimate promises’ to fight and prevent such ‘deviances’ as illegal entry, 
identity fraud and related crime or even terrorism. Three technologies used in the Netherlands 
have been analyzed in this thesis. One is the biometric identification and identity verification 
system called INS console used by the Dutch immigration services to identify immigrants. The 
second technology is the PROGIS console used by Dutch authorities within the law 
enforcement chain. Instances of identity fraud among criminals prompted this biometric system, 
which serves to establish trustworthy and verifiable identity for suspects, criminals and also 
deceased victims. Furthermore, this system is intended to provide coherence about the identity 
data of registered persons among authorities within the justice system. The third system is the 
Advanced Passenger Information (API) system, which serves to profile travellers against 
international and national risk profiles that are related to a variety of delinquencies. Personal 
characteristics, travel and baggage information in combination with international delinquency 
data are regularly projected on travellers by this system to filter those who ‘misfit’.  
The methodological set up of the thesis is legal desk research, whereby STS and in 
particular actor network theory is used to assist in drawing empirically-based, informed legal 
conclusions. One of the main perceptions of STS is that technology is not neutral and 
technology and persons mutually shape and implicate each other.  This has been considered 
helpful for this thesis when encroaching on the boundaries of such legal definitions as privacy, 
data protection and related human rights issues. Insights into professional practices have been 
gained by semi-structured interviews with professionals (15 professionals concerning children and 
12 professionals concerning migrants) having been involved either in the design or the use of one 
of these systems in different Dutch cities. When selecting professionals, I kept a diversity ranging 
from professionals who took part in the design of systems to those who were only users. With 
respect to the case study on children, this involved that I interviewed doctors and nurses using the 
Digital Youth Healthcare Registry and who also transmitted risk signals to the Reference Index. As 
to the Reference Index, I interviewed system designers and managers on different levels in 
municipalities who were responsible for the operational management of risk signals and the risk 
   
 
signaling by professionals via the Reference Index. Concerning ProKid SI 12-, I interviewed police 
officers who took part in the technical and policy related design of the system, and also field officers 
who carried out the digital risk profiling of children via ProKid. With respect to the case study on 
migrants, I interviewed immigration, alien police, Royal Marechaussee officers who took part either 
in the design or use of INS console, PROGIS console and the API system. In some cases a designer 
has also participated in operating the system. The experience from the user-perspective often proved 
to be helpful for these stakeholders as in this manner they could suggest practice-based 
improvements. 
This empirically-based approach towards technology and its daily use helped to provide 
more comprehensive legal conclusions about digital risk assessments and identity verifications. 
The legal research has been centered around examining the implications of technology use in 
the light of the normative framework provided by the existing and newly drafted data protection 
rules of the EU as well as in light of fundamental human rights and children’s rights principles.  
In light of the above the main research questions of this thesis are defined as follows:  
What are the implications of the design and use of preventative IDM systems for the legal and 
societal position of citizens within different contexts of citizen-government relations in The 
Netherlands; and what is the potential of the EU data protection as well as the ECHR fundamental 
rights regime to prevent and remedy the potential risks of such system-use for the lives of citizens?  
In answering this question, the second, third and fourth chapters focused on the youth care domain. 
Chapters five and six deal with the relevant issues related to migrants. Chapter seven presents 
lessons that can be learnt from the two case studies by providing an analytical comparison between 
digitalised risk profiling and identification practices of children and migrants.  
As to youth care, chapter two dived into the implications of the DYHR, RI and ProKid 
systems by STS methods. This chapter explored the mechanisms leading up to a risk profile of a 
child within these systems. It concluded that the extensiveness of risk categories, the broadness of 
the ‘social radius’ around a child, can figure in the risk qualification of a child.  In combination with 
the time span within which risk data can remain relevant, children can easily be assigned a high risk 
category. On the other hand, however, to erase such a risk profile and even a wrong risk profile is 
an extremely work-intensive process. All this raises ethical and social concerns about the 
implications of these systems for the position of children within society, which also serves to prompt 
discussion about the ‘acceptability’ of using these systems.   
Chapter three explored the normative potential of the current and proposed data protection 
regime1 in light of the implications of the DYHR, RI and ProKid on children’s lives. In addition to 
an analysis of the data protection regime, the analysis looked at the role the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child could play. The analysis explored how the proposed data protection rules 
will impact present profiling practices of children by requiring more tailor-made risk assessments for 
them. Although the digital applications as such are meant to prevent problems and serve in the ‘best 
interest’ of the child, the empirical examples show that the very use of these systems is what often puts 
this ‘best interest’ into jeopardy in various forms of potentially discriminative profiling. Furthermore, 
although the new data protection rules will provide far better protection for children than the current 
ones, the new regime alone appears not sufficient to prevent or mitigate the sketched risks stemming 
from the use of these systems. Therefore, the chapter concluded that reframing the data protection 
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regime in order to better protect “the best interest of the child” as established by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child is necessary, when it comes to the risk profiling of children. 
Chapter four, investigated current digitalised preventative practices directed at children that 
oddly are carried out by the Dutch police using ProKid. The analysis investigated the implications of 
the day-to-day use of this system on children’s lives according to prescriptions of the United Nations 
CRC. The analysis has shown first, that a variety of ambiguities surround this system. For instance, one 
relates to that by using ProKid the police carries out a new task of prevention directed at children under 
the age of 12. However, the police by law is not allowed to conduct (law enforcement) investigations 
on children under the age of 12. The analysis also shed a light on the policy goals behind the system. 
What appears problematic is that the system is employed for two highly different policy goals: 
preventing ‘crimes against children’ as well as ‘crimes committed by children’. Both are held up as 
equal priorities within the policy discourse ProKid is employed in by the Dutch police. The analysis in 
this chapter shows however, that risk profiling practices in order to meet such diverging goals clash with 
a set of CRC rights and principles, as the profiling by ProKid often frames children as potential 
perpetrators even when they are registered as victims of violence. 
Chapters five and six focused on the implications of the INS, PROGIS console and API 
system on migrants’ lives. Chapter five analysed how immigrants and travellers are increasingly 
framed as posing a risk to the Netherlands. More specifically, by STS methods it is shown how 
prevention modes and their associated risk assessment systems have come to focus on translating 
specific problems around migrants into problems of illegal entry, identity fraud and related crimes. The 
chapter describes that the quest for ‘accurate identity’ and the technologies used to tackle this goal 
transform the problem and create new uncertainties and risks for those subjected to monitoring by these 
systems. For instance, the high sensitivity of biometric readers and the density of inbuilt standards bring 
with them that the verification of fingerprints require extensive work-arounds, because the verification 
of fingerprints on these readers can easily produce false results. The analysis concluded that these 
systems can result in a shift that increasingly produces an image of migrants posing a risk. Clearly this 
raises ethical concerns. 
From chapter six, it becomes clear that beyond the politics of the current humanitarian 
migration crisis, digitalised professional practices of immigration and border control increasingly 
frame migrants being viewed as a risk.  This in particular can decrease the chances, for instance, 
for asylum seekers to become and remain to be seen as being ‘at risk’. The chapter discusses the 
normative implications of such practices on migrants’ lives by assessing these examples against the 
background of relevant prescriptions of the current and the proposed EU data protection regime, as 
well as of fundamental rights and principles of the EU human rights framework. It concluded that 
the capacity of the current data protection regime in protecting migrants from being framed ‘as a risk’ 
or a ‘misfit’ via digital prevention practices is insufficient. Moreover, although the new data protection 
rules provide a much broader set of protective prescriptions, the normative potential of the new rules 
would highly benefit from the European Convention on Human Rights as its prescriptions can provide 
additional legal remedy for migrants from the detrimental implications of digitalised identification and 
risk profiling. 
Chapter seven brings the domains of children and migrants together and sets out to search 
for similarities between risk profiling practices on children and migrants and thus acquire better insights 
in the use and implications of digital tools within policy areas that focus on vulnerable groups in our 
society. The chapter thus aims to determine the extent to which differences emerge in the position of 
individuals involved, among others given that youth care is addressed primarily on the a national policy 
level and immigration on the EU level. The analysis also entailed the pursuit of normative and broader 
societal options that can guide professionals in becoming reflective about the detrimental implications 
   
 
of digital technologies. Furthermore, this pursuit included testing possible differences in the normative 
potential of the data protection and human rights’ framework regarding the vulnerable position of 
children on the one hand and migrants on the other hand. The findings of the chapter show that for youth 
care, law enforcement and immigration, professionals need to orchestrate and perhaps re-prioritise 
digitalised prevention techniques with other methods such as education and social cooperation. 
Secondly, to balance and find adequate legal remedy against the negative effects of digital identification 
and risk assessment techniques on these groups in day-to-day practices remains an essential requirement 
for professionals. 
A key motive behind this is raising better insights and awareness about the possible detrimental 
consequences of using identity management systems by government authorities in order to forecast and 
prevent risks regarding children and migrants. By informing the theoretical analysis with empirical 
examples from youth care it becomes clear that although these systems are meant to serve the best 
interest of the child”, in practice their very use can potentially result in infringing upon this interest. The 
fact that migrants can also suffer the detrimental effects of such technology use relates to flaws in the 
set policy goals. Notably, profiling practices and identity verification practices are geared towards 
achieving the policy goal to render children and migrants ‘more and more transparent’. However, as the 
analysis in this thesis shows, the particular ‘transparency’ gained by these digital practices is not neutral. 
For if only risk related data is deemed interesting for registration about a child or a migrant, the lens 
through which professionals need to look and register issues becomes much more a transforming prism 
as to the identity of the subjected child or migrant.  The conclusions and recommendations in each of 
the chapters in this thesis have issued a plea for a more human rights and children’s rights-minded 
approaches in professional practices. An approach that gives recognition of the applicable regulatory 
framework on data protection as well as human rights is in particular crucial given risk related 
predictions shape the future of citizens already in the present. On the policy level a discussion on how 
potential detrimental effects (such as stigmatization and discrimination) can be addressed by giving 
recognition to the regulatory framework (as early as in the design process of the digital tools) appears 
therefore crucial. In line with this, the analysis in this thesis demonstrated that using IDM systems 
within the context of Dutch youth care and law enforcement and in the context of Dutch border 
control and immigration can render the positions of children and migrants vulnerable. The analysis 
furthermore highlighted that the potential of the new European data protection regime in providing 
protection and remedy for children and migrants compared to the 95/EC/46 Directive is 
significantly stronger which is highly beneficial for these groups. Yet, the thesis also pointed out 
that the challenges posed by the daily use of preventative IDM systems to screen children and 
migrants require the consideration of broader fundamental children’s and human rights 
prescriptions. These prescriptions proved to be indispensable not only in order to prevent and 
remedy unnecessary intrusions into the private lives of the scrutinized citizens, but also to prevent 
and remedy the detrimental, long-term implications of such intrusions on children’s and migrants’ 
lives, such as for instance the stigmatizing effects of false accusations demonstrated. 
